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Introduction
At every level of philosophical enquiry into moral theory, from the 
introductory to the advanced, the question of the objectivity or subjectivity 
of moral judgements resurfaces. Are there moral truths—or only opinions 
and beliefs? If there are such truths, how can we come to know them? Can 
one coherently deny that any moral opinion is better than any other? And 
could one simply turn one’s back on morality and, if so, what would this 
involve?
Metaethics is the study of these and related questions. Unlike the 
practitioners of ‘normative ethics,’ the metaethicist need not take a position 
on what anyone may do, or ought to do or is forbidden to do, or on what 
is morally right or wrong. He or she is interested rather in how moral 
language and moral thought work, no matter what the contents of anyone’s 
set of moral beliefs may be or what their practices amount to.
My aim in this book is to address the central questions of metaethics and 
to give serious answers to them. In writing it, I wanted to present a coherent 
and positive argument for the existence of moral knowledge that would 
be persuasive in the face of the possibility that morality is both a natural 
phenomenon and a human invention. At the same time, I was dissatisfied 
with many textbook presentations of the ‘isms’ of moral theory. It is all 
too easy to lose one’s way in a forest of taxonomy and then to abandon all 
hope and fall back on dogmatism or nihilism. I had in mind a freer sort of 
enquiry and one that would decisively eliminate both of those options. 
It occurred to me that there was a model that might prove useful. Facing 
an array of competing claims and systems, and saddled with a scholastic 
vocabulary that had long supported debate and discussion without 
answering any fundamental questions about the world, a philosopher had 
once responded by adopting, first, a posture of scepticism—indeed of 
hyperbolic doubt. Professing to reject all previous systems, he attempted to 
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2 Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint
derive important results in ontology as well as an understanding of human 
epistemological competence by arguing in a strict linear fashion from his 
‘first-person’ standpoint. Although there is much to dispute as well as to 
admire in his argumentation, Descartes’s strategy is agreed to have paid 
off handsomely. So I resolved to attempt a similar strategy, inventing an 
Enquirer who, in a state of uncertainty and confusion, decides to adopt the 
assumption that nothing is really good or bad, obligatory or prohibited, and 
that there is no such thing as moral understanding or moral knowledge. 
My aim was then to explore this position, which I first extended into a 
radical scepticism about all values ascribed to a group called the Destroyers 
of Illusion, to see where it would lead and whether it would run into 
difficulties. 
In considering this nihilistic position, my Enquirer discovers that the 
Destroyers have gone too far in their claim that we live in a value-free 
universe in which nothing about goodness and worth can be known. The 
Enquirer realises that she is motivated to pursue what’s good for her and 
able to come to some firm conclusions regarding her own self-interest. 
She finds that she can also know, in some cases, what’s good for other 
people whose situations she comes to understand. The Enquirer then 
turns to consider the topic of manners—the ‘norms of civility.’ These are 
social conventions specifying how two or more people in certain situations 
ought to treat one another. The Enquirer perceives that she mostly knows 
about and is mostly motivated to observe these norms, but that, as items 
of knowledge, these conventions have to be learned. Further, acting in a 
mannerly fashion is sometimes inconvenient or contrary to self-interest. 
The reasons for ‘opting out’ of a local system of what’s considered good 
manners, on particular occasions or altogether, are explored. The Enquirer 
finally proceeds to consider morals—which, like manners, concern the 
interactions between two or more people and how they ought to treat one 
another. The similarities and differences between manners and morals are 
explored in terms of how they become items of knowledge, the motives for 
conforming to them, and the possible reasons for ‘opting out’ of morality 
either occasionally or completely. 
In thus reasoning out metaethics from a first-person standpoint, the 
conclusions my Enquirer reaches are that moral claims are different to mere 
expressions of moral feelings and emotional reactions, though they are 
firmly tied to our individual and collective preferences; that there are good 
reasons both for remaining within the morality system and for sometimes 
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rejecting norms accepted by the ambient culture. Further, my Enquirer 
discovers there is a tendency for moral knowledge to increase when no 
obstacles are put in its way, and that there is good sense in the notion that 
moral enquiry is aimed at the discovery of moral truths. There is plenty that 
is contentious in my construction, as there was in the model upon which it 
is loosely based, but I hope the line of reasoning can be defended, as well 
as challenged, by able students. My overall aim is that readers who have 
worked their way through the arguments will decisively set aside the more 
commonplace forms of scepticism and moral nihilism to which they would 
otherwise be inclined. Moral confidence, rather than moral certainty, is the 
epistemological aim. 
In composing my text, I found that most of the major issues and concepts 
of metaethics, ranging from Plato’s worries about the relationship between 
power and truth, Hume’s account of the virtues, and Kant’s universalisation 
thought-experiments to contemporary theorising about plans and motives, 
practical reasons, moral realism, and the Darwinian perspective on human 
social life were raised at one point or another. Rather than seeing these 
treatments as belonging to competing theories, I suggest they individually 
capture different elements of a large and complex picture of moral learning, 
moral communication, and the progress of moral knowledge. Here, data 
sources, ideas, and positions are referenced in the endnotes and in the 
chapter-by-chapter suggestions for further reading. I hope this will make 
my book useful in a second respect. I would encourage readers to follow 
up the references that interest them and to study some of the old and 
new classics of moral theory and metaethics before, during, or after their 
encounter with the present text. 
Though grammarians will wince at each occurrence, I have occasionally 
used ‘they,’ ‘their,’ and ‘them’ for the singular in order to maintain gender 
neutrality. 
Acknowledgements
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Enquiry I
The Enquirer finds that the moral opinions and practices of mankind form a 
confusing jumble in which, while strong convictions reign, it is hard to see why 
any moral claims can claim to be true or to be known by anyone. She decides to 
doubt everything she has assumed hitherto about moral good and moral evil and 
her understanding of them.
Tot homines, quot opiniones—as many opinions as men! as the saying goes. 
Ever since I came to know something of the wider world, I have been 
curious about the variety of beliefs and practices that human beings have 
accepted and engaged in. I have been impressed by their variety but also 
sometimes troubled by their character. 
Many of the things people do from time to time for the sake of others 
strike me as noble and heroic. Firemen rush into burning buildings to 
save the lives of children and animals. Reporters travel to battle zones in 
war-torn countries to inform the world about what is happening there. 
Politicians defy opposition to demand civil rights for disfavoured groups, 
and middle-class people sacrifice luxuries to send their children to school 
or to donate to famine relief. In ordinary life, people go out of their way 
to help friends and even strangers, giving each other rides to the airport, 
assisting with the dishwashing, cheering up the depressed and calming the 
anxious amongst them. 
Yet just as many of the things people sometimes do seem cruel and 
shocking, and this has been noted and lamented by philosophers for 
centuries. For thousands of years, people have enslaved their fellow 
humans to build walls and palaces, to weave textiles, and to farm their 
fields.1 Now they are enslaved to manufacture sportswear and electronic 
equipment. From my readings, I have learned that torture was acceptable 
judicial practice throughout the 17th century, and that only a few hundred 
years ago in Europe, a criminal could be publically hanged, disembowelled, 
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drawn and quartered. I know that cockfights and bullfights have been 
considered amusing by many cultures and that ancient people would cut 
slabs of flesh off their living cattle to eat.2 Massacres and child armies are 
widespread in the contemporary world, as is sex trafficking. The newspaper 
brings constant reports of corrupt police officers and politicians. I have 
read that the ancient Greeks, with their brilliant mathematicians, poets, and 
sculptors, left their unwanted babies on the hillside to die or to be picked 
up and raised by strangers.3 Detailed reports of the abuse of children and 
old people in nurseries, orphanages, and care homes hit the papers on an 
alarmingly regular basis. It seems their caretakers, or some of them anyway, 
think that what they are doing is absolutely fine. 
I suspect that future generations will look back at some of our current 
practices—perhaps the prison system, factory farming, and the treatment 
of workers in the garment industry–with the same disapproval with which 
we look back on the flogging of sailors and draft animals, the slave trade, 
the mutilation of women’s feet, and the guillotine. Many of these practices 
and institutions have been abandoned in parts of the world in which they 
were formerly common. But did people discover that there were human 
rights nobody had known about before? Will people of the future discover 
more rights—perhaps the rights of plants, landscapes, or insects—in 
addition to ‘human rights’ and ‘animal rights’? Could we decide some day 
in the distant future that we were actually mistaken about some human 
rights and come to recognise torture, infanticide, and human sacrifice as 
morally acceptable? 
Meanwhile, there seems to be considerable disagreement about what is 
acceptable practice right now. Whenever I open a newspaper, columnists 
seem to be arguing about moral issues. Can doctors assist people who say 
they want to die, or induce abortion in the second trimester of pregnancy? 
Is there anything wrong with creating animals with human genes, and are 
quotas for disadvantaged groups fair or unfair? On a personal level, there is 
the same controversy and confusion. My vegetarian friends disapprove of 
my carnivorous habits, while I think they are being sanctimonious. We argue 
over whether one-night stands are fun or hurtful, whether smoking and 
heroin addiction are just personal choices or morally irresponsible. Some of 
the moral beliefs I held in the past have changed over the years. I used to be 
indifferent to charity appeals, now I think I should contribute some money. I 
have become more tolerant about some matters, less about others. 
 7Enquiry I
I am aware that I and most other people have visceral responses to the 
behaviour of others. I sometimes feel scorn, disgust, horror, admiration, and 
approval when witnessing or reading or hearing about others’ behaviour. 
Such reactions may be accompanied by confident verbal declarations such 
as ‘That was an utterly heartless thing to do’ or ‘It was absolutely right of her 
to resign under the circumstances’ or ‘He is fundamentally untrustworthy 
and should be shunned.’ Such utterances are considered to express ‘moral 
judgements’; they are ubiquitous in conversation and appear in editorial 
writing. Sometimes they are said to express people’s ‘moral convictions.’ 
But I have to wonder whether people who say and write such things are 
doing more than venting their feelings. Are they actually making claims 
that could be true or false about the actions, events, situations, and persons 
they seem to be commenting on? And, if so, are they ever fully justified in 
making such claims? Indeed, I am led to wonder about moral knowledge—
whether there is any such thing, and if so, what is involved in having more 
or less of it. 
Does anyone actually know that it is ‘morally good’ to risk one’s life to 
save a baby from a burning building and ‘morally wrong’ to leave a baby 
alone and unfed? Or are we just in the habit of applauding the former and 
feeling shocked by the latter? And what about those people in history? Did 
they think they knew that it was right and proper to flog their exhausted 
carthorses, though they were in fact mistaken about this and it was neither 
right nor proper? Is there a set of moral truths or moral facts that is partly 
known by some people but fully understood by no one? If so, how it is 
possible to get to know more of them? And what would be the point of 
acquiring more moral knowledge anyway? Is it so important just to ‘be 
right’? 
I feel strongly that the current treatment of prisoners is morally 
indefensible and that assisted suicide is justifiable if the person asking 
for it is in intractable pain, or facing that prospect, or if no one has ever 
emerged from his or her present condition to go on to live a pleasant life. I 
am reluctant, though, to say that I ‘know’ these things. Perhaps I should say 
that I ‘conjecture’ that the treatment of prisoners is morally indefensible? 
But this seems to imply that there is a fact of the matter and that someday I 
may come to know whether I am right. Really, all I am confident of is that 
I feel strongly about certain things, weakly about others, and I notice that 
others feel the same or differently about them. 
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The variety and changeableness of moral opinions, then, leads me to 
doubt that I really know anything about what is morally right, wrong, 
permissible, forbidden, and obligatory–or indeed what this term ‘moral’ 
really applies to. It also leads me to doubt that anyone else knows better 
than I do. People argue about these subjects, but I find myself sceptical about 
whether we can get to the moral truth by discussing and debating. In the 
arguments I have with people about moral subjects, we seem to be giving 
reasons that explain our feelings about things. Sometimes these feelings 
change as a result of what was said in the discussion, but discussing and 
arguing don’t seem to me much like proving or demonstrating as they are 
done in mathematics or like amassing evidence from historical records or 
like performing and interpreting scientific experiments. 
I can appreciate at the same time that the fact that other people believe 
things that I do not and do not believe things that I do, or that they have 
different feelings and dispositions from mine, does not imply that everyone 
is at sea when it comes to moral matters and that no one’s convictions are 
better than anyone else’s. The fact that people believe different things 
and are not always persuaded by moral arguments might be no more 
surprising than the fact that few people can follow mathematical proofs 
beyond some elementary level or understand a scientific paper or medical 
article establishing some important conclusion. There may be actual proofs 
of moral claims in the theoretical literature that have not filtered down to 
me. 
Moreover, despite my sense that moral arguments don’t really establish 
the truth or falsity of moral judgements in a knock-down way, some 
judgements strike me as better supported by arguments and considerations, 
whereas others seem to express mere prejudices or superstitions, akin to 
other non-moral prejudices and superstitions. On matters of health—what 
is good for the body—I know that many people are misinformed, believing 
for example that eggs and butter are dangerous to them, that getting their 
feet wet can bring on a cold, and that everyone needs to drink two litres of 
water a day. I know these beliefs to be poorly supported by the evidence. 
Many people are misinformed as well about such matters as climate change 
or the effects of punishment. For example, many people doubtless believe 
that the threat of capital punishment deters would-be murderers, although 
evidence for this claim is lacking. Perhaps some changes in moral opinion, 
in individuals, or in entire societies are definitely changes for the better, 
replacing moral error with moral knowledge.
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Yet the observation that people can be misinformed about health 
matters, the planet, or how society works gives me a second reason, besides 
the sheer variety of opinions held by intelligent people past and present, 
for being uncertain as to whether there can be moral knowledge. Where 
convictions about nutrition or the efficacy of punishment are concerned, 
there are methods of getting to the truth. Experiment, observation, and 
analysis of the data can eventually determine what is the case. Either eggs 
are conducive to heart attacks, given the existence of certain preconditions, 
or they are not; either global warming is principally man-made or it is not, 
and we will eventually know which, or at least some particular opinions 
on these matters will come to seem outlandish. I do not see, however, how 
we could make experiments or observations to establish whether capital 
punishment was right or wrong. Moral convictions do not seem to be 
causal beliefs about what happens if, or whenever, something else is done 
or occurs, or about the powers of certain substances like eggs, butter, and 
pomegranate juice. If I believe that capital punishment is wrong, I don’t 
think that its ‘wrongness’ can be detected by meters or test-sticks or by the 
effects of the wrongness on the human organism.
But perhaps I am being overhasty in supposing that experiment and 
observation, combined with analysis, cannot enable us to decide who is 
right in any moral dispute and that experiment and observation will never 
be able to do so. After all, it took physics and chemistry thousands of years 
to get off the ground. Perhaps we have slowly been developing methods for 
distinguishing moral truth from error, or perhaps we are just on the verge 
of developing them. Alternatively, perhaps no complex methodology 
is needed. There may be people who are gifted with a particular kind of 
moral sensitivity and insight that enables them directly to perceive the 
moral qualities of actions, such as their acceptability or their wrongness, 
in the same way that I directly perceive the blue colour of the sky. Then all 
we would need was a method for discovering who these oracular beings 
amongst us were. However, I see no way of identifying these experts, 
especially since those who make a profession out of speaking and writing 
about morality tend to disagree with one another. 
At this point, a third reason for doubting that I have any moral 
knowledge, besides the variety of opinions and the absence of any agreed 
upon experimental method for deciding between them, occurs to me. 
I can imagine various ways in which my individual existence within 
human society could have come about. A supernatural Being, the Creator 
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of Heaven and Earth, may have fashioned me or my first ancestors in Its 
image and equipped me with the limbs, organs, and physiology that would 
enable me to survive at least for a time and to perpetuate my kind. Perhaps 
this Being has also equipped me with a mind that was stocked with or 
able to acquire various beliefs about better and worse situations and so to 
look to its own self-interest. It is possible that this Being has laid down and 
revealed moral commandments that correspond to Its preferences about 
how I ought to behave and that my intuitions about moral right and wrong 
have also been instilled in me by this supernatural Creator. 
However, this supposition about the origins of my moral feelings and 
impulses raises many questions. Why should a supernatural Being have 
both the power and the desire to do exactly this? Why create a vast universe 
of billions of solar systems and then, on one tiny planet, create human 
beings to judge, reward, and punish them? Perhaps filling the universe 
with living creatures expresses this Being’s love of creative activity and 
Its desire for variety, while Its creation of only one Earth and only one 
set of humans expresses a special focus and interest? But if so, it must be 
admitted that Its tastes are peculiar. Why do all creatures have finite life 
spans and why is death either preceded by old age and decrepitude or 
expedited by painful illness and disastrous accidents? A Being powerful 
enough to create this vast variety of species is surely capable of making life 
healthy and of infinite duration. Perhaps the love of variety requires death, 
so as to make room for more different species and it amuses the Being to 
outfit each species with beliefs and desires conducive to its preservation 
only until it can be replaced with the next generation. Or perhaps this Being 
knows that every creature will sooner or later tire of experience and wish 
for death as for a long sleep? Another hypothesis4 that would better explain 
this situation is that there are many supernatural beings, each creating, in 
different parts of the universe, what they can. The Creator of our world is 
amusing Itself as children do when playing with their dolls, sometimes 
tenderly and sometimes cruelly. 
These hypotheses are possible, but I do not judge their probability to be 
high. For the great age of the earth, the evidence of multiple extinctions, 
and the similarity of humans and apes lead me to doubt that human beings 
were created from nothing and for some purpose fully understood only by 
a supernatural Being. I prefer to search for other explanations of how my 
species came into the world, explanations which can perhaps shed some 
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light on how I know a few things about what I ought and ought not to do 
and what is good for me, and also on why I have the moral feelings and 
make the moral judgements that I do. 
Here is another possibility. In the beginning, there were only particles 
and forces, or some unknown substrate of both that produced them. Some 
of the particles combined into atomic and molecular clumps under the 
influence of the laws of physics and chemistry. As crystals, though non-
living, possess the power to draw materials out of solution that replicate 
their structure, I can imagine that such clumps and strings grew and that 
pieces broke off and grew into new clumps and strings. Some of these would 
have had slightly different shapes and physical and chemical properties to 
others, rendering them better able to grow and split off and so perpetuate 
their type. While many of these simple entities would have fallen apart 
or failed to grow or to split, each small difference that conferred stability 
and the ability to copy itself would have been found in greater numbers. 
By such a process I can imagine that, from crystals, simple forms of ‘life’ 
should have arisen—forms that took in nourishment, grew, reproduced 
themselves and, inevitably, worn down by the wear and tear on their 
bodies, ceased to function. 
As time went on, these entities could have developed various tropisms—
some moved towards the light, others moved away from it for safety. And 
eventually, over the more than four billion years we know the earth to have 
existed,5 more complicated living things appeared which had appetites—
they felt a sort of pleasure when satiated and an anxious, unpleasant 
sensation otherwise that motivated them to hunt or forage for food, or 
to graze, when their bodies needed nourishment. Those that did not feel 
uncomfortable and did not seek shelter when it was very cold or very hot 
perished. Those with certain desires and appetites for union with others 
reproduced their kind. In this way, I can imagine that nature has fashioned 
certain of my basic beliefs about what is good for me, and instilled in me 
certain desires and patterns of behaviour, without culture and education 
coming into it. I share certain dispositions with other mammals—such as 
the tendency to retreat from a very hot fire, to seek food when hungry, and 
to care for my young. No one needs to teach me that the blazing sun or the 
bitter cold and wind are uncomfortable—though as a child I was always 
being reminded to put on a coat—and that I should seek the shade or the 
warmth of a fire. No one needs to teach me that I need food, water, and 
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rest. Indeed I must be cajoled and persuaded by others to brave the sun and 
wind when something makes this necessary, or to endure hunger, thirst, 
and tiredness for the purposes of culture.
Perhaps my basic moral feelings in response to occurrences I am involved 
in or observe are, like my other basic emotions, wired into me by nature. 
My primate ancestors have been found to punish antisocial behaviour in 
their fellows, and to react with gratitude and indignation to others who 
treat them in particular ways. These reactions are not true or false, they just 
are what they are and mine may be no different in that respect. Of course, I 
have received a more extensive education than apes and monkeys, thanks 
to the existence of language and cultural experimentation and learning 
taking place over more than ten thousand generations. But then perhaps 
my moral convictions and my tastes and preferences are only the results of 
my education as a person growing up in a Western European environment. 
I have had something of a scientific and mathematical education. I have 
read certain novels and have been exposed to the opinions of parents, 
teachers and newspapers. I have been indoctrinated since childhood with 
other people’s views about right and wrong, as well as their views about 
how the world works. I was punished for actions my elders frowned upon, 
and I was commended for behaviour of which my elders approved. The 
books I read and that were read to me planted in me the idea that children 
who behaved in certain ways were naughty and deserved punishment. 
Later, I heard sermons and read newspaper editorials and encountered 
moral philosophers who praised certain traits as good and noble. If I 
had had a different upbringing in some other part of the world, most of 
the contents of my mind, including my beliefs, convictions, tastes, and 
preferences, would be altogether different. Even my visceral reactions and 
my dispositions to act would undoubtedly be different. All I really seem 
to know is that other people in my culture are anxious for me to behave in 
certain ways and willing to back this up with praise or punishment. 
Perhaps, then, the contents of my own mind and my reactions and 
dispositions are the products of my particular culture, as everyone else’s are 
of theirs. Perhaps we simply go about in the world with different cultural 
and personal standards that overlap to some degree with other people’s, but 
that are as different as the various national cuisines and formal dress styles. 
Perhaps we can articulate certain rationales for our standards, rationales 
that sound plausible to others in our culture or even subculture, but not 
necessarily to those outside it. The ‘explanation’ for why it is right to hang, 
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disembowel, draw and quarter enemies of the regime convinced or would 
have convinced, had it been presented to them, my17th-century English 
ancestors, but it does not convince us, any more than the ‘explanation’ for 
why foot-binding as the correct practice for young girls convinces us. 
However, the recognition that my beliefs, feelings, and attitudes have 
been formed by my parents, teachers, and reading materials still does not 
quite persuade me that there is no such thing as moral knowledge. 
When I was young, and when the grown-ups of my culture told me 
what was the case in the world, or what was the right way to do something, 
or that I ought to do something, they were often—though not always—
right. For example, they impressed on me that I had better get 81 when I 
multiplied 9 by 9; that when beating egg whites, I ought to stop when the 
peaks were stiff; and that I ought to understand the material if I wanted 
to pass a difficult test. They imparted knowledge—useful knowledge—
to me in this fashion. Perhaps through long experience and practice, my 
elders were also able to accumulate moral knowledge, which they have 
passed on, along with some moral errors. So I do not see that the fact that I 
have acquired my beliefs through instruction by my elders and by reading 
their books implies that no one knows anything about morality. Their 
experience has given them knowledge of mathematics, cookery, etc. So 
why not morality too? While their understanding of these subjects may be 
fallible or incomplete, it seems absurd to maintain that no one knows how 
one ought to do a long division problem or put together and bake a soufflé, 
or how to operate a blowtorch safely. And if many of these how-to-do-its 
are known to experienced people, why should all other instructions about 
how to behave, the ‘oughts’ and ‘must nevers’ of morality, be unknown to 
everyone?
A fourth and final reason for scepticism now occurs to me. Perhaps, 
despite having acquired such moral knowledge from books and teachers, 
no one ever acts out of motives other than self-interest. If I help old ladies 
across the street, it is because I derive pleasure from doing so, or because I 
am pained by seeing them stumble. If I give money to charity organisations, 
it’s because it relieves my unpleasant guilt about starving children. If tell 
the truth it’s because I am a poor liar and fear the consequences of being 
found out in a lie. If I had the Ring of Gyges that, according to Plato, made 
its wearer invisible, I might be tempted to get up to all sorts of thieving 
behaviour that I now regard as too risky. If all my actions are performed 
out of self-interest, of what conceivable use would it be for me to ‘know’ 
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that action A was morally wrong, or that person P was immoral? For if 
it was in my self-interest to do A or to associate with P, I would do it, 
regardless of whether it was ‘moral’ or not, and if it was not in my self-
interest, I would desist from A and shun P. Knowing their moral properties 
would not influence my behaviour one jot. Perhaps there is a whole raft 
of moral truths, including some that various people know, but they make 
no difference to anything because no one is actually motivated to act by 
knowing them. 
This strikes me as a very strong and compelling argument for doubt—
not just about the truth of any moral claims, but about the very practices 
of moral discussion and debate that surround me. Perhaps I should 
simply ignore them and carry on living, seeking my own advantage and 
moderating my behaviour just enough to avoid retaliation from others in 
case seeking my own advantage proves disadvantageous to them. 
Yet however tempting this position seems, something in me rebels 
against it. When someone deceives me, or deliberately sets out to harm my 
reputation, I feel anger and resentment, and sometimes a desire for revenge 
which seems to be justified by the fact that the other party ought not to have 
hurt me in the way they did. I am sure the offender felt they were getting 
something out of it, even if it was just sadistic pleasure rather than some 
material or competitive advantage. Harming me was in their self-interest—
but it was not right! Conversely, it occurs to me that I could be angry and 
resentful about someone’s behaviour when they had done nothing wrong, 
and that my punishing them in that case would be wrong on my part. So 
even if I often or even mostly act out of self-interest, deriving pleasure from 
actions deemed ‘morally good,’ and avoiding actions deemed ‘morally 
bad’ out of fear of punishment, it still seems possible that a reason or a 
motive for doing something could possibly be that it is the morally right 
thing to do. 
As a result of these reflections, I can see no way of deciding whether 
my moral convictions and opinions bear any relationship to ‘knowledge.’ 
Some considerations speak for the possibility of moral knowledge, 
others against it. I think that to make any headway in this subject, to 
discover whether anything can be known about morality, I shall have 
to cast aside decisively all the moral beliefs that I have ever held and 
begin my reasonings from scratch. This is the only way I can now see to 
try to gain clarity about these confusing issues and to establish whether 
moral knowledge is possible, whether it would be worth having or make 
a difference, and if so why and how. 
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Putting aside all my moral beliefs and beliefs about morality will not 
be easy. I shall need to dispense with my most firmly held convictions 
about torture and slavery, as well as with my beliefs about how friends 
ought to behave towards one another. But I shall also need to cast aside all 
my suspicions about how morality is related to self-interest and adopt an 
agnostic stance on that question. I shall have to suppose as well that I do 
not have a clear idea of what morality is—what makes something a moral 
issue, rather than a question of etiquette or a question of practicality. 
To clear the ground, I shall even doubt that what I am inclined to call 
‘moral convictions’ or ‘moral opinions’ or ‘moral judgements’ actually 
are or express beliefs—beliefs like the conviction or judgement that it is 
raining, or the opinion that the sun will rise tomorrow. I shall suppose 
only that I experience certain feelings—including hope, fear, disgust, 
admiration, contempt, worry, foreboding, and joy—when I observe or 
contemplate actions, events, situations, and persons, and that these feelings 
sometimes prompt me to utter sentences of the type usually regarded as 
moral judgements. 
That I have these feelings as I move around in the world is undeniable. 
I contemplate with a mixture of pleasure and foreboding the long drive 
I am about to undertake; with admiration, the graceful movements of 
skaters on the canal; with disgust, the mess at the bottom of my rubbish 
bin. I feel uplifted when I see the first leaves unfurling on the trees in the 
spring. I also feel shock and horror when I read about a particularly lurid 
murder and resentment when one of my superiors denies what I feel to 
be a perfectly reasonable request. But I shall have to persuade myself that 
although I see actions, situations, events, and persons—the usual targets of 
moral evaluation—as having evaluative qualities, as being ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
in all kind of respects, and although I sometimes feel quite emotional about 
what goes on in the world, nothing that happens or that anyone does is 
really morally good or bad. 
I shall suppose that all moral judgements reflect illusions of a certain 
sort, that none of the targets of evaluation really possess the qualities of the 
contemptible or admirable, right or wrong, permissible or impermissible 
or obligatory, that no actions are virtuous or vicious. I shall suppose that 
the moral valuing and disvaluing of particular targets that I experience are 
only subjective and personal reactions to the world, and that none of the 
moral beliefs and convictions in my mind reflects reality. 
This total suspension of belief in moral knowledge is going to be difficult. 
How can I doubt that I hold beliefs about what is morally prohibited, that 
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these beliefs represent something in the world, and that at least some of 
them are true? I find it hard to doubt that if I were to create a spectacle by 
dousing my kitten with gasoline and setting her alight, this would simply 
be wrong, and wrong regardless of what I or anyone else thinks or feels 
about it. It will be difficult for me to get into a properly sceptical frame 
of mind, ignoring what my emotions seem to tell me, and difficult to set 
aside all my deepest moral convictions about warfare, sexual and economic 
exploitation, and political corruption. But I can see no other way forward 
unless I can manage to clear the ground of all my confusions and find a 
proper starting point for enquiry. 
Enquiry II
The Enquirer decides to doubt whether any actions, situations, events, and 
persons can be really good or bad, right or wrong, morally permissible or morally 
impermissible.
I seem to belong to a highly judgemental species, and it is hard to refrain 
from judging and evaluating, praising and blaming. All around me, people 
are rating, reviewing, giving stars, thumbs up and down to films, hotels, 
household appliances, and life events. They write restaurant reviews that 
say ‘The fish was underdone and the staff were rude,’ as though the fish 
and the staff actually had those qualities, and they expect others to make 
use of the ‘information.’ They gossip about one another’s personal lives 
and decisions, admiring and disapproving of their friends’ actions. Human 
beings slap fines on one another and cart others of their species off to jail. 
They also award them medals, badges, and diplomas for achievements 
deemed meritorious. I find myself constantly judging my food and drink 
for its tastiness and value for money. I cannot seem to help judging some 
kinds of people for what I take to be their moral qualities, as well as for their 
nonmoral qualities of being politically savvy or hilarious, or displaying 
athletic prowess or artistic ability. 
To help me to determine whether there are any moral truths that I can 
come to know, I will try to adopt an objective, strictly value-free perspective 
on the world. I will suppose not only that nothing is morally right or 
morally wrong, but also that nothing is really beautiful or ugly, good or 
bad, worth pursuing or pointless. Further, I will suppose that when the 
world changes, or anything changes in the world, it is never better or worse 
than it was before. 
Everything is what it is on my new assumption. The spotted toadstool 
and the warty toad are no uglier than the peacock or the racehorse; the 
worm is not inferior to the human species that has its Mozarts, Newtons, 
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and Lauren Bacalls. All cultural forms—laws, governments, styles of dress, 
conventions—are neither good nor bad; they too are as they are. They arise 
and perish as conditions change. Events that I used to consider as terrible 
disasters and moral horrors, such as the Holocaust or Napoleon’s assault 
on Russia, are no worse or more unfortunate on my new supposition than 
ample harvests and peace treaties. Disease and death are no worse than 
health and recovery. There is nothing to celebrate or regret. It is simply a fact 
that things happen. I have my preferences, to be sure. I admire and deplore, 
I rejoice in certain events that I perceive as having personal importance, 
and I regard with deep dismay certain political events. I understand words 
like ‘atrocity,’ ‘tragedy,’ and ‘benefit.’ But when people rejoice over the 
birth of a child or some prize that comes their way, I shall not suppose that 
there is anything intrinsically good in this event, only that it is the sort of 
event that induces ‘happy’ words and gestures in people who are related to 
the event in a particular way. 
It is difficult for me to keep this neutral picture in mind. It is hard for me 
not to consider the feathers of the peacock more beautiful than the warts on 
the toad, to refuse to admit that some people are genuinely annoying, and 
to deny that the maggots in the rubbish bin are really disgusting. I cannot 
help but judge some houses and flats nicer and better located than others. 
My habits of evaluation keep overwhelming me even while I try to keep 
them at bay. This knife is terrible! I think; it mashes the tomato I am trying 
to slice. This soup is delicious; the hint of basil makes it so. I have stipulated 
that evaluative properties and relations of better-and-worse do not exist, 
but I have difficulty believing the world to be value-free insofar as I do not 
experience it as such.6
I might however conceive the world as free of values by considering the 
following. All that really exists are the unperceivable atoms or subatomic 
particles and the forces described by physics that are the building blocks 
of the physical world, including everything from stars and planets to 
human beings and their brains. The world of animals, people, features 
of the landscape, and manufactured objects is simply an appearance 
conditioned by my brain. The ‘scientific image’ of a value-free world seems 
to lie ‘behind’ the image of nature carried about with me in my mind. At 
the subatomic level, science tries to account for matter, force, gravity, and 
also time and space. At the atomic level, it explains chemical reactions. At 
the level of physics and physiology, science tries to explain how molecules 
and physical and chemical processes generate all the various worlds of 
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experience in all conscious creatures, including birds and mammals and 
perhaps fish and insects too. The sciences give me a representation of 
the world that is unaffected by people’s neurological idiosyncrasies and 
cultural upbringing. A physicist can be colour-blind and tone deaf and still 
make discoveries. Physicists in Japan share a common scientific image of 
the fundamental particles and forces with physicists in Nigeria.
I am confident that there is no good or evil amongst the particles and 
forces that are the basis of everything that exists. Nothing they do is ‘better’ 
or ‘worse’ than anything else. So values are not to be found in the world as 
physics—or physics and chemistry—describes it. The same is true, I think, 
of the world as the biologist describes it. He or she may note that a certain 
gene confers resistance to a certain virus, while another gene predisposes 
one to malaria. It is ‘good for’ organisms to be resistant to viruses and ‘bad 
for’ them to catch malaria, but it is hard to see the world as better or worse 
off with one less or one more sick animal, except insofar as we care about the 
flourishing of the animal more than the flourishing of viruses and bacteria. 
I feel sorry for the young antelope caught in the jaws of the crocodile, but 
to the scientist this is just another event of the sort that sometimes happens: 
a crocodile is nourished, there is one young antelope less in the world, but 
this is neither fortunate nor unfortunate in itself. The growth of a cancer is 
a misfortune from the human point of view, but considered abstractly, it is 
just a physiological process that is what it is. 
Now, however, it occurs to me to wonder why I should accept accounts 
of the world given by physics, chemistry, and biology as true, as constituting 
knowledge—indeed as being paradigmatic of what knowledge is.
I accept this image, I think, in part because I value the understanding, 
power, and enjoyment that it gives me. I perceive its body of descriptions 
as having an especially valuable property—the value of being useful. I see 
it as better than the common-sense account of the world, insofar as science 
permits us to predict what is going to happen, to advance our interests in 
light of our expectations, and to exercise control over nature and direct 
nature to ends we consider (mistakenly or not) to be good. At the same 
time, I may fear science—or fear its effects. The technological mastery of 
nature is not without terrible by-products: weapons, including weapons of 
mass destruction, pollution, and perhaps certain unpleasant psychological 
effects that arise from living in an advanced technological age. I also admire 
science as an institution, an institution with a track record, not only of 
technological products, but of self-refinement. As an enterprise, science is 
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not only a way of learning about nature, but a way of learning how to learn 
about nature—through the development of instruments and methods, 
including experimental protocols and mathematical and statistical 
techniques. It can uproot and supplant harmful and idle superstition. 
So the acceptance of the value-free scientific image of the world itself 
reflects a number of my values and my attitudes of approval and disapproval. 
This leads me to wonder whether the vocabulary of physics, chemistry, 
and biology is the only one in which we can express our knowledge of the 
facts. Surely there are ‘unscientific facts’—matters of common sense and 
statements that are just as true as the statements of science. For example, I 
think I know that stoplights are red and that bread is nourishing to humans, 
though stoplights and bread do not belong to the ontology of physics and 
chemistry. And now the following idea occurs to me. Perhaps there are 
many types or levels of ‘real things’ described by various ontologies, or 
theories of what exists. One kind of reality is possessed by the subatomic 
particles that we will never be able to see or describe in sensory terms. 
Some of these entities do not even interact with us in a causal way—their 
existence is postulated on the basis of very good evidence. Our best science 
tells us they must exist and be the foundations of everything. In the middle 
of the range are the perceptible, stable, middle-sized objects we see, name, 
and interact with, such as animals, people, plants, stones, and bones. These 
do not exist for all possible sorts of perceivers—not for worms and fish—
though they may exist for birds and apes. In any case, all humans recognise 
these as real entities. Socks and clocks are perhaps not quite as real; not 
all cultures can identify them, name them, or see ‘what they are.’ Socks 
and clocks are more dependent on, more relative to cultural practices, than 
are stones and bones, and far more dependent on and relative to cultural 
practices than subatomic particles and fundamental forces. 
Even further away from the ‘ultimate reality’ of the subatomic level 
are the imperceptible things wholly dependent on human interests and 
practices,7 such as ‘the prevailing rate of interest,’ which do exist, and 
postulated ‘things’ whose existence may be in doubt—such as the ‘business 
cycle.’ Belief in these ‘social constructions’ is surely causally potent—
people make decisions and act on the basis of what they believe about the 
business cycle. But they also acted on the basis of their beliefs about witches 
in previous centuries. There is no causal potency ascribable to witches as 
opposed to belief in witches, and perhaps none to the business cycle either. 
Another kind of reality is possessed by fleeting and intangible, but still 
intersubjectively perceptible things such as rainbows and reflections in still 
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ponds. And yet another is possessed by entities that are fleeting, intangible, 
and private, such as dreams, fantasies, and afterimages. They really happen 
and may even possess causal powers—an afterimage might delight me, a 
dream might obsess me. Then there are fictional characters. Emma Bovary 
and Othello are really characters in a book and a play, though they do not 
exist in the same way that my next-door neighbours do. Thinking about 
them, or observing actors representing them, can have powerful effects—
they may move me emotionally, or inspire me, or appal me. 
I am willing to say not only that snow and plums exist, but also that I 
can know that snow is white and plums are purple, and that this is common 
knowledge. Agreement about such matters arises, I think, from a basic 
similarity in all human beings, perhaps because we all trace our ancestry 
back to a very small number of founders. Thus our sensory systems, our 
fears and our biological needs, are sufficiently alike for us to agree in 
many of our judgements. The exchanges between cultures of knowledge, 
technology, and material goods lead not to homogeneity, but to wide 
consensus and adoption of objects and practices. Socks and clocks, along 
with ‘the prevailing rate of interest,’ get to be known about and used by 
more and more people as time goes on. 
The observation that the entities I take to be commonsensically ‘real’ 
vary from culture to culture and that the claims about them that I take to 
be commonsensically ‘true’ are those on which there is wide consensus 
in our culture gives me another opening into radical doubt about values. 
For precisely where there is insufficient similarity in people to support 
consensus on everyday judgements, I am apt to become doubtful whether 
the objects referred to really possess the properties I and others sometimes 
ascribe to them. For example, I hesitate to say that broccoli tastes good 
without adding the qualification ‘to me.’ The good taste of broccoli does 
not seem to reside in it in the same way as the whiteness of snow, which 
all normal perceivers agree it possesses. The wrongness of torture does not 
seem to reside in it in the same way as its painfulness, which all normal 
observers agree it possesses. 
But what if every human being’s experience when they ate broccoli was 
pleasurable, if there were as much agreement about broccoli’s taste as there 
is about the colours of ripe tomatoes and snow? Would it be right to say 
that I and other human beings know that broccoli tastes good? If someone 
was born who, unlike everybody else in their world, did not like broccoli, 
would it not be reasonable to describe this person as ‘taste blind’ for the 
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good taste of broccoli, on analogy with colour-blindness. If broccoli were 
the main nutritional staple in the human diet, I think we might have to 
describe the mutant as ‘taste-blind’ and as deficient in that regard. Indeed, 
we seem to think of young children that they ought to be taught to like 
things they don’t spontaneously like—including broccoli. This suggests 
that there really is some kind of value inherent in broccoli. 
Yet I resist saying that everyone else in the imaginary society, apart from 
the mutant, knows that broccoli tastes good in exactly the same way that 
most people in our society know that ripe tomatoes are red. I think that 
this is because in my own world, I am aware of widespread disagreement 
about the good taste of broccoli. A substantial number of people do not 
like broccoli. I don’t judge them to be ‘taste blind’ because liking broccoli 
is not a very important asset for getting along in our society. Only in 
certain subcultures do we try to get our children to like it—elsewhere it 
does not matter whether they like it or not. Really, I am inclined to think, 
broccoli isn’t delicious or not delicious—some like it, some don’t. And I am 
beginning to suspect that moral qualities are matters of taste as well. 
When I first began to assemble reasons for doubting that I could have 
any moral knowledge, I considered the possibility that my basic beliefs and 
reactions were wired into me by evolution or society. This suggested to 
me that they could not be true—they were just the beliefs and reactions I 
happened to have. Let me now venture a hypothesis about why I might 
experience the world as loaded with evaluative properties and relations 
when it is not. The hypothesis is that my habits of evaluation, and so all 
my evaluative beliefs, and all the evaluative properties and relations I seem 
to perceive in natural and artificial things and in people and situations 
arise in me as a result of my personal Neurological Constitution and my 
society’s Cultural Transmission. These two forces, I suppose, cause me to 
form beliefs about right and wrong and to ascribe evaluative properties 
to various objects of moral appraisal that they do not have. They induce 
me to believe, for example, that the world became morally better when 
women earned the right to vote in some countries, and that genocide is 
morally abhorrent. Both my own Neurological Constitution and my 
society’s Cultural Transmission are able to induce in me illusions of moral 
properties and relations and the misapprehension that moral entities like 
‘vice’ and ‘justice’ actually exist and can be described. 
Why should I accept the hypothesis that my Neurological Constitution 
and my society’s Cultural Transmission deceive me in this fashion? 
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I reflect first that how an animal (and I have no doubt that I am a member 
of a particular animal species) perceives the world depends on its sensory 
system. Evolution has given me a brain of a certain sort, hardwired in 
certain ways typical of my species, though it is also responsive to teaching 
and able to learn from experience and observation. My experiences arise 
from the interaction between light waves and my visual system, between 
sound waves and my auditory system, between chemicals and my olfactory 
system and taste buds, and from interactions between my skin and limbs 
and the forces responsible for the solidity of conglomerates of atoms and 
that move things around. Things that are colourless in themselves—waves 
or particles of light, atoms, molecules arranged in certain patterns—
somehow interact so that some conscious creatures including myself see 
the world as composed of coloured objects. Different species of animals 
have different optical systems that make different colours or no colours 
appear to them—pigeons, for example, and other birds, are sensitive to 
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum that are invisible to humans and 
can see colours that we cannot. Humans themselves vary in the colours 
they can see. Many men are colour blind, and many women have enhanced 
colour vision. 
A world in which there were no perceivers—neither animal nor 
human—would not be a colourful world because no particular colour 
would be assignable to any object. In such a world, there would only be 
dispositions on the part of objects to produce diverse colour experiences 
in differently endowed sensitive beings. Further, no two of us are exactly 
alike. The sizes and shapes of our limbs and organs, the various textures 
of our hair and colours of our eyes, make each of us a little different from 
all the rest. Although we physically resemble, for the most part, the people 
amongst whom we live, each of us is physically and psychologically a 
unique individual. Within the normal or typical range, two people can 
perceive the world differently, without either one representing the world 
correctly. So although there is a characteristically human way of seeing 
colours, shapes, and distances, within the typical, normal range we may 
each see and experience the world a little differently. Whose particular, 
unique way of seeing red and applying the term ‘red’ to objects in our 
common world is ‘right’ in that case? And why should I suppose that one 
person’s way of ‘seeing’ torture is right and another person’s is wrong? 
The second force I suppose responsible for how I see the world is 
Cultural Transmission. The personality and character as well as the 
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physical features of each person arise not only from their genetic make-up, 
but from their environment and its role in their development, from the 
things individuals do to themselves or that others have done to them, such 
as overeating or forcing them to play sports. So the living individual is a 
product of heredity, development, socialization, and self-fashioning. 
Like everyone else, I have what I shall call a Normative Kit, a unique 
collection of beliefs—or whatever is expressed by my evaluative thoughts 
and judgements about actions, events, situations, and persons—along with 
dispositions to respond emotionally to them, and behavioural tendencies 
with respect to them. This Normative Kit has arisen through the interaction 
of Nature and Culture. This is simply a fact about me—a neutral, 
nonevaluative fact. The contents of my Normative Kit can be described 
in purely factual terms, though the contents are themselves values. My 
personal Normative Kit consists of a set of preferences (for example: I don’t 
like my scrambled eggs to be too runny); a set of emotional reactions to the 
thought of certain ways of doing things, or perceiving them being done 
(for example: I feel contempt at the thought of anyone’s cheating on their 
exams); and a set of tendencies to respond to certain pleasing or displeasing 
happenings and doings (for example: I usually like people who show that 
they like me). My Normative Kit, I shall suppose, is whatever it is and has 
only partial overlap with anyone else’s, insofar as it is conditioned by my 
unique Neurological Constitution and the particular Cultural Transmission 
to which I have been subjected. 
Reminding myself of the role of my unique Neurological Constitution 
in determining my unique Normative Kit helps me to keep the hypothesis 
of a value-free world before my mind. The colours of things are not really 
in them—rather, they come into being when a particular Neurological 
Constitution encounters a visible object, and there are as many differently 
coloured worlds as there are observers. In the same way, the goodness and 
betterness of my targets of moral appraisal, I now suppose, are not really 
in them either. They too come into being when a particular Neurological 
Constitution encounters an action, event, situation, or person of a particular 
sort. As it is misleading to ask what the real colour of a thing is, independent 
of any observer, it is misleading to ask what the real moral quality of any 
such target is. 
By reflecting on Cultural Transmission, I can reinforce this impression. 
As individuals differ from one another within a culture, so cultures differ 
from one another, each seeing the world and valuing things in somewhat 
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different ways and each inculcating those values in its members. My culture 
has given me myths and stories about good and evil, right and wrong, and 
lectures about the permissible, the forbidden and the obligatory. The novels 
I have read, the films I have seen, the friends and relatives from whom 
I have sought advice, and with whom I have discussed and gossiped—
all of these sources, together with the newspaper articles and editorials, 
and historical, sociological, anthropological, and philosophical books 
have shaped the contents of my Normative Kit. Relatives, friends, and 
other authorities have punished me for what they called my ‘bad’ deeds 
and praised me for what they called my ‘good’ deeds.8 The way I react 
to insults and oversights, or acts of kindness is conditioned by Cultural 
Transmission. So are my dispositions to act—to help others or to ignore 
them. As a result, my beliefs and practices are typical of educated Western 
Europeans of my age group and family background, and untypical of other 
populations. The Normative Kits of South Sea Islanders and the Inuit are 
accordingly different from mine, but mine is also different from my next-
door neighbour’s. 
So I am persuaded that my Neurological Constitution and the Cultural 
Transmission I have been subjected to explain my Normative Kit. They 
determine fully whether I see boxing as a shocking display of brutality 
or as a fun spectator sport, and whether I favour abortion or see it as 
baby-murder. This is not to say that my Normative Kit is fixed for all 
time. It changes in response to new experiences and developments in the 
surrounding culture. But reflection on the sources of my Normative Kit 
is beginning to persuade me that the moral qualities I am in the habit of 
ascribing to actions, events, situations, and persons and that I suppose 
I perceive in them could not really belong to them. I am on pretty firm 
ground in supposing that it is just true that coal is black and that water is 
liquid, even if these judgements depend on my having the sensory system 
I do, but only because I share the basic elements of my sensory system with 
almost everyone else in the world, no matter where they live and what 
their culture is like. But I manifestly do not share a moral appraisal system 
with almost everyone else in the world. And if evaluative properties are 
observer-dependent, and if observers vary a great deal, it is hard to see how 
one culture or one individual could come to see things as they really are, 
morally speaking, in the same way I see coal as black and water as liquid. 
On the suppositions about my Normative Kit that I have just made, 
how should I now understand moral discourse—the voicing of moral 
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judgements, disagreements, disputations, and reconciliations carried on 
live or in print? Is nobody actually ‘right’ or actually ‘wrong’? What is 
going on when people engage in moral argument and pronounce moral 
judgements if they are not describing the world, or at least attempting to 
describe the world, as it really is? 
I can think of the human world as a collection of people who interact 
with one another linguistically, socially, and politically. Their minds, like 
mine, are stocked with ideas, attitudes, and emotions, which sometimes lead 
them to speak or write declarative sentences such as ‘Abortion is wrong,’ 
‘Abortion is murder of the innocent,’ ‘Abortion ought to be prohibited by 
the state,’ or to issue imperatives such as ‘Ban abortion now!’ Others have 
in their Normative Kits the ideas expressed by sentences like ‘Abortion is 
every woman’s right’ and ‘A foetus is not a person with a right to life,’ 
and they are inclined to utter imperatives like ‘Hands off legal abortion!’ 
Perhaps they are, in effect, holding up placards or posting signs with these 
slogans written on them, and, as at a rally, they feel emotional about their 
cause and aim to change other people’s minds and behaviour. I need not 
suppose that their placards convey information or are susceptible of truth 
or falsity. 
To be sure, posted signs like ‘Thin Ice’ and ‘Beware the Dog’ give 
information as to what is the case. If I read these signs, I may come to 
believe, correctly, that the ice is thin and that there is a savage dog on the 
premises. But for the signs to have their intended effect of deterring people, 
it is not necessary for the ice to be thin and a savage dog to be present. 
A sign held up by someone on a placard or posted on a piece of property 
is normally intended to move others to some kind of action. Behind these 
warnings and commands, I now realise, lie the preferences of the sign-
posters. Someone who posts the ‘Thin Ice’ warning wishes for people not 
to try the ice, and someone who posts the ‘Beware the Dog’ sign wants 
them to stay off their property. These signs function as a warning about 
what could happen if a person proceeds further. What could happen if the 
command is disobeyed or unheeded may be left to the imagination—which 
can conjure up for itself the spectacle of falling through the ice or being 
mauled. It is assumed by the sign-poster that the people who read these 
notices will prefer staying dry to trying to walk on the ice and remaining 
unbitten to venturing onto the property. When people ignore such signs 
it is because they want to go further, crossing the lake or robbing a house. 
They may think either that the sign maker has exaggerated the risk or that 
the potential reward negates the risk. 
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It seems to me that something similar could be going on when 
people utter or write the declarative anti-abortion sentences above. The 
vocalisations and statements express the desires of the speakers and writers 
who have a preference for abortions not happening or, alternatively, for 
their happening sometimes. They are also warnings to others. Something 
unspecified but bad will happen, the signs imply, if abortion is permitted 
(or banned). But where ‘Thin Ice’ or ‘Beware the Dog’ will deter all but 
a few hardy souls from proceeding further, the people who sport anti-
abortion signs do not expect their signs to have this effect, though they 
hope, perhaps fervently, that they will. They likely believe that they are 
warning others of certain risks—the danger of moral harm—but they know 
that some who read their signs will either deny that there is any risk at all 
or will insist that the risk is worth taking. 
Thus a defender of abortion might say: ‘Yes, I see that proceeding 
further with the practice of legalising abortion is risky. Harm might indeed 
be done. But we must save women from death in backroom alleys, and 
we must try to ensure that children are loved and wanted. Their placards 
will read ‘No interference with women’s lives!’ Their signs too convey a 
warning. They believe there is a risk of harm to women and children if the 
anti-abortion faction persuades too many people and succeeds in changing 
the law. They too want to warn that there is ‘thin ice here.’ Their opponents, 
the anti-abortion group, believe either that the risks to women and children 
are negligible, or that they can be minimised, or that the risks of moral 
harm to foetuses or even to society at large are more serious. 
Accordingly, I suppose that people who utter the words ‘Abortion 
is wrong’ or ‘Property is theft’ desire that people neither perform nor 
undergo abortion or that people own no property. They also desire that 
their audiences adopt the same desires, the same view of the risks, and that 
they will in turn relay their preferences and risk assessments to others and 
attempt to prevent these performances, undergoings, and ownings. Our 
species argues and criticises, remonstrates and praises; we try to alter the 
Normative Kits of others and to defend or perhaps to improve our own. 
When I deliberate about whether some proposed course of action is right or 
wrong, I seem to hold up one sign at one moment, and another at another 
moment, and argue as though I were two people, with one or the other 
eventually dominating. 
For centuries, I suppose, people have held up their placards and argued 
about them. The placards and the reasons people give for holding them up, 
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or for being prepared to hold them up in discussion or debate, have effects 
on those who read them. They can change people’s emotional reactions 
to actions, events, situations, and persons, or result in new forms of 
legislation and punishment, or in the repeal of laws and the abandonment 
of punishment. There used to be more ‘Slavery is just’ placards around 
than there are today. This can be explained by the interaction between the 
world and our Neurological Constitutions and the effectiveness of Cultural 
Transmission. 
Yet something prevents me from thinking that this could be all there is 
to say about moral language and moral ideas. I am dismayed to read some 
of the placards people in my society hold up, declaiming on the radio and 
on television talk shows, snarling their opinions in the ‘Comments’ section 
of the newspaper. Many of these people seem wrong and misguided in 
their ideas and emotions. I think that people thoroughly disgusted by the 
thought of two men having sexual intercourse, or a mother nursing a baby 
in public, or an interracial couple holding hands ought to react differently. 
Conversely, they ought to respond more disgustedly, I think, to images of 
combat helicopters gunning down villagers. Yet, I can often understand 
what it must be like to have those feelings of disgust and enthusiasm for 
their moral causes, and why others are motivated to hold up those placards. 
If by contrast, someone professed to feel joy whenever he spotted a picture 
hanging crookedly on his wall and disgusted whenever someone plucked 
an apple from a tree and ate it, I would not understand this at all. So I 
seem to experience ‘evaluative impressions,’ as I shall call them, both about 
actions, situations, events, and persons, and also about other people’s 
evaluative impressions of their targets of evaluation. 
But maintaining my sceptical frame of mind, I shall continue to suppose 
that, regardless of anyone’s outrage or dissatisfaction, the distribution of 
feelings, opinions, and practices that now exists in the world is no better or 
worse in any objective respect than the distribution of a generation ago or a 
thousand years ago. It was what it was, is what it is, and in the future it will 
be whatever it will be. As populations have grown taller since the middle 
ages through their interaction with the environment, I shall suppose that 
the beliefs, attitudes, and preferences in their heads have changed through 
their interactions and experiences, but I shall also suppose that there is 
no basis for saying that there has been any improvement or deterioration 
in their Normative Kits. I shall continue to suppose that my own feelings 
and preferences have no special weight. Mine are mine and other people’s 
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are theirs and no one’s are better or worse, more enlightened or more 
benighted. 
My current hypothesis is that all values in a value-free universe are 
the product of my own mind, as determined by my constitution and my 
culture. I am supposing that there can be scientific and common-sense 
knowledge about the properties things actually possess or once possessed—
knowledge about plants, animals, stars, human thought processes, human 
societies, history and prehistory, and even knowledge about what various 
people’s aesthetic and moral beliefs are, and how they were formed. But on 
my current hypothesis, there can be no moral knowledge, in the sense of 
knowing what one ought to do or what actions are morally impermissible 
or morally dubious. There are no moral truths that anyone knows, or could 
come to know.  

Enquiry III
The Enquirer continues to ponder the notion of a value-free universe. She comes to 
the realisation that the world seems to be saturated experientially and linguistically 
with values. She entertains the possibility that a race of Destroyers of Illusion who 
use language differently has discovered that values are unreal and that there are 
only likings and dislikings. She discovers nevertheless that she does know at least 
one fact about what is good.
My working hypothesis is that I inhabit a value-free universe in which 
different people perceive different moral qualities in actions, events, 
situations, and persons in the same way that they perceive or do not 
perceive a good taste in broccoli. The world as I now see it contains an 
enormous variety of objects, living and non-living, as well as animals and 
people. They possess many qualities that can be discovered and described, 
but there is nothing actually right or wrong in this world and there are no 
obligations. No actions are demonic or saintly, cowardly or heroic, for to 
describe actions in this way is to imply that they are bad or good, wrong or 
right. There is absolutely nothing that we are morally obliged to do or to 
refrain from doing. It is as absurd to say ‘Everything is morally permitted’ 
as it is to say ‘Some actions are not morally permitted.’ Nothing is either 
permitted or not permitted. 
It now occurs to me that there are two entirely different ways in which 
I might try to understand and apply the proposition that the universe is 
value-free. I could understand it to mean that it is philosophically correct 
to take a detached perspective on the struggles of a young faun in the jaws 
of a lion, or on the growth of a cancer in someone’s body, or on torture 
or abortion. I could understand the proposal to imply that is appropriate 
to regard these events and situations as happenings in the world that just 
are, without seeing them as ‘bad,’ and that I should suspend my normal 
emotional reactions, my judgemental impulses. But if the world is really 
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value-free, then it cannot be ‘philosophically correct’ or ‘appropriate’ to 
regard it in one way rather than in another. Whatever way I regard it—
judgementally or nonjudgementally—is just the way I happen to regard it. 
There is another way, however, to understand the proposal that the 
universe is value-free that is perhaps freer of implied prescriptivity. Let 
me try to imagine a world that is like our world in every way except that 
the people in it, having realised that there are no moral facts and no moral 
knowledge, never make moral judgements, and never tell others what 
they ought to do or are allowed to do. They never assert statements like 
‘You ought not to tell lies to your mother’ or ‘You should make occasional 
donations to charity.’ They do, however, express their preferences, hopes, 
and fears. For example, a person belonging to this alien linguistic species 
might say ‘I hate it when you lie to your mother!’ or ‘I wish more people 
would make donations to UNICEF!’ These latter statements are genuine 
claims. They are true or false depending on whether the person who utters 
the words in quotation marks really has the emotions or wishes they report 
themselves as having. 
These aliens, I shall suppose, see things as they really are and only as 
they really are. While they occasionally make mistakes, their mistakes are 
factual ones about properties and relations that could be instantiated in the 
world but that are not. They are not under the illusion that their objects of 
moral appraisal can actually possess such properties as being right or wrong, 
morally permitted or forbidden, morally courageous or morally cowardly. 
Indeed, they deny that objects and living beings can possess any features 
of goodness or badness, appropriateness or inappropriateness, suitability 
or unsuitability for purpose, normality (as opposed to averageness) or 
abnormality. 
I shall call these people the Destroyers of Evaluative Illusion, or the 
Destroyers for short. They maintain that most of us live in a world of illusion, 
projecting our likings, dislikings, and preferences onto the world, that we 
‘see’ our targets of appraisal as possessing evaluative properties that they 
do not possess. The language of the Destroyers, I might further suppose, 
contains no evaluative terms, only descriptive terms. They employ the term 
‘red’ but not the term ‘good.’ They may describe a person as ‘weighing 150 
lbs,’ but not as ‘malicious.’ And it seems to me that I can readily classify 
terms according to whether the language of the Destroyers could contain 
them (or equivalents for them) or not. For example:
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On my current hypothesis, the Destroyers can know a room to be dark, a 
watercourse to be damp, a tree to be deciduous, a fence to be damaged, 
and a theorem to be demonstrable in classical mathematics, and they 
can assert in language that these things are so. But, lacking an evaluative 
vocabulary, they cannot say that an action is ‘despicable,’ or a policy 
decision ‘disgusting,’ or that a person is ‘duplicitous.’ To ‘describe’ actions, 
policies, and persons in this way is to imply that they ought to be some 
other way, and this is, in their view, an illusion that their purified language 
does not support. 
But now, I have to wonder whether my notion of a suitably purified 
language really makes sense. Can I actually classify terms as descriptive 
and evaluative? Are there really two exclusive, non-overlapping categories 
here? ‘Deciduous’ seems to be a purely descriptive term, drawn from the 
science of botany with its technical language, but many everyday terms 
seem to be descriptive but at the same time evaluatively ‘loaded.’ On 
reflection, ‘damp’ is a term that usually has somewhat negative evaluative 
connotations. Damp towels and damp ceilings are usually ‘worse’ than dry 
ones. But garden soil could perhaps be ‘nice and damp’ where seeds have 
been planted. To describe a room as ‘dark’ is usually to imply that it is 
worse than a lighter room—and perhaps to imply that one ought not to 
buy a house with such a dark room; whereas to describe a film as ‘dark’ is 
often to imply that it is a good film, one that ought to be seen. And where 
do terms like ‘zesty’ and ‘languorous’ belong in the descriptive-evaluative 
scheme? Zesty is pungent-tasting, but in a good way, and languorous is 
slow, in a good way. Do the Destroyers avoid using these terms? Do they 
never describe a citrus drink as ‘zesty’ or a movement as ‘languorous?’ 
Thinking further along these lines, I realise that many ordinary nouns, 
as well as ordinary adjectives, have evaluative connotations or can only be 
explicated with the help of words like ‘good,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘ought to,’ ‘must,’ or 
‘mustn’t.’ Take the words ‘criminal’ and ‘film star.’ To say of a person that 
she is a criminal is to imply (rightly or wrongly!) that she is a wrongdoer, 
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doing things that she ought not to do, and perhaps to imply also that 
she ought to be punished or rehabilitated, rather than let go scot-free or 
ignored. To say of a person that she is a film star is to imply that she has 
admirable qualities, such as beauty and acting talent, that are deserved or 
possibly undeserved. ‘Talent,’ I ordinarily suppose, is both good to have 
and good to observe in action. 
Implications of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ seem to permeate statements that at 
first glance are purely descriptive. Take, for example, the statement ‘X beat 
up Y.’ It is a bare statement of fact, one might think, not an evaluation. Yet 
it implies that X did something to Y that was bad for Y, though perhaps 
good for the victims Y had been bullying. Even the statement ‘X gave £5 to 
Y’ seems to have evaluative connotations; something good or bad was done 
here. My first impulse on hearing or reading this statement is to think that 
X did something good for Y. For I know that money is useful and that gifts 
of money or the repayment of loans are often appreciated. But on reflection 
I can see that it is possible that giving Y £5 might have been bad for them, if 
Y was expecting or hoping for more. Or X might have been the victim of a 
hold-up. The event of giving described could not have been ‘neutral,’ even 
if the statement does not logically imply either that something good was 
done for X or for Y or that something bad was done.
Does the value-free world of the Destroyers, which I suppose to be 
exactly like our world, except linguistically, contain ‘criminals’? Surely it 
must contain people who stab others on lonely streets with knives and take 
their wallets, or who get into their houses when they are not home and 
make off with things. Do the Destroyers see nothing wrong with this? Do 
they not mind damp towels or value water for its excellent thirst-quenching 
properties? 
On reflection, I can see that these absurd conclusions need not follow. 
Perhaps the Destroyers, rather than speaking a purified language, simply 
use and understand my usual vocabulary in a way consistent with the 
hypothesis of a value-free world. When one of the Destroyers says ‘This 
towel is damp,’ she is understood by the others to mean: ‘This towel is 
slightly wet and I do not much like it this way and I predict that others 
wouldn’t like it this way either.’ When another of them describes a new 
drink as ‘zesty,’ he means: ‘This new drink is mildly acidic and I like it 
and I would like it if you and other people liked it too.’ As I imagine them, 
the Destroyers know that criminality is not ‘wrong’—because nothing is 
really wrong—but they know that they and others do not like it when 
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they are the ones stabbed or whose possessions are removed. So when one 
of them uses the word ‘criminal,’ they mean ‘a person who does certain 
things I do not like done to me and that others do not like having done 
to them.’ The term ‘film star’ in their language means something like ‘a 
person who acts on screen in a way that many people like.’ The Destroyers 
can even understand terms like ‘election’ in a roundabout way. Where we 
naively think of an election as a choice of the person believed to be the 
best–suited for some occupation or task, these people know that no one can 
really possess the property of being ‘best-suited’ for anything. To them, an 
‘election’ is the choice of some person who is most liked when imagined in 
a specified occupation or task. ‘Smith won the election for party leadership’ 
for them means ‘Smith was determined to be the person most liked by the 
electoral body when imagined in the role of party leader.’ 
The Destroyers, it seems, can think and say everything we can think and 
say. There is a translation for everything from our language to theirs. For 
example:
‘Tigers are ferocious’ » ‘Tigers do things with their teeth and claws to other 
animals that the other animals do not like and that I and other people 
sometimes don’t like either.’
‘Bone is resilient’ » ‘Bone has a springy quality that I and others like’
‘Water quenches thirst’ » ‘Water changes the condition of a thirsty person 
from one he doesn’t like to one he likes better.’ 
‘X morally wronged Y’ » ‘X did something to Y that I don’t like and I would 
like it if others didn’t like it either.’ 
The Destroyers consistently understand such claims by reference to their 
preferences and those of other living creatures rather than in terms of 
properties actually possessed by actions, events, situations, and persons. 
When the Destroyers describe tigers as ‘ferocious,’ they are under no 
illusion that the behaviour of tigers has the property of being ‘bad’ for their 
prey in the same way that their coats have the property of being striped. 
But when a child discovers that tigers are ferocious or a medical student 
discovers that bone is resilient, it doesn’t seem to involve a discovery 
about likings. No introspection, no consulting of their feelings, is involved. 
Rather, the child finds these things out by observing tigers in the wild or 
reading about their behaviour, and the medical student finds them out by 
studying bone and perhaps subjecting it to certain tests. And when I wonder 
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whether a course of action is ‘morally acceptable,’ I am not wondering 
whether I like it or not. Suppose a factory owner ‘likes’ to imprison or 
shelter his workers at their sewing machines behind a barbed-wire fence 
for 12-hour workdays; the workers don’t like it, and I don’t like his liking it. 
It seems that I can investigate the claim ‘The factory owner‘s arrangements 
are morally unacceptable,’ whereas I don’t need to investigate the claim ‘I 
don’t like the arrangements the factory owner likes that the workers don’t 
like.’ My wondering concerns whether I and others ought not to like the 
arrangements or may like them. But these ‘oughts’ and ‘mays’ have no 
meaning or application in a value-free universe. 
I admit to being as confused as ever about the possibility of evaluative 
knowledge in light of these further reflections. On one hand, I think that the 
non-moral evaluative statements ‘John knows that artichokes are delicious’ 
and ‘Marcia knows that cobras are dangerous’ could be true if either 
sentence was uttered or written in a particular context. The first statement 
could be made by the parent of a child with sophisticated tastes; the second 
by the parent of a child who reads nature books. And if John knows that 
artichokes are delicious, and Marcia knows that cobras are dangerous, then 
the claims are true, at least in the context in which the relevant thoughts are 
had and the relevant sentences uttered. On the other hand, I don’t see how 
John can know that artichokes are delicious, if there are cultures in which 
artichokes are spurned as inedible, or how Marcia can know that cobras are 
dangerous if there are cultures that keep a tame cobra around the house to 
eat rats. In these other contexts, Jack might be said to know that artichokes 
taste terrible and Miranda might be said to know that cobras are useful and 
friendly. It looks as though evaluative claims are ‘true’ or ‘false’ relative 
to particular cultures and that ‘knowledge’ depends on human likings, 
preferences, and circumstances. 
Turning to moral properties and moral knowledge, I am equally torn. I 
am tempted to say that Mary can not only believe but know that the factory 
owner’s arrangements are morally wrong. But factory owners and their 
social circle proceed as though they know that there is no problem with 
them, and many capitalists would deny that what Mary believes is correct. 
Despite my ongoing uncertainty and confusion, I have now established 
a number of important things. 
First, I recognise that my normal vocabulary for describing the world—
the vocabulary I use when I am not thinking of it in physical and chemical 
terms—contains not only evaluative terms like ‘good’ and ‘wrong,’ but also 
nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs that have evaluative connotations 
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or implications when they appear in sentences that are used to make 
statements. The Destroyers have paraphrases for everything I say and 
write with this vocabulary, but I have not yet determined whether their 
paraphrases are really adequate—a problem I can defer until later. 
Second, I no longer see a reason to suppose that beliefs that depend in 
some way on my Neurological Constitution and on Cultural Transmission 
are invariably false. My common-sense knowledge about the colour of 
snow, the temperament of tigers, and so on depends on both of these 
features, and I see no reason to deny that I know that snow is white and 
tigers are ferocious. Miranda, living in her culture of tame cobras, can 
know that they are useful and friendly, even if Marcia, living in her culture, 
knows that cobras are dangerous. At the same time, these observations do 
not help me to understand morality better, for morality does not seem to 
be simply a matter of common sense. And I am not entirely satisfied with 
the notion that Miranda, living in her culture, could know that torture is 
wrong, while Marcia, living in hers, could know that it is right.
At this point, turning my attention inwards, I find in myself—despite 
these worries—a certain conviction about what is good. The conviction is 
that my existence, at least for the time being, is better for me than my non-
existence. Accordingly, the following statement, when uttered by me, is 
one in which I have complete confidence. 
‘My continued existence, at least right now, is good for me.’ 
I am also reasonably certain that anyone who is not in terrible emotional 
or physical pain can make the same judgement about their own existence. 
Now, in uttering these words, or writing them, or merely thinking this 
statement, I have not deduced the fact that it is good for me now that I exist 
from the more general premise ‘For everyone in the world, it is good for 
them now that they exist.’ In fact I am sure this latter claim is false—there 
are people in the world suffering terrible torments who, at the moment, 
would be better off not existing and who wish they did not exist. But so 
what? I only judge that it is good for me that I exist now. 
Nor am I asserting that my existence is in some absolute way a good 
thing. If someone were to insist that my continued existence is no better 
for the universe, that the universe is not a better place for my existing in 
it, I might have no argument against them. Maybe the world would be 
improved by my deletion from it. Nevertheless, I cannot doubt that for me, 
existence now is better than annihilation now. 
Could I be wrong about this even if I am unable to doubt it? 
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The Destroyers will say that even if I know about myself that it is better 
for me to exist now, all that statement means is ‘I like existing.’ Or ‘Right 
now, I’d rather exist than not.’ Perhaps they are right. I will investigate this 
possibility later. Meanwhile, their paraphrase doesn’t imply that I don’t 
know that existing is better for me. 
Doubtless both my Neurological Constitution and Cultural Transmission 
play a role in my conviction. An instinct for self-preservation seems to be 
a characteristic of all living things; few animals that did not take steps to 
prevent injury to themselves or death are to be found amongst my ancestors. 
All animals have some means of avoiding or defending themselves against 
threats and a built-in instinct to do so. And I am constantly warned about 
dangers to my existence by parents, friends, and authorities and given advice 
on how to avoid them. These warnings and urgings no doubt contribute 
to my sense that my life right this moment is valuable. Accordingly, my 
positive response to the thought of my continuing to exist and my negative 
response to the thought of my ceasing to exist arise from the interaction of 
my mind with a presentation to my consciousness in the form of a thought. 
But, as I have already established, all my thoughts seem to arise in this way 
and that does not prevent me from sometimes knowing what is the case at 
least where I am concerned.  
Enquiry IV
The Enquirer discovers that, as far as her self-interest is concerned, there are certain 
things that are good and bad for her and therefore things she ought and ought not 
to do. The Enquirer discovers that she can also know something about what is in 
the self-interest of other people.
Very well. I seem to have discovered or realised that I know something 
about myself and what is good for me, what is in my own interest: namely, 
my present existence. 
But this epistemic accomplishment is a long way from the discovery of 
any moral facts, facts about what is vicious or virtuous, morally permissible 
or impermissible, required or forbidden. It is unclear whether I know or 
can come to know any facts about what is good or bad, better or worse, 
besides this one. But it is a start, so I shall press onwards. 
Reflecting further, I find in myself certain strong beliefs relating to my 
condition as an existing thing. These have to do with my biological needs 
as the living creature I know myself to be. My discomforts in particular are 
signs of danger—of threats to the existence that I currently prize. I know 
that I cannot survive for more than a few hours without special equipment 
in temperatures above 45oC or below 0oC, or without water for more than a 
few days, or without food for more than a month. Moreover, I doubt that I 
would survive for long if I were the last person left alive on earth. 
But do I really know that it is better for me to be warm and dry, to be 
satiated rather than hungry, to be surrounded by other humans rather 
than alone? It seems that it is not always better for me to be in comfortable 
conditions. I may prefer to be cold and wet on an exciting rafting adventure 
that I would not have missed for anything, rather than warm and dry in my 
own sitting room; and my current state of hunger is not unpleasant since 
I know that I can look forward to the gratification of lunch soon. While it 
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would be a catastrophe if the rest of the human race were to vanish, leaving 
me in a world stocked with food and books, I like to be alone for some 
hours of the day. So my beliefs about what is good and bad for me do not 
generalise to all conditions. I think I can nevertheless claim to know that 
temperate conditions and sufficient food and water are generally better for 
me than extremes of temperature, starvation, and dehydration.
Recognising that these things are good and bad for me leads me to think 
that there are things I ought to do in order to secure companionship, food, 
water, and warmth and to avoid starvation, abandonment, and death. I 
ought to eat and drink from time to time, cultivate the attention of other 
human beings, and seek shelter when temperatures soar or plummet. 
Could I be under the illusion or misapprehension that I ought to do such 
things? I can imagine special circumstances obtaining under which it would 
be inadvisable to eat or drink or seek shelter or cultivate the attentions of 
people around me because of the dangers such activities posed. But I am 
not claiming that I ought always to do these things, given the opportunity. 
I am claiming only that for the sake of my own survival and welfare, I will 
mostly need to. (I know that birds fly, for example, even if there are a few 
exceptions, such as penguins.) I am confident accordingly that there are 
facts about what I ought to do. 
Another fact I know about myself is that I probably have something of a 
future, and that my decisions and actions right now have a bearing on my 
future. I cannot be absolutely certain that I do have a future, for a sudden 
stroke could knock me out before I finish writing this sentence, or an 
asteroid colliding with earth could destroy me along with my environment 
next week. But I know is that the probability of my surviving for many 
years hence is very high. 
The knowledge that I will likely survive for quite a long time into 
the future indicates to me that I ought to take it into account that some 
possible futures will be better or worse for me than others. Certain plans 
I formulate and act upon now will make my future security, opportunity, 
and happiness more or less than it would be had I formulated and acted 
upon other plans. While I am rarely certain of what is absolutely the best 
plan, or even whether, in some cases, I ought to be making a plan and 
carrying it out, rather than just waiting to see what happens, I am certain 
that some plans would be bad for me if I carried them out and that others 
are more promising. 
Normally, I ought not to do anything that could threaten my immediate 
existence. I ought not to climb up a very rickety ladder to try to wire and 
 41Enquiry IV
hang a heavy chandelier, or to swim in shark-infested waters without 
special equipment if the opportunity immediately presents itself. Special 
circumstances might again make it necessary to do just what I ought not, in 
general, do, but it would be misleading to say that it is neither true nor false 
that swimming without equipment in shark-infested waters is a bad idea, 
and that there is no fact of the matter as to whether I ought to attempt DIY 
feats of the type just described. 
The causes of my beliefs about what I ought to do and what to avoid 
doing lie in nurture as well as in nature. I have an innate fear of heights, 
thanks to my Neurological Constitution, and people informed me as a child 
of the dangers of electrical wiring. Movies and newspaper articles—Cultural 
Transmission—inspired my fear of sharks. Yet, their origins in nature and 
culture do not make these emotions irrational. And when the sentences 
below are uttered by me, in conditions in which the opportunities present 
themselves in a certain way, I am confident that they express my knowledge 
and understanding of the world and how things work or happen in it. 
I ought not to try to hang this chandelier unassisted. 
I ought not to go for a swim in these shark-infested waters. 
There are many other ‘ought’ statements I could formulate that represent 
my knowledge of what it is good or bad for me to do right now, in these 
circumstances, whatever the circumstances may be at the moment. My 
knowledge of matters affecting my self-interest indeed appears to be 
extensive. Nevertheless, I anticipate two objections to my claim to know 
quite a bit about what’s good and bad for me and what I ought to do. 
First, someone might argue that it is not true that I ought not to perform 
various actions that are extremely risky and dangerous. For it might be 
the case that the universe would be better off without me, and, as long as 
this possibility cannot be ruled out, I cannot make the above claims with 
any confidence. Surely my going out of existence through electrocution or 
being eaten by a shark would be good for at least some others. Someone 
would get my job, and some others would enjoy my clothing and effects if 
my heirs donated them to be sold in a charity shop. 
Perhaps there is a Supreme Being who oversees the Universe and who 
knows all that has happened in the past, is happening in the present, and 
will happen in the future, as well as all that might happen. Perhaps this 
Being knows that, were I to be annihilated, things would start to go better 
in the Universe. Very well, but I am not claiming to know that my existence 
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is good for the Universe in the long run, only that it is good for me right 
now, and that since it is probable that I shall in fact continue to exist for 
some time, it is good for me to pursue and avoid certain things. From the 
mere possibility that, unbeknownst to me, the Universe would be better 
off without me, and that there is a God who knows this, it doesn’t follow 
that I need not avoid doing foolish, self-destructive, or dangerous things. 
Perhaps my interest in existing and in preserving my existence and the 
good of the Universe are in conflict, but even if that is so, it does not defeat 
my claim to know what is in my own interest. I might, in a moment of 
psychological desperation and confused judgement, come to think that I 
would be better off not existing, but this thought could only occur to me in 
a state that I know at the moment that it would not be good for me to be in. 
I can also appreciate that there are perspectives from which my 
existence does not matter, indeed, from which it does not matter how many 
or how few humans exist at all. I can imagine callous Martians, or callous 
foreigners, or even just people who dislike me intensely, holding the view 
that what happens to me—including my annihilation—does not matter 
one whit.9 Nevertheless, this gives me no reason to take this position with 
regard to myself. 
But now a second objection to my claim to know certain things about 
what I ought and ought not to do occurs to me. It is that I cannot see into the 
future with sufficient clarity to be certain that my continued existence will 
be better for me than my ceasing to exist at some moment hence. Perhaps 
I shall shortly be struck down with a dreadful illness involving prolonged 
suffering, or an invading army will capture me and subject me to lifelong 
solitary confinement punctuated by torture. If that happens, it might turn 
out to have been better for me had I electrocuted myself or been quickly 
consumed by sharks. Perhaps, unbeknownst to me, the disease has already 
taken hold, perhaps the invading army is quietly massing just up the road? 
In such cases, it will soon be the case that things would have gone better 
for me had I been destroyed. But, again, I do not see that the possibility that 
these things are, as I write, invisibly happening could imply that I cannot 
now know that I ought not to attempt this wiring task or go swimming in 
shark-infested waters. It is logically possible that by attempting to hang 
the chandelier I would release a pile of gold coins from the ceiling, whilst 
remaining unharmed. I can nevertheless deny that I ought to do this.
I do, however, have to admit that my ability to judge what will turn 
out to be best for me and so what I ought to do in various situations is 
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hampered by my inability to foresee the future. When I move beyond 
the ubiquitous laws of physics that make severe electric shocks, falls 
from a great height, and attacks by certain predators invariably fatal and 
realise the multiplicity of causes and the role of chance, it seems that the 
full consequences of any decision I take are impossible to predict. Many 
occurrences make certain kinds of occurrence more likely in the future, 
but they do not necessitate them. A person who has already had one heart 
attack is more likely to have a second heart attack than a person who 
has had no heart attacks so far is to have a first one. Receiving a good 
education increases the likelihood of finding an enjoyable job. Having 
a sense of humour helps to attract a mate. But none of these further 
outcomes is guaranteed. All causes require the co-operation of other 
causes, and much happens by chance in the sense that from fortunate or 
unfortunate coincidences important effects can follow. I trip on a step and 
miss my usual bus; waiting for the next one, I meet a former colleague 
who offers me a new job. I win the lottery but have a miserable and vexed 
life trying to keep hold of my new-found wealth. 
Yet I must make decisions about what will turn out to be good for me 
under conditions of uncertainty, and avoiding or postponing deciding is 
a way of deciding. So it is useful for me to establish something about the 
scope and limits of my knowledge about what is good for me in the longer 
term and what I ought to do. 
Thinking on my past decisions and how they turned out, I know that 
I regret some actions and I have no hesitation in saying that I now know 
that they were bad for me. The extra drink that gave me such a headache 
and the carelessness about checking the schedule that caused me to miss 
my train were mistakes. Correspondingly, I know that some prudential 
actions that I undertook were good for me. Deciding to hide my passport 
in the refrigerator when I went on holiday turned out to be a good decision 
when thieves ransacked the house and took all my other legal and financial 
documents. Visiting the dentist regularly has reduced painful episodes of 
toothache. 
I can assert with confidence statements such as: 
1)    ‘Because I was careless in looking up the timetable, I missed my train, 
which was bad for me.’ 
2)    ‘Because I was prudent in hiding my passport in the refrigerator, I 
escaped its being robbed, which was good for me.’ 
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But what about ‘acts and omissions’ undertaken on a grander scale, for 
example, the decision to attend University X or to move to city Y? Can I 
assert with confidence statements such as: 
3)    ‘Because I attended University X rather than University Z, my life has 
gone worse than it would have otherwise.’ 
4)    ‘Because I moved to city Y rather than to city W, everything has gone 
better for me than it would have had I moved to W.’
Here I am rather doubtful. I may have certain beliefs or even ‘convictions’ 
about these propositions, but I don’t think I can really know how my life 
would have gone had I attended University Z or moved to city W instead. 
One reason for being sceptical about my power to evaluate claims like 3) 
and 4) is that I find in myself a tendency to rationalise by finding something 
‘good’ even in events and decisions that had regrettable aspects. Had I 
never broken my back in a riding accident, I would never have read all of 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Had I not taken up with P who broke my 
heart, I would not have learned so much about chamber music. Some good 
things come out of some misfortunes, and some misfortunes come out of 
good things, and the chain of causes can extend over a lifetime. Imagine 
that my broken heart (bad for me) causes me to learn a great deal about 
chamber music (good for me), which causes me to be hit by a bus on my 
way to a concert (bad for me). Or that by becoming immobilised (bad for 
me), I become enchanted with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (good for me), 
and as a result spend my life writing incompetent commentaries on it and 
dying in ignominy (bad for me). So was it good for me or bad for me that I 
took up with P or broke my back? The question seems undecidable. 
The thought about the past, ‘Event E was good for me’ implies that ‘If E 
had not happened, things would have been in some respects worse for me, 
and they would not have been overall better for me.’ But how can I know 
this to be the case? What would otherwise have happened to me in the long 
run would have depended on a lot else besides the non-occurrence of E. I 
cannot factor in these other events associated with the non-occurrence of E. 
For it was E that happened, and I have a sense of what did follow from E. 
But I can only guess at what would have followed from E’s not occurring. 
Should I suppose, nevertheless, that all events that have happened to 
me—including so-and-so becoming Prime Minister in my lifetime and such 
and such cosmic rays striking me—are either good for me, or bad for me, or 
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indifferent, though for most of these events, I can never know which? This 
seems a fantastic supposition. I can imagine a very capable biographer who 
writes the story of my life in such a way that the various good, bad, and 
indifferent effects of various events are brought out. But such a biography, if 
it were not to be both incredibly long and incoherent to the average reader, 
would have to be highly selective in treating only ‘major’ events and their 
’significant’ impacts. It would be open to the objection of critics that for any 
event E whose value for me is discussed in the book, if E had not happened, 
the effects portrayed as flowing from E might have happened anyway, so 
that certain effects alleged to be good or bad for me were not really due to 
E. These considerations lead me to doubt that I or anyone else can have a 
thorough and complete understanding of what is good or has been good 
for me, regardless of the satisfying and plausible autobiographical and 
biographical ‘stories’ that can be constructed, portraying certain decisions 
as wise or foolish. The ‘acts’ involved in 3) and 4) and their effects are so 
complex compared to the ‘acts’ involved in 1) and 2) and their effects, that 
it seems there is no objective fact of the matter, knowable by me or not. 
I have not lost my conviction that with respect to 1) and 2) I can judge 
wisdom and foolishness correctly. Nevertheless, this complexity and the 
fact that simple cases like 1) and 2) shade gradually into complex cases like 
3) and 4) may have implications for the problem of moral knowledge. 
In any case, life presents me with constant opportunities for decisions, 
decisions that I must take consciously or that will turn out to have been taken 
by default. These decisions, when acted upon, change the probabilities of 
certain events occurring in the future. So I must constantly decide what it 
is best to do for my own well-being. In making decisions about my self-
interest, I need to ignore unlikely possibilities such as a pile of gold falling 
from the ceiling or amazing good luck in escaping disaster, and I cannot 
look too far into the future. It is accordingly sensible to pay attention to 
likelihoods. Deciding to go to medical school increases the chances that I 
will become a practicing physician from close to, though not quite, 0% (I 
might decide to practice medicine without a license) in case I don’t go, to 
perhaps 50% if I do go. (Not all who go to medical school finish the course, 
and not all who finish the course become practicing physicians.) Deciding 
to marry X rather than Y reduces the chances that I will ever visit China 
from around 95%, in case Y is a patriotic Chinese with many affectionate 
relatives, to some lower figure in case X is not. Few of my ordinary decisions, 
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however, have outcomes that can be predicted with certainty, and even to 
estimate the likelihood of one outcome rather than another, I need access to 
statistics that may be hard to come by. 
It occurs to me that good practical decisions are not the same as decisions 
that will maximise my pleasures and minimise my pains. If, for example, 
I could attach myself to a machine that stimulated the pleasure centres of 
my brain on an ongoing basis, I would not consider it in my self-interest 
to do so. Nor would I think it in my self-interest to become addicted to 
a euphoria-inducing drug, even if it could be reliably supplied to me at 
no cost. Other people may disagree; they may be in no doubt that being 
hooked up to an ecstasy machine would be good for them, but so what? 
For me, living an interesting human life, being spared certain tragedies 
such as losing my children, or being sent to prison, or finding myself in the 
middle of a war, or suffering a painful and debilitating medical condition, 
or being professionally disgraced, or being friendless and ignorant about 
the world, would be good, and I ought to do what is conducive to this end. 
Nevertheless, pain and boredom are not experiences I think it would be 
best wholly to avoid, even if I could knock out my pain receptors or take 
an excitement-producing pill whenever my interest in the environment 
flagged. For one thing, I think I learn through painful experiences about 
what is and isn’t in my self-interest. I do, however, want my pains to be 
treatable and not indefinitely prolonged. 
I do not always know what I ought to do and what will be good for me, 
but I know that I sometimes feel regret over what I earlier decided to do 
and subsequently did, and that regret is an unpleasant emotion that I ought 
to try to avoid. I ought to be at least somewhat prudent, for the prudent 
person is less apt to suffer regret over their former stupidity, haste, and 
carelessness. However I do not think I ought to be as cautious as possible. 
For it is possible to be too dedicated to minimising regret—so dedicated 
that one misses out on a good deal of pleasure and excitement. Exactly how 
cautious I ought to be and how thoughtless, hasty, and careless I may be 
without negatively affecting my welfare is a problem I cannot solve. I can 
only seek out information about likelihoods and try to put it to use, taking 
into account my individual, indeed unique nature. 
So let me consider a typical decision: the frugality vs. pleasure dilemma. 
Here is what I know about my situation:
The most attractive flat available costs 30% more than a minimally acceptable 
‘baseline’ flat.
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If I choose the most attractive flat, there is a very good chance that I will 
run out of funds by the end of the year, whereas the baseline flat is easily 
affordable. 
I am very likely to survive, to need a flat, and to be able to enjoy a flat until 
the end of the year.
All these assumptions involve likelihoods. My existence might be cut short 
in the next instant, or I might not require a flat if I wind up in the hospital 
for a very long stay. I might inherit money from a long-lost relative and 
have no more financial worries. My tastes in flats might change. All of these 
eventualities are possible, and my choice of the more or less expensive flat 
would turn out to be fortunate or unfortunate depending on which were 
realized. But they are unlikely. On the basis of what usually happens, I 
might reasonably decide that it is prudent to take the less expensive flat. 
If it matters to me a great deal to live in a very nice flat, however, I might 
reasonably decide to take the risk of running out of funds. Taking the 
baseline flat could be a bad decision if I were miserable there and if I would 
gain quite a bit more enjoyment from a nicer flat, even if the financial risk 
is greater.
Now suppose that a range of 100 flats is available at various rents, their 
attractiveness varying with their prices, and their prices corresponding 
to their riskiness for me. Is there a fact of the matter about which flat it 
is best to take? Can I come to know which one is best? Could it be the 
case that, whatever I decide to do, there was an ‘optimal flat’ that balanced 
attractiveness against risk, assigning to each value the weight it ought 
to have? Some people doubtless believe that there is just such a unique 
flat. God, they might think, is omniscient, so God must know which is the 
optimal flat for me (as well as which University, X or Y, would have been 
better for me in the long run to attend). For every possible decision I could 
take in a situation, they think, there is ranking of the alternatives, so that 
one is best, one is worst, and the other alternatives are all better or worse 
than one another, but worse than the best and better than the worst. Even 
if I lack the information and concern required to work out what would be 
good for me, there is an objective fact of the matter—dependent on my 
likings and dislikings, but objective nevertheless. 
This seems a peculiar assumption. Either there is an omniscient God 
or there isn’t. If there isn’t an omniscient God, there is no being who, by 
definition, must know which is the unique optimal flat and how all the 
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others stack up. Even if there is an omniscient God, this God can only know 
everything there is to be known. I am not persuaded that the identity of the 
optimal flat and the ranking of the other 99 flats is one of the things to be 
known. Even if these are things an omniscient being can know, I think they 
might nevertheless be forever beyond human reason just as certain colour 
or tone discriminations lie outside human perception. 
Rather, it seems to me that amongst the 100, there might be a range 
of flats such that it is definitely reasonable for me to take one of them; 
another two ranges of flats, all of which would be definitely unreasonable 
for me to take because they are either too expensive or too unattractive; 
and a lot of flats that do not definitely belong to any of those categories. 
Whichever flat I decide on, I may have regrets depending on how things 
turn out; I may regret spending so much, or not spending more. But if I 
made my decision—whatever it is—by pondering the risks and rewards 
for a reasonable length of time, I will at least not be able to accuse myself 
of having been foolish and impulsive, however things turn out. I will not 
reproach myself for having acted unwisely, even if I bemoan my living 
conditions. 
Practical reasoning of this sort is, then, strongly dependent on 
probabilities and on the information I have about myself and about the 
world. Where my practical decisions are concerned—Shall I marry P or Q 
or nobody? Change jobs and cities or stay where I am? Buy a car or forego 
the purchase?—I must take into account facts about what usually happens 
to the average person in my situation, facts about how I am different from 
the average person, and consider the likelihoods of various outcomes for 
me. 
But can I ever really know what I ought to do in my own self-interest—
what is good for me or better than the alternatives? Can I ever be sure that I 
have figured that out? Consider the following two accounts of what I did: 
1)    I did what seemed to me most reasonable in light of what I actually knew 
and cared about.
2)    I did what was most reasonable in light of what I ought to have known 
and ought to have cared about. 
I can be reasonably certain that I have fulfilled the conditions of 1). 
Suppose I decided to smoke. I had no data on the long-term harmful effects 
of smoking and I liked to smoke. The decision seemed to me altogether 
reasonable. But it is hard to see that I acted on the basis of my knowledge that 
it was in my self-interest to smoke. 
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By contrast, if I was able at the time to fulfil the conditions of 2) it seems I 
would have succeeded in acting in my self-interest. But it seems impossible 
for me to know that I have fulfilled those conditions. There are many things 
I wish I had known before I took certain decisions, but the class of things I 
ought to have known is different, and poorly demarcated. 
On prudential grounds, I ought to know what’s on the label of the 
medicines I take and whether the local weather forecast is for tornadoes if 
they are common and devastating around here. Such well-known dangers 
as overdoses and harmful drug interactions are made known by Cultural 
Transmission and I am responsible for being alert to them. 
More problematic is the second clause. Can the culture really settle 
what I ought to care about? Why should I care about things I don’t? On 
reflection, I can see that this makes sense. I may not care that my drinking 
water is heavily contaminated with arsenic, but it is definitely in my self-
interest to care about this. If I care about my health, I ought to care to some 
extent about my diet, my drinking water, the effects of privatisation on 
cleaning practices in hospital wards, and other such matters, and to seek 
out factual information about these things even if Cultural Transmission is 
not providing it. 
So, the claim that I ought to do what I would do if I knew what I ought to 
know and cared about what I ought to care about seems right. But what use 
is it in making decisions about what to do? It is always possible that I don’t 
know something or care about something that I ought to. And it seems that 
any decision procedure for deciding what I ought to do depends for its 
reliability on further ‘oughts’—moreover, on further oughts for which the 
decision procedure could only involve reference to even further oughts! 
This situation persuades me that no decision-procedure is guaranteed 
to issue in a decision that I never come to regard as having not been in 
my self-interest after all. In choosing a flat, I may come to realise that I 
did not know about some of its features or care sufficiently about others. 
Rather than despairing over the lack of a guaranteed method of making 
correct decisions, however, I can take the ineliminability of ‘oughts’ as 
an invitation always to press my reasonings and concerns as far as I can, 
asking myself whether I know enough to make a decision and whether I 
am attaching sufficient weight to the right things. I can see that there are 
pathways to extending both my knowledge and my regions of concern in 
ways they ought to be extended. I often become aware of my ignorance of 
certain important matters, realising that they are relevant to my condition 
and that knowledge is available. And I am often made aware that I ought 
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to care about something to which I previously gave no attention—that 
my shoelaces were untied or that I hurt someone’s feelings with my 
brusqueness. There is, it seems, a horizon, towards which I can extend both 
my factual knowledge and my concerns. But the domain of what I ought to 
know is limited by the knowledge that is actually available in my culture—I 
cannot get very far beyond what others know and can communicate to me, 
and I cannot extend my concerns very far outside the range of concerns 
other people present to me. 
Armed then with the confidence that, with due diligence, I can make 
good decisions about what it is in my self-interest to do, I shall try to 
determine what else I can establish about my knowledge of ‘oughts.’ Can 
I know what you ought to do, what would be good for you? Or is my 
evaluative knowledge limited to my own case? 
Here it seems to me that I am not always in a worse position in judging 
what it would be best for you and for other people to do in your and their 
own self-interest than I am in my own case. The same facts about the world 
and about the average person are relevant to my case and to yours. When 
I see you stumbling around, I know that it would be good for you to find 
your lost glasses. If I see that you are starving, I know that it would be good 
for you to get something to eat. The basis of my confidence is the knowledge 
that the average, psychologically healthy person has preferences to be 
warm, dry, well-fed, just as I do, and able to see, hear, and move around, 
whilst recognising that even where these basic human needs are concerned, 
preferences and likings may be quite variable. 
For example, if you enjoy adventure travel and love camping on glaciers 
and catching your own food, your requirements for creature comforts are 
much less than those of a constitutionally or temperamentally more delicate 
person. You may know facts about yourself and how you are different from 
the average person that have a bearing on what it is reasonable for you to 
do in your self-interest. But I too can know these facts about how you differ 
from the average person, enabling me to know what you ought to do and 
what will be best for you. And sometimes it is the case that your emotions 
blind you to certain facts about how the world works and about likelihoods 
that are apparent to me as a detached observer. I may know that relevant 
information is available and even know what it is; you may not. In some 
cases, I am a better judge than you about what you ought to do, whereas in 
other cases you are a better judge than I am about what you ought to do. 
There is no hard and fast rule here that I can see. 
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So far I have considered whether I can know what it is good for me 
to do and good for you to do—what is in my self-interest or in yours. 
The good outcomes envisioned concern comfort, security, flexibility, and 
enjoyment and often involve trade-offs. Prudential decisions about saving, 
for example, concern the balance between enjoyment in vigorous youth 
and security in frail old age. Prudential decisions about marriage concern 
the balance between the attractiveness and charm of the proposed partner 
and their dependability and willingness to pitch in. These are all matters 
for investigation. Suppose I enjoy smoking but am aware that it shortens 
life and degrades health. How do I weigh present my enjoyment against 
the possibility of future misery and gnawing regret? I should consult the 
statistics. What condition are people usually in after they have smoked 
for twenty, thirty, or forty years? Have I any reason to believe that things 
will go differently for me? What about the people who have quit smoking? 
Have I reason to believe that the pleasure they formerly derived from 
smoking was any less than mine? Do they miss the habit so strongly that 
their quality of life is diminished? 
In principle, I have concluded, knowledge of evaluative properties—the 
goodness or badness of decisions taken and actions performed by me and 
by others—is at least possible. Nevertheless, this knowledge is limited. It is 
false that for every decision I face there is a right answer about what I ought 
to do and a number of wrong answers. The knowledge of the world and 
of likelihoods and the knowledge of how I am like or unlike other people 
that would be required to make a reasonable decision may be unavailable 
to me, even if I strive to extend my knowledge and concerns to a reasonable 
degree. I think I should be content with the conclusion that I do sometimes 
know what you, or I, or we ought to do. I have gained, it seems to me, the 
right to claim that I have evaluative knowledge, but only by way of keeping 
my aspirations to knowledge modest. 
But what about moral oughts? Judging what I ought morally to do, what 
it would be morally good or right to do, is not the same as judging what it 
is in my self-interest to do. Prudential decisions concern me, or some entity 
with which I identify, such as my family, or my business, or my career. If 
I act imprudently, then, in the absence of good luck, things will likely turn 
out badly for me or for one of those entities, and if I act prudently, then, in 
the absence of bad luck, things will likely turn out well for me or for one of 
those entities with which I identify. Moral decisions, though, do not seem 
to concern my security, comfort, and enjoyment—my self-interest—or at 
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least not in the same way. A prudential decision that serves my interests 
could very well be one that makes me morally uneasy. 
A moral ought, it now occurs to me, involves a decision about how 
I ought to behave towards you in certain types of situation or, more 
generally, how Person 1 ought to behave towards Person 2 in certain types 
of situation. I am aware that there are people who think that there are 
moral issues involved in how people treat or regard animals, landscapes, 
exotic languages, institutions like marriage or democracy, or perhaps even 
disused typefaces. And some people even think there are immoral ways 
to treat yourself. Perhaps they are right, but I suspect these views concern 
extensions of the central idea of morality. So I will confine myself for the 
present to thinking about situations involving two separate but interacting 
persons as morally basic. Accordingly, to discover whether there are actions, 
situations, events, and persons that are morally good or bad, and actions 
I ought to perform, or may perform, or should refrain from performing, 
I should investigate whether there is anything I can establish about how 
Person 1 ought to behave towards Person 2 when they come to stand in 
some sort of relationship.  
Enquiry V
The Enquirer discovers that she knows some of the ‘Norms of Civility’ dictating 
how Person 1 ought to behave towards Person 2 in certain typical situations and 
wonders why these norms are observed and whether it is always good to observe 
them. 
I have established that I can know a few things about what is good for 
me and what I ought to do for my own sake. I have also discovered that 
arriving at reasonable decisions about what to do in my own self-interest 
under conditions of uncertainty requires attention both to actual features 
of the world and of myself and to scrutiny of my own cares and concerns 
for their appropriateness. 
Whenever I have to make a decision about a practical matter of self-
interest—because ‘doing nothing’ is tantamount to making a decision—I 
ought to do what is reasonable even when I do not know exactly what is 
most reasonable—e.g. paying £X/pw for a flat as opposed to £X + £1/pw. 
To decide what to do, I ought to seek out information about what usually 
happens in situations like mine and to people like me when various 
alternative courses of action are pursued. I have to interrogate myself as to 
whether I have as much factual information as I need to make a reasonable 
decision and whether I care about the things I ought to care about. This 
introduces an element of indeterminacy—any decision can be regretted. 
Still, it would be absurd to say that no one can ever make a good decision 
about what it is in their self-interest to do. Further, good prudential 
decisions are not maximally cautious decisions. It is surely worth risking 
some degree of regret in case there is a reasonable chance of things working 
out in my interest. For I may also regret not having acted more boldly and 
not having taken on more risk. And some regret may be irrational, just as 
guilt can be irrational.
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My reasoning has also persuaded me that I can know a few things about 
what is good for other people and what they ought to do for their own 
sakes. Most people who care about their health and appearance (though 
perhaps not all) should quit smoking. Most people ought to save for the 
future and extricate themselves from intimate relationships with people 
who do not care about them. Accordingly, when I declare, knowing that 
my friend James is seriously near-sighted, that ‘James ought to get glasses,’ 
adding that doing so will enable him to enjoy films more, I am not simply 
expressing a certain feeling I have when I think about James’s optical 
situation. I am not merely holding up a placard expressing my preference 
for James to get glasses. I am also expressing my understanding of a causal 
relationship between enjoying films and good vision and my knowledge 
of how James likes to spend his evenings. Of course James might get 
glasses and then discover that he is not really as keen on the cinema as 
he formerly thought. Or perhaps, after he gets glasses, the film industry 
might deteriorate seriously, and there would be no more good films to see. 
But I think I can still claim to know what James ought to do. It can be an 
evaluative fact that it would be good for James to get glasses, a fact that 
glasses will be good for James. 
But can I ever know, not how I or someone else ought to proceed in 
order to make things better for themselves, but how Person 1 ought to treat 
Person 2? If I can sometimes know this in the general case, I can know, at 
least sometimes, how I, as Person 1, ought to treat Person 2, when Person 2 
and I are in a certain types of situation in which normative questions about 
what ought to be done, or what it is right or wrong to do, arise. Perhaps I can 
even know how I ought to treat Person 2 in morally significant situations. 
But as I am not sure at this stage what a ‘morally significant’ situation is, I 
shall postpone consideration of that question. 
It occurs to me that I do know certain things of this type. For example, I 
maintain that I know that: 
If Person 1, who is lost in a large city, politely asks Person 2 the way to the 
nearest bus stop, and if Person 2 knows the answer and is not in a desperate 
hurry on account of some pressing business or some emergency, Person 2 
ought to tell Person 1 the way to the nearest bus stop. 
Failure to answer Person 1’s question on the part of Person 2 would be 
‘unkind’ or ‘rude.’ If I were Person 1, I would be affronted if I had good 
reason to believe that Person 2 knew the answer to my question and was 
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brushing me off. I would experience the brush off as a violation of what 
might be called an ‘ought of civility’ or a ‘Norm of Civility.’ I hesitate to 
say that it would be a violation of a a ‘ought of morality’ or of a Norm of 
Morality as I have not yet decided what morality is all about. Yet this Norm 
of Civility may have some relation to moral oughts, as reflected in the 
phrase ‘manners and morals’ and the Latin term mores covering customs 
in general.10 So, pressing onwards, here are some further Norms of Civility 
that I think I know:
If Person 1 is a guest in Person 2’s house, then, upon departure, Person 1 
ought to thank Person 2 for entertaining and feeding them. 
If Person 1 is a guest in Person 2’s house and it is late and Person 2 begins to 
yawn, Person 1 ought to go home. 
Further, it seems to me that I can lay down the following as general truths 
about how things ‘ought to go’ in Host-Guest situations when Guest comes 
to a meal prepared by Host:
Host ought to show appreciation for Guest’s coming to visit. 
Host ought to try to ensure that Guest has an enjoyable meal in comfortable 
surroundings. 
Guest ought to try to entertain and amuse Host.
Guest ought to show appreciation for Host’s efforts. 
Perhaps just to be on the safe side, I should put ‘normally’ or ‘usually’ 
after the main verbs in each sentence, as I can imagine some exceptions to 
these generalisations. Normally, Guest should show appreciation for Host’s 
efforts. 
It seems to me in any case that I know all these things, and that I was 
taught them or learned them by watching the behaviour of other people 
and the effects it had. Knowing that Host and Guest ought to do these 
things seems tantamount to knowing how to behave as a Host or a Guest. 
Where the Norms of Civility are concerned, there seems to be a great deal 
of room both for local convention and for improvisation. Local convention 
and time of day will determine whether Host should offer Guest a cup of 
coffee, a cup of tea, or an alcoholic drink. The ways in which Guest tries to 
entertain Host will depend on Guest’s imagination, recent experiences, and 
sense of humour. Host will typically devote some thought to coming up 
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with an interesting menu, which will usually contain ingredients that are 
mostly recognizable to Guest. Snake or snails will usually be on the menu 
only if Host is fairly certain of Guest’s enjoyment of these delicacies. 
Other situations in which Person 1 and Person 2 interact require the 
intelligent appreciation of Person 2’s likely state of mind and needs if the 
Norms of Civility are to be observed. Take the Strangers on a Train (or 
these days, the Strangers on a Plane) situation. How ought a seatmate to 
be treated? This seems to depend on many factors—the ages of Person 
1 and Person 2, the difference in their ages, their apparent receptivity to 
conversation, and their overall state of mind—relaxed or tense. If Person 
2 pulls out a sheaf of papers and begins to study them intently, it is a 
violation of the Norms of Civility for Person 1 to begin to ask Person 2 
personal questions. If there is severe turbulence in the air and Person 2 
appears distressed, it is civil for Person 1 to say something reassuring. If 
Person 1 finds Person 2 attractive and wants to start up a conversation and 
Person 2 pulls out a novel Person 1 has recently read, it is not uncivil for 
Person 1 to comment briefly on the book. 
The Norms of Civility accordingly reflect the needs, desires, and states 
of mind of Persons 1 and 2. The response of Person 2 to Person 1’s overture 
will reflect Person 2’s grasp of Person 1’s intentions and assessment of them. 
There are ‘scripts’ but also deviations from them. Sometimes a violation of 
a Norm of Civility such as asking nosy questions or interrupting someone’s 
concentration on a task will be resented and a rebuff issued; at other times, 
it will be tolerated. 
It occurs to me in this connection that when I initially decided to doubt 
all my evaluative beliefs, I did not consider that I knew how to do certain 
things in addition to knowing that certain things were the case. I believed 
that I knew how to rewire a lamp, how to make a cake, how to fill in a 
tax return. I also believed that I knew how not to do certain things—the 
‘wrong way’ to rewire a lamp by attaching the green ground wire to one of 
the poles, and the ‘wrong way’ to bake a cake, namely at 220°C. I thought 
I could distinguish between a well-baked, tasty, elegant cake and a burnt, 
underdone, tasteless, or shapeless one. So when setting all my evaluative 
beliefs aside, I should have doubted that I knew how to do anything 
properly, correctly, elegantly, or efficiently, and that anyone else knew 
how to do anything properly, correctly, elegantly, or efficiently either. I 
should have supposed that we merely have the feeling or impression that 
we know how to do things as they should be done or are best done. 
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However, the assumption that no one really knows how to do anything 
well seems implausible. I get constant feedback from the world that tells me 
whether I know how to do something and how to do it well. My constantly 
falling off and scraping my knees is information that I do not know how to 
ride a bicycle, or not well. My receiving a bad electric shock is information 
that I do not know how to do simple home wiring. My shoelaces constantly 
coming undone is information that I do not know how to choose shoes or 
shoelaces or how to tie good knots. By contrast, if I know how to ride a 
bicycle, I can cycle everywhere speedily without mishap. If I know how to 
bake a cake, I will likely receive compliments on my baking. This negative 
and positive feedback convinces me of what I do and do not know how to do. 
A grasp of the Norms of Civility implies the knowledge of how to do 
certain things, mainly in one-to-one encounters. The personal interactions 
involved are rule-governed but somewhat flexible ‘practices’—games of a 
sort. I can take personal satisfaction in the exercise of skill—social polish—
in much the same way as I can take satisfaction in having mastered and 
being able to apply the rules of chess and poker. I am aware that I have 
mastered these roles somewhat imperfectly; my manners are not altogether 
smooth, and I make blunders from time to time, as I observe others do. 
There are norms I cannot be expected to have mastered. I do not know 
how to behave with perfect correctness as a guest in the home of a Chinese 
family.
Knowing how to behave civilly towards others, it occurs to me, involves 
feedback mechanisms, both positive and negative, that are analogous to 
the feedback I receive in attempting other practical tasks. By mastering the 
norms, I am able to participate in the common forms of human life, and to 
receive the rewards of sociability and avoid the misery of social exclusion 
and the pain of criticism. The way others treat me should persuade me that 
I know or do not know how to behave as a guest in my local culture or in 
some other culture. If I go as a Guest to a dinner party in my own city and 
sit like a stick the entire evening, I may never be invited back. If as a Host 
my food is carelessly prepared and not very tasty, my further invitations 
may be declined. So it is that I slowly learn the norms of civility and how 
to behave when I am Person 1 or Person 2. My expectations of how Person 
1 ought to behave towards me are formed as well, and I become puzzled or 
annoyed if they are unfulfilled. 
I can nevertheless ask myself ‘What reason do I have to adhere to the 
Norms of Civility? Why play the games, why master these rules at all? 
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Am I not free to fail to show appreciation as Guest, or provide good food 
as Host, or do any of the other things that Hosts and Guests ought to do, 
such as leaving when my Host appears tired?’ For these things will cost me 
some effort: good food is expensive and takes time and trouble to prepare. 
Perhaps the evening went badly, and I did not enjoy Host’s presence; it will 
be emotionally difficult as Guest to show appreciation. 
I need to distinguish, however, between two very different questions: 
1)    Why ought I to conform to any Norm of Civility ever? 
2)    Why, in this particular case, ought I to conform to this particular Norm 
of Civility? 
The first question did not occur to me in connection with the norms of 
self-interest. I didn’t have to wonder why I should ever do what it is in 
my interest to do. However, where question 1 is concerned, I believe there 
are some exceptional people whose life situation is such that they have no 
reason to confirm to any Norms of Civility, ever, and they are not motivated 
to conform either. Such people have no desire ever to play such roles as 
Stranger on a Train or Host and Guest. They see no point in mastering the 
routines required. If I am a Happy Hermit, content with my own society 
and perhaps that of my domestic animals and the wildlife around me, there 
is no reason for me to learn and practice the Norms of Civility. If I am an 
Unhappy Hermit who, on account of madness or some grave psychological 
condition, is unable to master them, there would seem to be no point in my 
trying to do so because I could not possibly succeed.
The second question, however, did occur to me in connection with the 
norms of self-interest. The fact that something is in my interest to do can 
help to explain why I ought to do it, and it normally constitutes a reason in 
favour of my doing it. However, there may be things it is in my self-interest 
to do that I ought not to do.11 Filching and lying can be advantageous to my 
interests if they are performed undetectably. As a postman or postwoman, I 
could decide to bin a small parcel at the nearest bus stop rather than walking 
through a cold rain to deliver it. The reasons I can cite to myself for doing 
things need not be decisive reasons and they may or may not be associated 
with motivations to do the thing. For a reason to do something can co-exist 
with many reasons not to do it, and with conflicting motivations, such as 
the feeling that it would be disgraceful to bin an inconvenient parcel.
I can think of several reasons why I might disregard the usual rules of 
Host-Guest behaviour in a particular case or be unable to live up to them. 
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Imagine that as Host, I have just received some terrible news and am so 
distracted that I fail to look after my Guests. Or that as Guest, I find that I 
have been invited to the home of a sadist who embarrasses and ridicules 
me for the first hour. I would be justified in departing abruptly and without 
thanks. Or maybe I am a gauche ten year old who has not yet learned how 
to behave. If I never take public transportation, I may never have learned 
the conventional behaviour of Strangers on a Train, and I don’t need to 
know it. 
Or what if I simply think a norm is stupid and inconvenient? Suppose 
I just hate writing thank-you letters for birthday presents and believe such 
letters to be frequently insincere, though I know it is expected of me in 
my culture? Suppose I just don’t do it. There is a risk that people will stop 
giving me birthday presents, or reproach me with ingratitude, but I may be 
willing to assume that risk. 
I may know or believe that I can get away with unconventional behaviour. 
Perhaps people are loving and forgiving and will give me birthday presents 
anyway. Perhaps I am such a celebrity that people will perform the Guest 
or Host role to my benefit despite my performing my part abysmally. As 
a Great Man, I might sit like a stick all evening, refusing to be drawn into 
conversation, either because I am shy or because I have contempt for the 
others and know that my presence will be prized no matter what I do. Or 
if I am a Spectacular Beauty and Wit, I might decide to violate the Norms 
of Civility by interrupting the work of the busy stranger next to me in case 
I find him or her intriguing and attractive. I am taking the risk of a serious 
rebuff, but it might be one I have decided is worth it. In all of these cases, 
my behaviour is explicable. 
The Shy Great Man, I think, has not rejected the norms of Host-Guest 
behaviour—he is simply incapable of living up to them. His behaviour is 
neither reasonable nor unreasonable. By contrast, the Arrogant Great Man 
and the Spectacular Beauty and Wit have calculated the likelihood of social 
punishment and decided to go ahead. The Arrogant Great Man derives 
personal satisfaction from his arrogance and Spectacular Wit and Beauty 
hopes for a bit of flirtation. Their norm-violating behaviour does not strike 
me as ‘irrational,’ and perhaps not even as ‘unreasonable’ But it can be 
‘annoying’ and carries some risk. 
So the answer to question 2, why I should conform to particular Norms 
of Civility on particular occasions, even when there is some reason not to 
do so, can, I think, take one of the following forms:
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Because I can avoid risk, annoyance, and social punishment by living up to 
the norm 
Because I am able to live up to the norm without much trouble
Because the other person is playing their part appropriately
If none of these things is the case, I have no reason, it seems to me, to 
observe a Norm of Civility, though I may do so out of habit. 
So far, then, I have established that in human life there are certain 
conventions dictating how Person 1 ought to behave towards Person 2 
when they are occupying particular social roles and that there are reasons 
for observing them. I learn these norms through practice, imitation, 
instruction, and social feedback. Other people’s mastery of these norms 
may be different from mine. And the particular forms these conventions 
take will vary from society to society: burping shows appreciation for a 
meal in some cultures; in others it is considered rude. A thank-you note or a 
telephone call may be expected or not expected after a visit, etc. But insofar 
as I am neither a Happy Hermit nor an Unhappy Hermit, I am satisfied that 
there are things I ought to do that are different from those that are directly 
in my self-interest. I think I have established that: 
1)    There are ways that Hosts and Guests or Strangers on a Train ought and 
ought not to behave whenever they encounter one another. These are the 
Norms of Civility.
2)    The reason for someone to act in accordance with Norms of Civility in 
general is that it is generally rewarding and easy to take part in human 
society, though a Happy Hermit may find satisfaction outside of it, and 
an Unhappy Hermit might be incapable of participating. 
3)    There can nevertheless be a good reason to disregard a particular Norm 
of Civility in a particular case. 
I can therefore be confident that there are good reasons to observe the 
Norms of Civility whenever there are no special reasons not to do so. My 
social life will be made easier and more pleasant if I do than if I don’t. 
To understand the nature of the ‘oughts’ of self-interest, I had to consider 
such notions as: ‘needs,’ ‘comforts,’ ‘bad outcomes,’ ‘likelihoods,’ ‘available 
knowledge,’ and ‘reasonable concerns.’ To understand the nature of the 
Norms of Civility, I have to consider such notions as: ‘practices,’ ‘skills,’ 
‘social roles,’ ‘social rewards and punishments,’ ‘the expectations of others,’ 
and ‘hermits.’ 
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I no longer suppose that my beliefs that there are things I ought to 
do and states of affairs that are better for me have arisen only because I 
have been brainwashed by the warning placards waved by others, who 
were coerced in turn by placards written and waved about merely because 
someone else felt strongly about them and wanted others to conform. But 
how shall I apply what I have discovered to morality? Morality, like civility, 
appears to concern relations between Person 1 and Person 2. At least this is 
how I understood it when I decided to assume a sceptical posture towards 
morality. At the same time, moral relations strike me as rather different 
from the formal relations of Host-Guest manners. And there are at least 
three reasons why morality might be very different from civility. 
For one thing, I appreciate that the Norms of Civility are local. Knowing 
how to behave in my home city does not ensure that I know how to 
behave in other countries, or other regions, or other subcultures. What is 
appropriate there, such as the Host’s apologising about the poor quality 
of the food, or burping on the part of the appreciative Guest, may not be 
so here and vice-versa. Further, there is no reason for me to learn and to 
conform to the Norms of Civility of another culture or subculture if I do not 
interact with its members and have no aspirations to do so. Conformity is 
optional and depends on my curiosity, my interest in getting along in the 
culture, or my needing to do so. 
The way I have always thought of morality before I decided to doubt 
everything was that morality was universal and applied to everyone 
regardless of their culture or region. Morals, I thought, involved a higher 
form of ‘ought’ than manners, and they were not optional. Whether to 
conform to morality, I thought, didn’t depend on whether I was interested 
in participating in the morality system or needed to do so to avoid being 
ostracised. So perhaps I need to rethink this old assumption. Perhaps morals 
are relative to times, places, cultures, and subcultures and are optional. Or 
perhaps morality really does have the features I naively supposed it to and 
is different from manners. 
A second feature that puzzles me in thinking about how the norms of 
civility might be like or unlike the norms of morality is the role of experts. 
There are experts in manners who write books and columns about how to 
behave in polite society. I can pretty much take their word for it about what 
is strictly correct in many sorts of interactions. Of course sometimes the 
experts admit that there is no established norm, or they suggest a new norm. 
The presence of former spouses at weddings is a question about a Norm 
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of Civility. Fifty years ago, it would have been considered atrocious taste 
and very bad manners to issue or to accept such an invitation. Today some 
people might think it rude to exclude a former spouse from the guest list. 
But I don’t see morality as working in the same way, with experts telling us 
exactly how to behave in a range of concrete situations. Can moral experts 
suggest new moral norms and put their weight behind them? 
A third feature that concerns me is that the reasons I have identified for 
acting in accord with particular Norms of Civility, and for respecting the 
Norms of Civility of my Culture in general, were based on the relative lack 
of effort required and the rewards and satisfactions for me of mastering the 
skills involved. But morality, as I formerly understood it, is not a system of 
rules that is easy and pleasurable to master; indeed, it can be painful and 
detrimental to my self-interest to act morally. It will not be so easy, I fear, 
to find reasons for observing the Norms of Morality, either in the general 
or in the particular case. 
I will defer these questions until I have arrived at a better understanding 
of what makes an interaction between two people morally significant.  
Enquiry VI
The Enquirer determines what makes a relationship between Person 1 and Person 
2 morally significant and investigates the origins of her moral feelings and 
attitudes. She then discovers that prudence and self-interest sometimes have a 
moral dimension insofar as they concern the relations between a Present Self and 
a Future Self.
Thus far I have established that I can obtain knowledge of several kinds 
of ‘oughts’—knowledge of what is good for me and so what I ought and 
ought not to do, knowledge of what is likely good for others—what it is 
in their self-interest to do and not to do, and, finally, knowledge of how to 
treat others in a civil fashion and what to expect from them. I know how 
in many contexts, including some contexts in which Person 1 and Person 
2 stand in conventional social roles, you and I, or Person 1 and Person 2, 
ought to behave, and what we ought to do and say. 
My knowledge of what is good and bad for me has been acquired 
by observation, introspection, and through my reading and inferring. 
While these processes required me to have a functioning Neurological 
Constitution and to be subject to Cultural Transmission, there is a lot that 
I simply figured out for myself. I haven’t only been brainwashed by my 
culture or forced to think things by my brain. I have taken an active role in 
learning about prudence and civility. 
I learned early on that shocks and falls were bad for me, and I came to 
realise that there were many discomforts and deprivations that I preferred 
to avoid. My life went better when I was warm, dry, amused, occupied with 
meaningful work, had the companionship of interesting people, access to 
books and films and natural landscapes, such as fields, forests, lakes, and 
oceans, and when I could take pleasure in clothes and furnishings. All these 
things made my life better in the sense that it was more pleasing to me. To 
the extent that I am a typical person and others are like me, I can assume 
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that what’s good for me is good for them as well, and I can therefore claim 
to know that they ought to strive for and to have these things. To the 
extent that I recognise others as having different preferences, abilities, and 
limitations, I can know what is good for them and what they ought to strive 
for and have, even if these goods are not those that I ought to strive for and 
to have. 
In turn, my knowledge of how to behave in civil fashion was acquired 
by instruction, observation, and social feedback. I grew up in a culture, I 
was told what to do, I experienced the approval and disapproval of my 
fellows, and I experienced resentment and gratitude at the incivility and 
civility of others. I established that I could ignore what I had learned only 
if I was prepared to be a Happy or forced to be an Unhappy Hermit, for if I 
were to try to behave consistently like an Arrogant Great Man, I might save 
myself the effort of civility for a time, but only until others became fed up 
with my behaviour and excluded me. Moreover, I continue to learn how 
to treat Person 2 and how to expect Person 2 to treat me as new situations 
with different relations and conventions arise and I continue to refine my 
knowledge and correct my behaviour. 
To return to the central question, what is ‘morality’ all about, if it is 
different from self-interest, prudence, and civility? 
Reflecting back on the kinds of issues I used to consider ‘moral issues,’ 
before I decided to put all my moral beliefs in question, I recall that they 
clustered around a certain range of topics amongst which were: bodily 
harm and killing, treatment of the young, the helpless or vulnerable, the 
actions generated by love, passion, and sexual attraction or repulsion, 
deception, economic exploitation, and damage to a person’s self-esteem, 
confidence, honour, or reputation. What do these topics have in common, I 
now wonder? What has sex to do with killing, or financial behaviour with 
insult?
Let me try to recall some of the actions that, before I decided to question 
all my moral ideas along with all my other normative ideas, I considered 
morally wrong. I still have not established that I can know them to be so, but 
here are some that occur to me:
1)    A politician poisons a political rival. 
2)    A police officer tortures a prisoner to make them confess. 
3)    A woman tells a man the falsehood that she is pregnant to persuade him 
to marry her.
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4)    A man who has been living with a woman refuses to take a paternity test 
to establish whether he is the father of a woman’s child. 
5)    A student writes and sells essays to other students. 
6)    A mother chains her young child to the bedpost to go to a nightclub.
7)    An employer profits magnificently by forcing his employees to work 
long hours for low pay.
Like violations of the Norms of Civility, these situations involve the 
purported misbehaviour of Person 1 towards Person (or sometimes 
Persons) 2. But what do these situations have in common in virtue of which 
I used to regard them as violations of morality? 
Reflecting on what these cases have in common, I can see that the actions 
performed by Person 1 are deliberate12 in every case, and that they fulfil a 
personal desire, ambition, or goal of Person 1 at the expense of Person 2. 
The ‘helping’ behaviour of the student in 5) certainly benefits the lazy or 
untalented purchaser in the short run; it can only be wrong if it harms the 
purchaser in the long run because they do not learn, or if it harms those who 
had to write their own essays, or misleads future employers. The politician 
believes they will benefit from having their rival out of the way; the police 
officer that they will obtain valuable information which it is their mission 
to obtain; the woman seeks the security of marriage; the man, escape from 
a financial burden; the student desires more spending money for desired 
goods; the mother, an exciting evening out; and the employer, profit. 
In cases 1 and 2, the cost to Person 2 is death, or extreme pain and 
grievous bodily harm. In case 3, the cost is entrapment in a relationship; 
in 4, it is disappointment—perhaps abandonment and humiliation; in 5, 
the loss of due reward for effort and ability in a competitive situation. In 
6, Person 2 is immobilised and risks physical injury and psychological 
distress; in 7, Person 2 experiences exhaustion and poverty. 
Now, I do not think that there is anything unreasonable as such 
about the desires of Person 1 in each of the cases above when they are 
considered ‘in the abstract.’ Political victory, obtaining a confession to a 
crime, security, sex, spending money, and profit are all legitimate human 
aims. Their pursuit makes the world go round. But even worthy aims 
can impose costs, hardships, and suffering, just as deliberate cruelty and 
sadism do. 
So ‘morality,’ I think, is essentially the subject that deals with relations 
between Person 1 and Person 2, where the satisfaction of human aims that 
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impose costs on others is concerned. (Perhaps one can behave morally and 
immorally as well towards animals, or the landscape, or the ocean, or even 
towards oneself, but I think it is important to get clarity on moral relations 
between different persons first.) Insofar as morality concerns the behaviour 
of Person 1 and Person 2 in certain familiar types of situation in which they 
are interacting, it is like civility. But morality also concerns the prudential 
interests of both Person 1 and Person 2. For I think I can see that:
In pursuing her prudential interests—what’s good for her, her self-interest—
Person 1 can undermine the prudential interests of Person 2—what’s good 
for him. 
What about actions of the sort I used to consider morally worthy before 
putting everything in question? The following occur to me: 
1)    A politician resigns his post to care for his recently disabled wife.
2)    A police officer intervenes to stop a colleague from manhandling a 
prisoner.
3)    A woman tells a family-oriented man who is getting serious about her 
that she is unable to bear children. 
4)    A man assumes financial responsibility for a child born outside of 
wedlock and helps to care for it.
5)    A teenager takes a wallet full of cash they found on the bus to the police 
without removing any of it. 
6)    A mother works long hours to pay for art supplies for her talented child.
7)    An employer responds promptly and effectively to an employee 
grievance. 
In each of these cases, Person 1 gives up something that is normally valued 
in order to benefit Person 2 or prevent a harm to Person 2. The politician 
gives up fortune, fame, and influence; the police officer, the chance to obtain 
valuable information; the new father, a proportion of his time and income. 
The woman may lose a man she loves; the teenager foregoes a windfall; 
the mother sacrifices her free time and recreation; and the employer may 
reduce his profits by improving working conditions. Yet, these are the sorts 
of actions I was formerly inclined to think of as morally good. 
At the same time, I was never disposed to regard any and all actions 
intended to prevent harm to or to benefit another person as moral. I 
recognised cases in which Person 1 could make things better for Person 2, 
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but without acting morally. For example, I can imagine cases such as the 
following:
1)    A show-off tipper leaves a waiter a 50% tip to impress their companion.
2)    A driver speeds up on the motorway when entering from the slip road so 
that other drivers need not anxiously brake. 
3)    A father leaves his desk and rushes to comfort his child who has fallen 
and skinned their knee. 
4)    A politician puts their career at risk by voting for a law that lowers the 
tax rate for top income earners. 
In these cases, Person 1 confers a benefit on Person 2 (or on several Persons) 
that requires something from Person 1: money, attentiveness, interruption 
of a project, or the sacrifice of popularity. However, the intention of the 
tipper is not to sacrifice for the benefit of the waiter, the driver simply 
follows the rules of good driving, and the father acts spontaneously and 
irresistibly. In Case 4, political effort was required, and the action was bold 
and risky, but the wealthy beneficiaries are perhaps not deserving of the 
benefit, and the side-effects of the politician’s action for the poor may be 
deplorable. The fact that an action is done only in order to show off, or 
from good manners, or from an unreflective impulse, or only benefited 
someone incidentally—someone who did not really deserve it—seems 
to disqualify it as a moral action. A quintessentially moral action, on my 
former understanding, is one that is done at a cost to the agent that he or 
she recognises, that goes beyond everyday good manners or caretaking, 
and that is done reflectively, with the intention of benefiting someone. But 
wouldn’t this characterisation fit the underling Person 1 who risks a long 
prison term by helping the Mafia boss Person 2 to fit concrete shoes on their 
victim? It must also be the case, I suppose, that the benefit conferred does 
not contribute to the harm that is done to yet another Person.
Further, there seem to be certain kinds of harms Person 1 can inflict on 
Person 2 for Person 1’s benefit that, although they are extremely serious, I 
had trouble conceiving as quintessentially immoral. For example: 
1)    A brain-damaged man kidnaps and murders five young women. 
2)    In a fit of rage, a normally forgiving and equable woman stabs her 
taunting, unfaithful husband.
3)    A schizophrenic patient leaps from a window to his death, devastating 
his family and deeply upsetting the hospital staff. 
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The results of these actions are terrible—the suffering they cause to Person 
2 or a number of affected persons is immense and irreparable. Yet the 
‘benefit’ Person 1 receives is not the sort of benefit that the agents in my 
earlier cases received. It is not obvious to me that the actions of Person 
1 are under control in the same way as the earlier cases described. The 
brain-damaged killer is driven by a neurological abnormality; the two 
others act out of desperation or from disturbed states of mind. To say that 
they act ‘immorally’ seems both too weak, given the horror of their deeds, 
and too strong, given their inability to engage in the sorts of knowing and 
caring that would deter them from these deeds. The realm of morality 
thus seemed to me to embrace deeds that present constant temptations to 
normal people—people who are persuadable rather than compulsive.
Morality, like civility, seems to depend on the existence of social 
relationships, even relationships that are not mediated by language. It is 
not surprising to me that Darwin thought that all social animals that can 
help one another to survive and that are capable of interfering in the lives 
of others of their species might be able to evolve a form of morality. In my 
own case, the fact of my social dependency on other humans has long been 
obvious to me. Without these others I could not survive, or, if I did survive, 
I would not resemble a human being of the sort that lives in any culture. 
I have read reports of feral children, fed by animals of other species, who 
grew up mute and unaccustomed to the care and teaching of a mother 
and other adults and to interaction with other children. They behave very 
strangely, and I can readily believe that to grow up in a culture and to 
participate in observation, imitation, and conversation with other humans 
is absolutely necessary to becoming a normal human being. 
The desire for human society in babies, for example, is not instilled by 
life in human society, or not altogether, while, at the same time, experience 
in human society is needed to become human. True, there are hermits who 
turn their back on human society and live in caves or in the desert, but I 
have reason to believe that they are either suffering from a type of mental 
illness or have been so inspired by devotion to an idea or an ideal that they 
have adopted a form of life that most human beings would find distressing 
and unsustainable. This is not to say that some degree of solitude is not 
good for me. I am surely able by my very nature to tolerate and even to 
enjoy periods when I am alone with my work or my thoughts. 
But why do I prefer to live in a society with others rather than on my 
own? Why is it in my interest to do so? When I was young, I could not 
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nourish myself and depended on others to feed me; as a young child 
unable to swim, run fast, or make judgements about invisible dangers, I 
was unaware of the threats posed by animals or violent human beings, by 
fast moving automobiles, electric currents, poisons, and water. I required 
tending when sick, and, were it not for the care of my elders, I surely would 
not have survived my infancy. As an older child, I required to be shown 
what plants and animals were edible and how to procure and prepare 
them, how to fashion and use tools to do so, and how to build or find 
shelters against cold or wind or heat. I imagine that for my ancestors these 
methods of instruction were quite different, as they are for people living in 
different cultures today. In my own country, I do not learn how to build 
a hut and thatch the roof but rather certain intricacies having to do with 
buying or renting houses or flats, and keeping them in good repair, which 
I rely on others to explain to me. I depend on others for amusement and 
entertainment with jokes and stories; they can do better at this than I can 
myself. 
Further, I depend upon others to explain to me what to expect from 
my own behaviour and that of other people. I do not need to be taught 
when someone is angry, for I can interpret the raised voice, the flushing, 
the scowling as threatening to me, but I need to be taught why people 
sometimes become angry when I cannot see the cause for it, and when I am 
perhaps myself the cause. 
I can see now that from the dependency of my ancestors on others 
for nourishment, for protection from danger, and for learning, my own 
dependencies, however different in form, have persisted and arisen. I 
must find a mate and co-operate with that person to produce and raise 
to maturity our offspring, and I can understand the origins of romantic 
obsession, jealousy, rejection, and other forms of human behaviour as 
efforts to attract and retain the best mate I can. 
I need not be in doubt that certain of the things I judge to be good for 
me—the nutritional and environmental requisites of life and a surrounding 
society—really are so and that this is the case in view of the way I came to 
possess enjoyment in these things and a desire for them through a long 
process of evolution. 
In particular, I seem to share a narrower set of dispositions with my 
closer evolutionary relatives, the apes and monkeys. I suppose that there 
was a common ancestor and that this explains the similarity between the 
faces and bodies of apes and mine, though we also differ in the upright 
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gait, the differentiation between hands and feet, the larger brains, and the 
relative hairlessness of my species.
Apes, I have learned, share food when others beg for it. They may 
threaten one another and even injure one another, but they generally do 
not kill other members of their local troops. They assist one another by 
grooming and tending one another’s wounds and show concern when a 
member of their party is injured. Some animals appear to grieve over the 
deaths of their fellows and to remember them. I seem to have inherited 
some of these patterns of behaviour. Like my living primate relatives, I 
have the capacity to make friends, to display loyalty, to seek revenge and to 
suffer it, and to be helpful to others, especially those who have been helpful 
to me. 
But some dispositions, I have learned, are specific to my species: for 
example, spontaneous food-sharing, paternal care of infants and children, 
elaborate ceremonies for the dead, the veneration of ancestors, and 
religiosity. The fact that my species employs articulated language with 
a complex grammar, and that thoughts can be memorised and recorded 
on paper, that they can be discussed and debated, gives rise to practices 
that the other animals cannot share in. I have learned as well that there 
are powerful human capabilities including ‘mind-reading,’ the ability to 
understand what others feel, believe, and do or do not know. At the same 
time, much of people’s inner lives is hidden from me. 
What I perceive as a good or bad condition of the world can motivate 
me to take action. If I notice a picture hanging crookedly on the wall, I tend 
to want to straighten it. If I see that the refrigerator door is open, I move to 
shut it. If someone asks me to remove a splinter or examine a wound, I am 
quick to do so. Many of my ‘corrective’ reactions of this sort seem to have 
to do with harm to others. I notice the following: 
1)    When I observe a child about to run into a street full of cars, I am 
immediately inclined to stop her.
2)    When I observe someone getting a bump on the shins, I wince. If 
someone shows me an injury or begins to bleed, I start to feel a little 
unwell myself.13
3)    If someone near me is struggling with a package to open a door, I am 
inclined to help. 
4)    If I read in the newspaper of the mistreatment of workers or children, I 
feel a sense of unease or even anger. 
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5)    Although I know that it is not real, a film in which a young person dies 
or lovers are separated forever can make me weep. 
These responses indicate that I know what it is like to have difficulties, 
to need something, to struggle with something, or to be in pain; that I am 
disposed to mirror the suffering of others even when they are fictional; and 
that I try to improve matters when it is easy to do so. 
I conclude that some of my responsiveness to other’s requests, and to 
the needs and wants I can see they have even when they are not articulated, 
together with some of my feelings of approval and disapproval of others’ 
actions, are part of my inherited Normative Kit. The urge to pick up a crying 
baby if it is my own, to feed it, to fret over the injuries of my children, to 
help strangers struggling with bundles, and to give directions to those who 
are lost is spontaneous and must have been imprinted in my evolutionary 
history. 
But doesn’t evolution favour selfishness? I can see that this is not 
necessarily the case. Evolution favours whatever behaviour is conducive to 
my getting my genes into the next generation. Kindness and altruism may 
help me if others help me in turn to survive and flourish. Selfishness may 
induce others to withdraw their co-operation or to punish me. Helpfulness 
and kindness to my siblings, cousins, and my parents who share my genes 
are also conducive to getting my genes and those I share with my close 
relatives into the next generation. Moreover, anger when I have been 
cheated or when I observe that another is being mistreated may improve 
my relations with others and the social environment. With less stress, I can 
reproduce and bring up my young more easily. 
I suppose that I am a typical human being and that others of my species 
have similar underlying dispositions and tendencies. I know, however, that 
there are persons who do not feel empathy, who are not troubled, and who 
are rather excited and gratified by the suffering of others.14 They are not a 
threat to my project of understanding morality and its sources, but they 
are, I concede, a threat to peaceful and happy existence. 
In this way I think I have come to a better understanding of what morality 
is and how moral dispositions have evolved in my species. Whenever 
Animal 1 could gain something for itself—food, a sexual opportunity, 
a good place to sit or sleep, or the intimidation of a rival, but does not 
take advantage of the situation so as to spare an injury to Animal 2, and 
whenever Animal 1 confers a benefit on Animal 2 at some cost or some 
trouble to itself, it is showing ‘proto-moral’ behaviour. Animal 1 could 
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have gained a short-term advantage for itself by molesting, hurting, killing, 
deceiving, raping, or thieving from Animal 2, or refusing to help it, but it 
resists the impulse. These self-denying patterns of behaviour must not only 
have enabled the groups in which they arose to flourish, they must have 
enabled the more moral animals to out-reproduce the less self-denying 
ones. For otherwise the selfish ones would have dominated in these 
populations. My evaluative judgements are accordingly based in nature 
in the sense that nature has fashioned me into a creature spontaneously 
disposed to generate useful emotions and evaluations in the face of certain 
actions, events, situations, persons, and useful feelings of right and wrong, 
obligation and shame. 
In order to understand the nature of the ‘oughts’ of self-interest, I had to 
consider such notions as: ‘needs,’ ‘comforts,’ ‘good and bad outcomes,’ and 
‘likelihoods.’ Good decisions regarding my self-interest took these features 
of the world into account. To understand the ‘oughts’ or Norms of Civility, I 
had to consider such notions as: ‘practices,’ ‘skills,’ ‘social roles,’ and ‘social 
harmony.’ Good decisions about how to behave in a civil fashion and when 
to do so depended on my taking these features of the world into account. 
And now, in order to understand the notion of a ‘moral ought’ or a ‘Norm 
of Morality,’ and to make good decisions about what to think and how to 
behave in morally significant situations, it seems I have to consider such 
notions as ‘sacrifice of interests,’ ‘reciprocity,’ and perhaps even ‘species-
specific behaviour.’ 
Meanwhile, the following thought occurs to me. Morality and self-
interest seem to have something in common that I did not earlier suspect. 
Decisions about what is in my self-interest can involve questions of sacrifice. 
My present self may stand to my future self in the relationship of Person 1 
and Person 2. 
Suppose I decide to give up smoking, which I enjoy, so as not to die 
prematurely, or to scrimp and save so as to avoid pauperism in old age. 
My Future Self has thereby extracted a sacrifice from me! Why should 
my Present Self sacrifice their enjoyments in order to reduce the risk of 
misfortune to Future Self? Why shouldn’t my Future Self endure pains, 
if they come, so that Present Self can enjoy the moment? While some 
prudential dilemmas—such as whether to continue at the poker table in 
the hope of recouping my lost winnings or quit now—do not concern the 
relations between the Present Self and the Future Self, many such dilemmas 
do. I now realise to my astonishment that they are a kind of moral dilemma, 
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involving an action by Person 1, my Present Self, which can benefit or harm 
Person 2, my Future Self. 
In making prudential decisions, I take the needs and comforts of my 
Future Self into consideration along with those of my Present Self. It would 
be irrational to attach too much weight to the needs and comforts of my 
Future Self, for the future may never in fact arrive, or it may be shorter than 
I expected. But it would also be irrational to attach no importance to the 
future and to think only of the present moment. Who in their right mind 
would not act now so as to prevent their experiencing a searing, long-lasting 
pain ten minutes or two days from now, even if the measures required for 
prevention were slightly inconvenient or troublesome, or involved a lesser 
pain? Thus prudence requires that reasonable interests be weighed in a 
reasonable way. What allocation of burdens and benefits, amongst all those 
I can envision, do I prefer? What will my Future Self have to say about my 
decision? 
At the same time, insofar as my Future Self does not yet exist, the decision 
to sacrifice now on behalf of my Future Self or, conversely, to require my 
Future Self to suffer deprivations for the sake of my Present Self is made 
from the unique perspective of Present Self, who is required imaginatively 
to project into the future. There are many possible futures and many 
possible Future Selves, making prudential decisions that concern the long 
term exceedingly difficult. I can, however, try to find out how people like 
me facing similar dilemmas to mine who have chosen one way or another 
come to feel about their choices. By and large do people conclude: I wish 
I had saved more, foregone the champagne, quit smoking? Or do they 
wish they had indulged themselves more and stored up more memories of 
good times to look back on? I can read biographies of people who seem to 
resemble me to get a sense of how things turned out for them or ask friends 
and relatives. Alas, however, I cannot get useful feedback from my Future 
Self—not until it is too late, at which point my story becomes a source of 
useful information for others. 
It is often hard for me to be certain that I know now what it is in my 
self-interest to do, what I ought to do, and what will be best for me. Perhaps 
the question of whether I made the right decision regarding the allocation 
of burdens and benefits between my Present and my Future Self can only 
be answered when the future arrives, on the basis of the regret or relief I 
come to feel. But my aged Future Self might be unreasonably resentful of 
the youthful indulgences of my Present Self. Moreover, the correctness of 
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my decision, on this view, will depend on the moment n at which I recall 
and evaluate it. The decision could be ‘correct’ by these standards at t1 but 
then ‘incorrect’ at t2 if my regrets are postponed. Furthermore, insofar as 
the entire purpose of prudential deliberation is to identify the right course 
of action now, it does not help me to know that I shall endorse or regret this 
decision at various times in the future. My conviction that my decision is a 
reasonable one that has taken into account all that I ought to know and all 
that I ought to care about will weaken as the distance between now and the 
time I am planning for lengthens. 
Nevertheless, I conclude that I can sometimes know what I or someone 
else ought to do. My judgements are reasonable if they would survive 
scrutiny based on the considerations I arrived at earlier: what usually 
happens, what most people want to happen, and why I could consider 
myself to be an exception to the general rule, either because I want 
something different or because the usual outcome is less likely to happen 
to me. 
With luck, I can arrive at reasonable decisions even if I fail to perform 
this scrutiny. For example, suppose I am motivated to quit smoking by 
seeing a public service message on TV. Responding to urgings presented 
on TV is a very dubious method for making good choices. Nevertheless, 
the decision to quit smoking is in fact reasonable if I am a person with an 
average risk for the debilitating diseases and the average desire to avoid 
them.  
Enquiry VII
The Enquirer discovers an analogy between the Present Self’s natural and moral 
concern for the Future Self and the Narrow Self’s natural and moral concern for the 
Extended Self of kith and kin. She goes on to ponder whether she has any natural 
concern for Strangers and why she ought to care about them.
It now occurs to me that my self-interest is not narrowly limited to my Present 
Self and the array of possible Future Selves whose interests I consider in my 
self-interested reasoning. Some of my happiness and sadness arises from 
the experiences and conditions of others who are close to me, for example, 
my parents, siblings, children, and mate. I find in myself a strong incentive 
to act in their best interests and to consider their interests as continuous 
with my own. 
As a parent, sibling, child, spouse, or as a close friend, I can consider myself 
in two ways, either as a Narrow Self, whose desires or interests may be at 
odds with those of my children, siblings, parents, spouse, or friends, or as an 
Extended Self, forming a unit with these others, such that their good is mine 
as well. In the latter case, I try to do what’s good for the Extended Self. In the 
former case, I may have to determine whose interests—those of the Narrow 
Self or those of family members and friends—are to be sacrificed and by how 
much. In particular cases I can ignore or entirely discount the interests of 
these others, just as I can ignore the requirements of my Future Self, but the 
wholesale shrinkage of concern to the Now and to the Narrow Self would be 
a pathological state. Imagine a person utterly indifferent to the severe pain, 
dismemberment, or death they are threatened with in a week’s time because 
they only care about Now, or a person who could watch, unmoved, torture 
being perpetrated on a family member. I have no doubt that such people 
exist, but I need not concern myself with them here. As they are beyond the 
reach of reason, lacking the sorts of feelings that make productive argument 
possible, they cannot be persuaded by philosophy. 
© Catherine Wilson, CC BY http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0087.07
76 Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint
At the same time, I am aware that human nature is such that the interests 
of parents, children, siblings, and mates can come apart. Ancient history, 
myth, and drama illustrate the conflicts that tear families apart and the 
cruelties that closely related or paired persons can perpetrate on one another. 
The brothers Cain and Abel quarrelled with a fatal outcome. Medea killed 
the children she had with Jason in fury at his abandonment of her, and 
Agamemnon sacrificed his own daughter for a fair wind. The closer people 
are in familial relationships, the greater the opportunities for both care and 
concern and for anger and aggression. This conflict can be dramatic, as in 
the cases just cited, or it can exist on a familiar but troubling level. Should I 
loan money to my struggling but slightly lazy brother knowing it will never 
be repaid? May I install my aged and demented parents in a nursing home 
despite their protests? As there is both agreement and conflict between 
my Present Self and my Future Self, so there can be conflicts between my 
‘Narrow Self,’ the present and future mind-body complex that I am, and 
my ‘Extended Self,’ the set of people and causes that I care about and with 
whom I identify. 
A fully satisfactory resolution of the conflict between these various 
Selves requires attention to the welfare of all involved. It also requires that 
the Narrow Self and the Present Self, who are charged with deciding what 
to do, are sufficiently well informed to make a decision and care sufficiently 
about what they ought to. For example, in the case of conflict between the 
Now and the Future Selves, my method is to try to adopt the perspective 
of the not-yet-existent Future Self through imaginative projection, asking 
myself what it will be like to be my 45- or 50- or 87-year-old self and how 
I will then judge my youthful actions. I need to initiate a debate between 
my Now and Future Selves that draws on factual information and objective 
likelihoods. In the case of conflict between the Narrow and the Extended 
Selves, I might adopt an analogous method, projecting myself into the 
position of my relative or mate or close friend and initiating a debate over 
whose interests need to be recognised and how far. This debate too should 
draw as far as possible on the facts of the situation and on information 
about likely outcomes. However, if the Narrow Self is depraved, insane, 
temporarily blinded by passion, or deeply irrational, it cannot care about 
the things it ought to and cannot make reasonable decisions, and the 
Extended Self may well become a helpless victim. 
Even if a Narrow Self is sane, rational, calm, and not in the grip of 
depraved tastes, it can make the same kinds of errors vis-à-vis the Extended 
Self as the Present Self can vis-à-vis the Future Self. The Present Self can 
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weigh the interests of the putative Future Selves too heavily, giving up 
too much pleasure and adventure now for an only probable future, or 
too lightly, by weighing the interests of the Present Self too heavily. I 
may make corresponding errors in weighing my own individual interests 
against those of others about whom I care. I may err in always putting their 
desires and well-being before mine and thereby doing myself an injury, or 
in always putting my desires and my welfare before theirs. 
A negligent parent risks the death or loss of a child, or their alienation and 
the loss of their affection. Failure to feed them or educate them will impair 
their chances of becoming independent. Neglected mates may vanish, and 
neglected elders cannot furnish advice and company. My Narrow Self may 
benefit from altruism directed to friends and family. But such altruism can 
also be harmful to it. I might devote myself to my children, becoming a 
bore to the adults in my life. I could become a slave to a very sick and 
petulant elderly parent who rightly belongs in an institution. 
These considerations lead me to wonder whether the Extended Self has 
an interest in the good of others beyond the family and beyond the circle 
of friends, mates, and lovers, and if so what the source and meaning of this 
interest is. 
There are several reasons for supposing that I have been equipped by 
nature with some form of general sympathy. Human beings routinely 
show concern for and interfere on behalf of human beings they do not 
know. It seems to be part of human culture to create institutions whose 
only purpose is to help strangers in need. These institutions range from 
doctors and hospitals, to police and fire services, to courts intended to 
secure justice and to protect the weak and victimised, by applying the same 
rules to rich and poor, powerful and powerless. Whether they succeed or 
not, whether they are corrupted or not, political bodies such as senates and 
councils are formed and carry out their proceedings under the assumption 
that their entire purpose is to do what is best for the whole community. 
To the extent that I approve of the existence of these institutions and am 
willing to support them, I must care about the good of others besides those 
with whom I am intimate. My wider concern is evidenced by my sense of 
approbation and relief when I read about the outcome of a trial that seems 
to me just, or the passage of a bill that I think will be good for the country 
or for a needy and deserving element of the population. 
Further, when I see a perfect stranger about to receive a blow or about 
to trip and fall, I cringe, and this response seems to me automatic: no one 
has ever taught me to do that. The alarm and shock of bystanders at a traffic 
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accident indicate that humans are profoundly moved by disasters that do 
not affect their Narrow or their Extended Selves. Indeed, I spontaneously 
feel anxiety and discomfort when watching an adventure film or when 
reading a suspenseful novel. I do not know the hero and heroine and they 
are not even real; yet how things turn out for them is important for me. 
A third reason for believing that I have something of a natural disposition 
to care about Strangers is the discovery that a certain small subgroup of the 
population lacks this concern. Things go better for them when other people 
suffer at their hands. They appear to be lacking the neurological requisites 
that enable me and most other people to respond to suffering with aversion 
and a desire to help. This syndrome can also be an effect of brain damage 
and can be considered a serious impairment.
However, my relationship to Strangers, as well as to friends and family, 
is characterised by some ambivalence. Much of the time I am simply 
indifferent to Strangers and ignore them and their plights. And humans 
often relate to other humans they do not know well with fear, by assuming 
they are dangerous and might kill them, rob them, rape them, or exploit 
them. 
These observations do not answer the question, ‘Why ought I to be 
concerned with the well-being and sufferings of Strangers?’ They rather 
make it salient to me that I already am to some degree and that I would 
have to make a special effort to become completely unconcerned with the 
well-being and suffering of Strangers under all circumstances. At the same 
time, it seems that I have to make far more of an effort to be concerned with 
the well-being and suffering of Strangers to anything like the same degree 
as the well-being and suffering of those in my immediate circle. 
The demands and requests for consideration of its interests implicitly 
presented by my Future Self—the sacrifices it is asking for from my Present 
Self—come in the form of worries about the future; the ghost, as it were, 
of self-to-come interrogates me about my current plans and practices. 
To be sure, worry about the future is more common and more intense in 
technologically advanced societies in which there are such phenomena 
as careers, wealth-accumulation, pensions, and inheritances. Hunter-
gatherers do not need to and cannot therefore worry about these matters, 
but they may well worry about health matters or the approach of death. 
Some individuals of the happy-go-lucky type in technologically advanced 
societies are little prone to worry, or only begin to worry when it is too 
late to affect the future. However, this individual indifference exists in a 
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broader context of human concern wherever social institutions have made 
such concern possible. Once the very possibilities of careers, accumulation, 
and so on are presented to them in early adulthood, people tend to become 
concerned with their own futures. This concern intensifies as these goals 
present themselves as within reach. Parental lectures, career advice bureaus 
and placement offices, newspaper and magazine articles, messages from the 
bank, and literary forms such as biography and autobiography all impress 
on me the message that the decisions I make and actions I take now are 
important and necessary for the future. Those who seem not to care about 
their own futures are reproached, either literally or by implication, by other 
persons and institutions. Without these external prompts, it is unlikely that 
I would worry about the future or think very much about it at all. 
The demands and requests to my Narrow Self presented by the relatives 
and intimates of the Extended Self are a different matter. These people 
exist now, and they are usually articulate about their desires for food, 
transportation, advice, financial assistance, companionship, presents, and 
so on. They usually present their needs and desires to me directly. The 
very young and the elderly, even if they do not or cannot ask for attention 
and assistance, usually make it obvious when they need help. All human 
societies provide a cultural framework in which we are urged to be aware 
of and attempt to some extent to meet the needs and satisfy the desires of 
family members, friends, and mates—advertisements for cleaning products 
and food items as well as advice columns about how to be a good husband 
or mother are examples of this urging. The natural partiality for kith and 
kin is thus reinforced by social mechanisms. Those who are negligent are 
reproached, directly and indirectly. 
When it comes to the demands and requests of Strangers, however, 
the situation is very different. Take, for example, starving persons in sub-
Saharan countries, or the unemployed in our own, or persons who might 
be exposed to radioactive emission or toxins in their drinking water in 
some distant community. They do not talk to me or appear before me, 
manifesting their needs and desires; they don’t present their requests and 
demands to me with the same vivacity as my intimates do. Moreover, 
there are far too many needy Strangers to invite my focussed rumination 
on their various conditions and deprivations. Hence it is obvious from a 
psychological point of view why I am inclined to worry about my future 
and to make provisions for it, and to worry about the condition of my 
family and friends, but not to worry a great deal about Strangers. Whereas 
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I have a considerable, often ‘visceral’ incentive to consider the demands 
of my future self and my relatives and intimates, which I experience as 
urgent, the general human concern with Strangers exemplified in those of 
our institutions devoted to welfare and justice does not supply me with a 
strong, visceral, urgently-felt incentive. 
Nevertheless, as the requests of the Future Self become manifest in 
complex technological societies, the needs and desires of Strangers also 
become manifest. I become aware of them through media reports that 
communicate the sufferings of people in war-torn regions, in factories 
and slums, and in areas ravaged by natural disasters such as earthquakes, 
famines and floods. I become aware of the effects of unemployment, poor 
health, and poor healthcare in distant communities. As a result of this 
awareness, the Stranger puts pressure on Me, and Strangers put pressure 
on Us, just as the Future Self puts pressure on the Present Self, and the 
Extended Self on the Narrow Self. In each case, meeting demands and 
requests requires sacrifices from the Present Self, the Narrow Self, or the I 
or We who confront the Stranger or Strangers. 
Still, these observations do not answer the question, ‘Why ought I to be 
concerned with the well-being and suffering of Strangers?’ nor the question, 
‘How concerned ought I to be and how much should I be prepared to 
sacrifice my narrow interests or my extended interests on their behalf?’ In 
trying to answer these questions, I think it might be useful to distinguish 
between motives for being concerned and reasons for being concerned, where 
a reason is a consideration that ought to be a motive whether it is or not. 
Some people do respond to the knowledge that Strangers are in trouble 
with a strong, visceral desire to help. They feel the pressure acutely and 
respond to it by joining Doctors Without Borders or Habitat for Humanity, 
or they volunteer in schools, libraries, and prisons. But others do not. They 
consider charity appeals a big nuisance and immediately bin any request 
for donations even if it is accompanied with pictures of starving children. 
There are some considerations that could be presented to a person 
who lacked the sympathetic dispositions just mentioned and that might 
persuade her to take an interest in the sufferings of Strangers. She might be 
reminded that she might someday want or need the assistance of Strangers 
in the case of an accident or a national disaster when no family member or 
friend is available to help.15 It could be suggested to her that by performing 
acts of assistance to Strangers in need, she increases the likelihood that such 
help will be available to her and to her friends and family, should it ever be 
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required. But I do not think every indifferent person will be moved by this 
argument. Perhaps they are well-cushioned financially, well-insured, and 
surrounded by loyal and powerful retainers and bodyguards. They regard 
it as so unlikely that they would ever require the help of Strangers that the 
argument does not move them. Or perhaps they could be moved by fear—
the fear that it could be dangerous to their personal, narrowly-construed 
welfare to ignore the needs and interests of Strangers, who might turn on 
them resentfully or breed dangerous diseases.16 Bringing to their attention 
the danger of violence or harm emanating from a set of deprived Strangers 
might motivate the indifferent person. But again, I do not think that this 
will necessarily result in their conversion to a broader form of altruism. 
At this point, I might appeal to their sense of honour. I might propose 
to them that the character of the broadly altruistic person is noble, upright, 
and estimable and that the character of the indifferent person is selfish 
and contemptible, or that their behaviour is more characteristic of ‘lower’ 
animals than of human beings with humanity.17 This might have some 
effect, especially if the argument was frequently repeated. But again, results 
are not guaranteed. The indifferent person might brush off these aspersions 
as merely verbal. 
Finally, I might try appealing to the rationality of the indifferent person, 
rather than to their insecurities or fears or sense of honour—which they 
may not possess. A reason for being concerned with the welfare of Strangers 
is that my interests are in fact no more important than the interests of the 
Stranger; they only feel more important and more urgent to me.18
Sometimes reasons—even highly abstract reasons like this one—not 
only ought to motivate, but do motivate less selfish behaviour. But if they 
do not, there is nothing more to be said. There are persons temperamentally 
unsympathetic and uninterested in the lives of others, responsive only to 
considerations that move them emotionally, yet surrounded by a protective 
network of friends and family and unfazed by the threats of accidents, 
disasters, and rebellions. Philosophy will not be able to supply them with 
either reasons or motives for being concerned with the needs and comforts 
of Strangers that will move them to action. 
Very few human beings will, I expect, fall into this category of the 
completely unresponsive once they have heard all the arguments. This is 
not to say, however, that the needs and comforts of Strangers must always 
take precedence over those of the Self. As there can be conflict and harmony 
between the Present Self and the Future Selves, and between the Narrow 
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Self and the Extended Self, so there can be conflict and harmony between 
the good of Me or Us and the good of a Stranger or a group of Strangers. 
I am not one of those people inclined by nature to make large donations 
to charity or to engage in volunteer work. Indeed, I suspect that things 
would go better for me if I did not have to see gravely ill people wandering 
in the street, and did not have to learn anything about famines, massacres, 
and social injustices. I frankly doubt that things would go worse for me if I 
did not have to witness the suffering of others or become aware of injustice. 
So, why shouldn’t I just make arrangements not to become aware of the 
demands in the first place, by immediately skipping most of the newspaper 
that deals with political issues and binning the charity appeals that come 
through the letterbox? 
The strategy of evasion can, I realise, be practiced with respect to my 
Future Self and my Extended Self. If I enjoy smoking, I may decline to seek 
out information about the usual fates of smokers that will tend to spoil 
my pleasure, so as to avoid having to make the decision whether to be 
prudent or imprudent. If I don’t like being asked to wash dishes at home 
and don’t want to get into an argument with someone who thinks I am 
being a parasite, I can arrange to arrive home only after someone else has 
done them and can refuse to discuss the issue. 
I do not think I am always wrong to avert my gaze from a Stranger’s 
request for help. I cannot respond to every request without spoiling my 
own life. However, the essential problem of morality is: How should Person 
1 treat Person 2 when the advantages to Person 1 impose burdens on Person 
2? How far must Person 1 sacrifice and how much is it reasonable to require 
Person 2 to endure? What is it reasonable for Person 2 to ask of Person 1? If 
I project myself into the situation of the Stranger, as I have to project myself 
into the position of the Future Self to decide what it is in my self-interest to 
do, I will surely be persuaded that some requests they might make of me 
are reasonable. I ought to compromise, neither shielding myself from the 
knowledge of the sufferings of others that would make me indifferent to 
their good, nor sacrificing too much of my own good—that of my Present, 
Future, Narrow, and Extended Selves—to improve their condition. 
Before their needs became so apparent to us, thanks to television and 
the other media, people who were entirely indifferent to the Stranger did 
not stand out, and they were not reproached by the judgemental voices of 
the culture. But today, someone who professes not to care at all about local 
poverty, conditions in overseas garment factories, global warming-induced 
flooding in Bangladesh, the recruitment of child soldiers in sub-Saharan 
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Africa, elder abuse in nursing homes, and other such harms to persons, 
and who would be unwilling to make any sacrifice, however small, to 
improve these situations, will seem as unusual as a person who is perfectly 
unconcerned with the welfare of his sisters, his cousins, and his aunts, or 
his own future well-being. 
I can come to a reasonable decision about how much to sacrifice by 
constructing a discussion or debate, projecting myself into the role of any 
Stranger who might have a claim on my attention and my resources. In my 
inner debate, the Stranger must attempt to justify the reasonableness of her 
demands on me, given my interest in my needs and comforts and the many 
Strangers competing for my attention. I, in turn, must justify to the Stranger 
the level of attention and support I am willing to give her.
But can I actually know what I ought to do morally when questions 
of harm, help, and sacrifice arise? Can I arrive at ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ 
decisions that can be represented as statements, capable of literal truth and 
falsity, about what I ought to do? Consider the following:
‘I ought to donate £5 per annum to Doctors Without Borders.’
The decision of how much I ought to sacrifice, in the cases of Present Self 
vs. Future Self and Narrow Self vs. Extended Self, is typically made on 
a case-by-case basis (‘Shall I buy a new car or invest the money? Shall I 
allow my brother to live with me rent free this year?’). But the case-by-case 
basis is not practical when it comes to assessing the needs of Strangers, 
insofar as there are simply too many Strangers and too many cases, and I 
lack resources to make a measurable difference to more than a few causes. 
I would do better to decide how much of my time, effort, and money it 
would be reasonable to give to the entire class of Strangers, and then to pick 
and choose a limited number of causes from amongst those that are worthy 
and ignore the others. I could decide to give £5 to charity X but ignore the 
equally worthy charity Y, in the expectation that someone else will support 
charity Y but not charity X. This policy need not be inflexible in case I am 
suddenly moved by another appeal. 
But can my decision actually represent or fail to represent what I 
objectively speaking ought to do? Could my judgement that ‘I ought to give £5 
per annum to Doctors Without Borders’ be false, whereas ‘I ought to give 
£20 per year to Save the Whales’ be true?
I think it is plainly false that I ought to give £1,000,000 to Doctors Without 
Borders on behalf of Strangers, just as, in my earlier example of choosing a 
flat, it is plainly false that I should choose a superb flat that is guaranteed 
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to bankrupt me and also plainly false that I should choose to live in a hovel 
just because it poses no financial risk to me whatsoever. However, just 
as I doubted that there was a single figure that produced a uniquely true 
statement when plugged for N into the sentence ‘I ought to spend £N pw on 
a flat,’ I doubt that there is a single figure that, when plugged into ‘I ought 
to give £N to Doctors Without Borders,’ makes the statement uniquely true. 
By contrast, the following statement seems susceptible of truth or falsity: 
‘It would be reasonable for me under my own circumstances and those 
of the relevant Strangers to give about £5 per annum to Doctors Without 
Borders, and so I ought to do so.’
as does:
‘I ought to give £5 per annum to Doctors Without Borders.’
I am disposed, then, to regard the statements above as true. 
Further, I have established that I know quite a bit about what I ought 
to do and ought not to do in various circumstances. It is held by most 
philosophers that if I know that P, where P is some proposition, such as 
‘Snow is white’ or ‘Tigers are carnivorous,’ it must be true that P, i.e. that 
snow is white and tigers are carnivorous. So it seems that there are some 
evaluative truths and that I know some of the ones there are. I have not 
determined, however, whether I can routinely evaluate actions, situations, 
events, and persons for their moral worth and whether I can come to know, 
in every morally significant situation, what I ought to do. 
Does it really make sense, I wonder, to think of some moral truths 
as known and others as waiting to be discovered, just as some scientific 
truths are already known, while others have yet to be discovered but some 
day will be? I think in this connection of aspects of reality that were once 
hidden from people. They did not know that oxygen was the principle of 
combustion, or that viruses were the cause of many diseases. Can aspects 
of moral reality be hidden from us now, as I am tempted to think they 
were hidden from our ancestors who chopped off people’s heads, held vast 
retinues of slaves, tortured animals for fun, and so on? To answer these 
questions, I think I ought to explore what might be involved in coming to 
change one’s moral practices and beliefs and what this might reveal about 
moral language and the relationship between moral statements and truths.
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It occurs to me in this connection that I still have not directly addressed 
the question of whether moral judgements merely reflect the likings and 
dislikings of the persons who make them. In that case, what I am calling 
‘moral truths’ and instances of ‘moral knowledge’ are not truths about the 
world and other people, or knowledge of what is the case outside my own 
head. What should I now think of the Destroyers’ claim that ‘I ought to 
give £5 to Doctors Without Borders’ means ‘I like the idea of giving £5 to 
Doctors without borders?’ I think this question had better be settled before 
I proceed any further.  

Enquiry VIII
The Enquirer returns to a consideration of the language of the Destroyers of Illusion 
to try to determine whether moral claims are nothing more than claims about 
the likings and dislikings of the person who asserts them, or nothing more than 
expressions of attitudes, and the issuing of invitations and commands, without 
any epistemic significance. She comes to the conclusion that the Destroyers lack a 
coherent position, and she goes on to consider how to think about moral norms and 
demands and the possible motives and reasons for being moral. 
What should I now think about the position of the Destroyers, who maintain 
that all judgements of right and wrong, all evaluative language, reflect 
only personal likings and dislikings? In Enquiry II, I found some reasons 
to be dissatisfied with this position, but it remains somewhat plausible in 
my mind and I think it is time to subject it to detailed scrutiny According 
to the Destroyers, I’ll suppose that the following sentence is meaningless 
and has no definite interpretation, unless some individual person in some 
particular cultural setting utters or writes it:
1)    ‘Vegetarianism is obligatory for good.’
To understand the sentence and to see how it functions, I need to imagine 
that:
2)    S says (or thinks) that ‘Vegetarianism is morally good.’ 
Does this mean that according to the Destroyers, if S were to express herself 
in a more literal and precise manner, she would say something like: 
3)    ‘I really like vegetarianism and I really dislike carnivorism.’
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Or perhaps: 
4)    ‘I really like vegetarianism and I would really like it if others really liked 
it too … and I really dislike carnivorism and the liking of some people 
for carnivorism.’ 
On this analysis, ‘Vegetarianism is morally obligatory’ when uttered by S 
is true just in case S has the likings and dislikings cited. ‘Vegetarianism is 
morally neutral’ when said by T is true just in case T has the corresponding 
likings and disliking. It does not follow that vegetarianism is both morally 
good and morally neutral because there is no interpretation of the sentence 
‘Vegetarianism is morally… .’ It has to be interpreted in the context of some 
particular person’s thinking or saying it. 
Is this an acceptable way to understand moral clams I wonder? The 
following objection occurs to me. A person who asserts ‘I like vegetarianism 
and I like other people’s liking it’ has made a statement about their own 
frame of mind. I would come to suspect that what they said was false—that 
they were lying or self-deceived about their own preferences—if I noticed 
that they ate meat with obvious enjoyment and encouraged others to order 
meat dishes in restaurants. I would come to believe that what they said was 
true if they avoided meat and reacted with some discomfort around those 
with hearty carnivorous appetites. 
By contrast when a person asserts ‘Vegetarianism is morally obligatory,’ 
I don’t think that the truth or falsity of this claim can be established by 
looking at their dietary habits. I don’t think they are talking about 
themselves, what’s going on in their heads, but about the world. If the 
claim is true, it must be so because of facts about animal suffering and 
human nutrition. Accordingly, I can’t accept the Destroyers’ interpretation 
of what a person means when they assert a moral claim. 
The Destroyers might concede that their paraphrase does not work 
and that it, along with their earlier attempt to purify ordinary language, 
was a mistake. But they may suggest another way of understanding 
moral claims, not as true-or-false assertions of likings and dislikings, but 
as expressions of attitudes. On this view, moral claims are not true or 
false. Nor are they equivalent to or paraphrasable by any other form of 
statement. 
Earlier19 I supposed that so-called moral ‘beliefs’ might be like placards 
carried around by people committed to what was written on them. This 
view left me somewhat uneasy, but I had no good argument against it, 
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and the Destroyers might now insist that the view can be developed into a 
viable theory that precludes the possibility of moral knowledge. 
Suppose that rather than carrying visible placards stating ‘War 
is Wrong’ or ‘End Factory Farming’ around on posts, I carry as it were 
invisible placards around in my head and sometimes utter, write, hear, 
or read the words corresponding to them? The Destroyers may suggest 
that these invisible thoughts, in addition to audible and visible utterances 
and writings, express my feelings and attitudes about various people and 
goings-on, without communicating any information about the world or 
conveying any knowledge about it. The words I utter or write invite or even 
command my audience to share these feelings and attitudes. S might as well 
have shouted at me ‘Never eat meat!’ and T might as well have whispered 
to me ‘Go ahead and have some meat from time to time.’ 
If S and T are expressing their attitudes towards meat-eating, however, 
and commanding or inviting me to behave in certain ways, I need to 
consider whether to obey the command or take up the invitation. After 
all, I don’t need to take up every invitation or do everything someone else 
orders me to do. I have choices. 
I could, it seems, just do whatever I felt like doing on the presentation 
of a moral claim expressing someone’s attitude, including ignoring it. 
But I could also make an effort to try to determine whether I ought to 
agree with S or T and ought to comply with the command or accept the 
invitation. If someone’s expression of an attitude can prompt this kind of 
critical reflection and further investigation of the issue which results in my 
changing my beliefs and practices, or maintaining them, but not just because 
they commanded or invited me, then moral utterances and inscriptions 
seem to lead us into the realm of truth and knowledge, contrary to what 
the Destroyers maintain. 
I have plenty of reasons to distrust some of my natural inclinations 
and immediate reactions to presented moral claims. At times, my feelings 
incline me to protect the weak, to sacrifice my advantages, and, as Person 
1, to improve the prospects of Person 2 when I am in a position to do so. At 
other times, my feelings incline me to ignore the needs of Person 2 or to act 
against their interests, or even to use them for my own purposes. I do not 
know how to decide what would be the right thing to do—when I should 
follow my feelings and when I should reject their guidance. 
I know that self-interest and civility often require me to act against my 
immediate inclinations, and that conforming to their norms can be difficult 
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or taxing. It can however be satisfying to make a prudent decision and to 
act on it, thereby advancing my self-interest, and it can also be satisfying 
to play my role as Host or Guest well. So perhaps I shall discover that 
morality is similar; its demands can be difficult but satisfying to fulfil. 
But while I now have a good idea how to determine what is prudent and 
imprudent and civil and uncivil, I am still somewhat in the dark about how 
to determine what is moral and immoral. 
All cultures, I’ve observed, have certain prohibitions on theft, on certain 
kinds of sex, on hurting and killing, ignoring children, deceiving people 
and interfering with their autonomy and liberty. While the particular norms 
vary from culture to culture, in all these cases, Person 1 is prohibited from 
doing something to Person 2 that is considered to harm them physically 
or psychologically or to harm their interests for the benefit of Person 1. 
These common prohibitions and statements about moral propriety and 
impropriety I’ll refer to, for the time being, as the Norms of Morality. They 
are expressed in claims such as the following, which hold in my culture and 
in many others as well: 
1)    If Person 1 is aware that Person 2’s property is desirable and unattended, 
it is morally improper for Person 1 to take it without permission. 
2)    If Person 1 is asked a question by Person 2, it is morally proper to answer 
truthfully and sincerely. 
3)    If Person 2 irritates Person 1, it is morally improper for Person 1 to cause 
bodily harm or death to Person 2. 
I can’t remember exactly how I learned that these were some of the Norms 
of Morality in my culture, but I am sure that I learned them in more or 
less the way I learned the Norms of Civility, through instruction, social 
experience, and feedback. In reflecting on the various motives and reasons 
I might have for extending my concerns from the Present Self to the Future 
Self; from the Narrow Self to the Extended Self; and from the Extended 
Self to Strangers, I discovered that motives such as my instinct for self-
preservation, my natural concern for kith and kin, sympathy for strangers, 
and also fear, worry, and the sense of honour might motivate me to be 
moral. In case I am very receptive to abstract considerations, I may be 
moved as well by the observation that I am actually no more important 
except to myself than anyone else on earth is, and that they are all more 
important to themselves than I am to them. 
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But can I decide to take the risk of being immoral or amoral? Can I opt 
out from morality on occasion in the same way that I can throw prudence 
to the winds and follow my impulses, or opt out from polite behaviour—
sometimes even to make a moral point, if for example, my host makes a 
racist joke? This question strikes me as seriously difficult. For example, 
what if I decided to be a burglar, honest in my dealings with my friends, 
scrupulous in my sexual morality, gentle with my captives, but no respecter 
of private property? I can’t see that this would necessarily lead to a fearful 
and bad life if I were an exceptionally skilled burglar who managed never 
to get caught and who enjoyed the risk. In this case, I’d have stepped partly, 
but not entirely, outside of conventional morality. 
My decision to flaunt the norms of ownership would sit oddly with my 
preference for others not to thieve from me. I would be a beneficiary of 
other people’s respect for the property norm but also a beneficiary of my 
willingness to ignore the norm. 
There would be no practical impossibility in my situation, but I would 
be unable to give a simple, truthful Yes-or-No answer to the question, ‘Do 
you think it is acceptable for Person 1 to steal from Person 2?’ I would have 
to give the more complicated answer that it is acceptable for me as Person 
1 to steal from Person 2 but not for me as Person 2 to be stolen from by 
Person 1. 
But what if I do not care about being able to give a simple answer? There 
is nothing incoherent that I can see in the complicated answer. 
This problem brings me back to the fundamental question. Why make 
any sacrifices of personal interest at all in the name of morality if there is 
no danger to me in not doing so, or only a small risk of punishment or 
retaliation? Reminding me of the fact that I belong to a moralistic species 
does not persuade me that I should not opt out when I feel safe in doing so, 
just as I may partially opt out of the norms of prudence and civility if there 
is quite a bit to be gained. Moreover, the stakes are higher. Observing the 
Norms of Civility usually does not require major sacrifices, and behaving 
prudently is by definition in my self-interest. But to be consistently moral, 
it is necessary to sacrifice quite a lot of personal advantage. 
On reflection, I can only respond to this puzzle as follows: morality 
essentially involves a sacrifice of one’s own interest and advantage in 
favour of another’s. Accordingly, it is futile to look in particular cases for 
the direct advantage to me of remaining ‘within’ morality and observing 
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the norms of truthfulness, nonaggression, respect for property, avoidance 
of sexual predation and so on. I cannot expect to discover a selfish motive 
for being unselfish that will consistently move me. 
To be sure, I have various self-interested motives for generally respecting 
the Norms of Morality cited above. A thoroughgoing failure to respect and 
operate with the norms of non-interference with people and their property, 
truth telling, and nonaggression, will sooner or later, in nearly every case, 
isolate me from the benefits I receive from others and subject me, if I am 
not a psychopath, to the pangs of conscience. Few people—no matter how 
grand and arrogant—are so powerful that they can disrespect all moral 
norms with impunity over the long term and Arrogant Great Men must 
live in constant fear of displacement and punishment. A few extremely 
clever people might manage to live as liars, thieves, aggressors, and sexual 
predators, but most people will be more successful in achieving their aims 
and living well if they abide by at least some Norms of Morality. If I am not 
motivated by concern for my reputation and comfort, I ought to be, and in 
this regard, I have reason to conform. I don’t find in myself any reason to 
disregard all moral norms, and I don’t feel motivated to do so. 
Yet I can certainly disregard some standard moral norms on particular 
occasions without fear of retaliation and without my conscience troubling 
me, and I am often motivated to disregard them. Indeed, I think it is 
sometimes reasonable to suspend the norm of truthfulness, or the norm 
of nonaggression or of respect for ownership in particular cases. There 
are occasions when I ought not to tell the truth when someone asks me 
a question, and occasions when I could reasonably resort to violence in 
self-defence. If a burglar asks me the combination to my safe, the ‘answer 
truthfully’ rule should be suspended. If a would-be rapist is troubling me, 
I ought to try to inflict bodily harm on them, and it is better to filch a pie 
from a windowsill than to starve. Sometimes pursuing my own advantage 
is so important to me, even if it causes harm to others, that I am tempted to 
say that others must simply fend for themselves. Therefore, I do not always 
have reason to act in accord with the Norms of Morality as they are stated 
above. Morality demands sacrifices, but in certain contexts, the sacrifice 
involved in heeding a generic norm is too great to count as reasonable or the 
benefit would go to a person who does not deserve it. 
Nevertheless, there can be some good reasons for me to observe a particular 
Norms of Morality on some occasion even if I put myself at a disadvantage 
by doing so, and even if social punishment is unlikely to follow in case I do 
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refuse to observe it. One good reason is that by conforming to the norm, I 
can avoid injuring another person (or, at least, in the case of certain moral 
dilemmas, minimise injury to others). Another good reason for conforming 
is that I thereby avoid giving anyone else a good reason to resent or punish 
me (whether or not they do resent or can punish me). People who are 
motivated by reasons, as we all ought to be, may well find that they are 
motivated by these reasons. Indeed, some people’s concept of what’s in 
their self-interest is such that they have a strong preference for avoiding 
harming others and avoiding being the objects of resentment. Their sense 
of well-being is enhanced by the conviction that they have minimised 
injuries to others and that as few people as possible have just cause to be 
angry with them. These people have, we might say, self-centred, though 
not exactly selfish, reasons for being unselfish. 
I conclude that there are numerous reasons, many of which are likely to 
be motivating, for generally being moral, just as there are numerous reasons 
for being generally prudent and civil. Yet the Norms of Morality seem to be 
significantly different from the Norms of Civility. If I memorise the rules 
of etiquette I will rarely be stumped as to how to behave, but even if I 
memorise a set of rules like those above, I will often be stumped. Morality 
seems to concern a whole range of human interactions, often involving 
unique situations, whereas civility concerns stereotyped encounters 
between persons in fixed roles. It is all very well to say that my decisions 
about what to think and how to act should be based on knowing what I 
ought to and caring about what I ought to to the extent that I should, but 
how can I possibly put such abstract instruction into practice? To try to 
answer this question I will return to consider my earlier moral judgements, 
which I am still inclined to regard as correct, and their relationship to the 
theories of right conduct proposed by philosophers of the past.  

Enquiry IX
The Enquirer ponders the question of whether there are moral truths, whether 
there is a method for discovering them, and what the reach and limits of moral 
knowledge might be. She considers in what sense there has been moral progress and 
an increase of moral knowledge in the world. 
Before I began to doubt everything I had previously thought about morality, 
and came to wonder whether there were any true and false moral opinions 
or any moral knowledge, I made various judgements with some degree of 
confidence. The following actions are examples of the sort of behaviour I 
judged to be in most cases morally wrong: 
1)    An ambitious politician poisons a political rival. 
2)    A police officer tortures a prisoner to make them confess. 
3)    A woman tells a man the falsehood that she is pregnant to persuade him 
to marry her.
4)    A man refuses to take a paternity test to establish whether he is the father 
of a woman’s child. 
5)    A student writes for and sells essays to other students. 
6)    A mother chains her young child to the bedpost to go to a disco.
7)    An employer profits magnificently by forcing his employees to work 
long hours for low pay. 
And actions like these I judged to be in most cases morally worthy: 
8)    An ambitious politician resigns his post to care for his recently disabled 
wife.
9)    A police officer intervenes to stop a colleague from manhandling a 
prisoner.
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10)    A woman tells a family-oriented man who is getting serious about her 
that she is unable to bear children. 
11)    A man assumes financial responsibility for a child born outside of 
wedlock and helps to care for it. 
12)    A teenager takes a wallet full of cash they found on the bus to the police 
without removing any of it. 
13)    A mother works long hours to pay for art supplies for her talented child.
14)    An employer responds promptly and effectively to employee grievances.
At the same time, I don’t suppose my judgements to be infallible and I don’t 
suppose that I have always known how to behave. I take it as given that I 
have sometimes been in the wrong morally, that I have sometimes given 
others decisive moral reason to resent my actions, and that I have failed to 
do on occasion what I ought to have done. While it is possible that I have 
behaved with impeccable correctness at every point, I regard this as highly 
unlikely. For I occasionally notice what I take to be moral failures in the 
people around me, and it would be a miracle if either there actually were 
no moral failures at all in the world or if I was unique in escaping them. 
So I shall suppose that I am in the wrong an average amount of the time—
neither as morally good as the most saintly and self-sacrificing persons 
nor as morally bad as the most exploitative and selfish, but somewhere in 
between. 
Another reason for supposing that I have sometimes been morally in 
the wrong is that I know myself to have often behaved imprudently, to 
have done things that were not in my long-term self-interest. That is to 
say, I privileged the needs and comforts of my Present Self at the expense 
of my Future Self in ways I came to recognise as wrong. Because concern 
for others is like concern for my Future Self, I can assume that I have often 
privileged the interests of my Narrow Self over the needs and comforts not 
only of Strangers, but even of those of my Extended Self. 
If I can determine how I discovered my prudential mistakes and what 
led to them, I may correspondingly gain some insight into the source of my 
moral errors and how to prevent them. If moral knowledge involves the 
avoidance or the correction of moral mistakes, it may turn out to be less 
mysterious than I have hitherto supposed. 
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Reflecting on the times when I have acted imprudently, against my 
own best interests, I realise that these errors fall into various categories. For 
example:
1)    Food: I have occasionally followed my appetites and later felt sick as a 
result of eating too much, or eating food that was too fat or too sweet, or 
food that, unbeknownst to me, contained some pathogen or poisonous 
substance. 
2)    Indulgences: I have felt powerfully inclined to excess—for example to 
drinking too much alcohol. Drinking too much has left me nauseated 
and hung over, regretting my actions. 
3)    Finance: I have been miserly when I would have derived great pleasure 
from a purchase and a spendthrift when the purchase was wasteful and 
unsatisfying. 
4)    Society: I have been powerfully attracted to friends who were not good 
for me, avoided some who probably would have been good for me, and 
wasted time with others. I have written letters hastily and emotionally 
that did much damage to my own interests.
What do these instances of misjudgement have in common that makes 
them different from situations where I knew what was good for me and 
acted accordingly? 
In certain of these cases, some properties of the things with which I was 
interacting—foods, drinks, commodities, other people—were unknown to 
me. I was unable to tell from the qualities they presented to me that they 
were bad for me, for they had qualities that appeared to me to be very good 
indeed. Food seemed tasty, alcohol seemed to be having a good effect on 
my mood, it was agreeable to spend money and carry away my purchases, 
and people struck me as attractive or unattractive. 
In other cases—my writing of hasty letters—the strength of my own 
emotions seemed to push me to an action that turned out to be harmful 
to my interests, though performing it felt necessary and rewarding at the 
time. 
How can nature have made me so that I spontaneously sometimes 
do what is better for me but sometimes what is worse for me? How can I 
have survived a rigorous process of natural selection when I so often act 
imprudently against my self-interest? 
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My mistake, in all the cases I have just cited, involved being unable to 
see beneath the appearances, to predict the future, and to be motivated by 
what was in fact most likely to happen. In some cases, there was no way 
for me to know what was going to happen, for example, in the case of a 
rare pathogen infesting my food. In other cases, I could have ascertained 
the danger if I had had more experience, or investigated more thoroughly. 
If I knew all the real, underlying, hidden properties of things and people 
and did not react to their superficial qualities, and if I had more insight into 
causal relations in the world, I would reduce my prudential errors. 
Yet it seems that I might know a great deal about things and people and 
about causal relations and yet still suffer from weakness of the will. An 
expert in substance abuse might, for example, drink too much at a party, 
despite knowing more than everyone else in attendance about the effects of 
alcohol. I might know very well that the letter I was going to write would 
not advance my cause and might cause trouble for me, yet be so angry or 
so flattered that I could not resist. 
Reflecting on this matter, I have arrived at three explanations of my 
liability to misjudge what is better for me. 
First, even if my world-imprinted inclinations and tendencies sometimes 
lead me to do what is worse for me, they facilitate my survival and 
reproduction most of the time, or facilitated the survival and reproduction 
of my ancestors. There must be a reason why strong emotions often move 
me to immediate action and why I try to conserve effort in other situations. 
Second, some of my world-imprinted inclinations and tendencies may 
be the unfortunate by-products of others that are good for me. There must 
be a reason why my brain responds positively to intoxication—if I had a 
different sort of brain that did not respond in this way, I might not function 
as well as I do. 
Third, some of my choices reflect social pressure or are made possible 
by my culture and upbringing. I may yield, unwisely, to my host’s urging 
to have another glass of champagne. If I had not learned how to type and 
post letters I could not have written the letter that caused me to be expelled 
from the Club, however annoyed I felt. It was the interaction of my world-
imprinted desires with the pressures of the social environment and the 
cultural materials at hand that brought about my misfortune in both cases. 
I can draw several morals from this, recognizing that my spontaneous 
judgements about my own self-interest are liable to error:
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First, I must become aware of and acknowledge my innate dispositions, 
which are the product of a long history of natural selection, consider 
the situations in which they mislead me, and control my appetites when 
experience has taught me that the outcome will be bad for me. 
Second, I must become aware of how conventions, hearsay, informal 
opinions about what usually happens, and other people’s expectations of 
me can assist or mislead me. I must  think about how I am like or different 
from the average person. I must consider myself as a statistic, but also as an 
individual.
Can I do more than this to decide how it will be in my self-interest to act? 
I do not see how this is possible. Perhaps it will turn out, because of the 
way events unfold, that my actual decision produces more unhappiness, 
deprivation or regret for me, than another decision would have. But I can 
rarely know for sure what the other decision would have led to, or what its 
broad, long term effect on other people would have been. There is no fact of 
the matter about how the choice I did not make would have turned out and 
perhaps no fact of the matter as to whether I ought instead to have chosen 
that path.
Applying these lessons to the detection of moral error, I think I can see the 
way forward. Moral error is likely to result when I rely too heavily on my 
natural appetites and partialities, failing to consider the effects on other 
people, those close to me as well as distant Strangers, of giving them free 
reign. While these appetites and partialities may be deeply ingrained in my 
constitution, I can become aware of their operation in me and their harmful 
effects on others. It is not only my aggressive, competitive, self-seeking 
tendencies that I need to become aware of and to moderate but even certain 
built-in cognitive tendencies such as the tendency to stereotype people 
and to make overly hasty inferences about their intelligence, competence, 
or deservingness. A pernicious habit of judgement is my assumption that 
people by and large deserve their misfortunes; that, were they more prudent 
and resourceful, they would not suffer the fates they do.20 My tendency to 
defer to strong, charismatic leaders and to avoid making a fuss even when 
I become aware of wrongdoing also creates moral failure. 
All these habits and tendencies are shared with others of my species and 
are the main sources of our collective moral failures. They exacerbate self-
centeredness and the refusal to consider seriously the position of Person 2 
in morally relevant interactions. Further, moral error is likely to result to 
the extent that I am ignorant about the world, not only about cause and 
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effect and the lessons of history, but about other people’s needs, desires, 
feelings, and reactions. 
It occurs to me now that before I came to doubt everything I was taught 
a set of rival theories, invented or discovered by the great philosophers 
of the past. These included Utilitarianism, Kantianism, and Virtue Theory. 
Embedded in their more general accounts of human nature and moral 
motivation were certain implied tests for evaluating proposed or completed 
courses of action to determine their status as morally permissible, forbidden 
(insofar as it is physically possible to do what is morally forbidden), 
obligatory, good, wrong, etc. These tests appeared to be constructed more 
or less as follows. 
1)    Utilitarianism: Contemplate the situation facing you and consider how 
you could act. Would one possible course of action serve better than 
another to increase the total amount of happiness or well-being in the 
world, or to decrease the total amount of pain and frustration? If you 
have already acted, ask yourself what the consequences of your action 
were in this regard. 
2)    Kantianism: Contemplate your situation and consider how you could 
act. Review the various possibilities, asking of each alternative course of 
action: What would it be like if everyone did this in the same situation? 
Could I coherently will that everyone act in this way in this situation? 
If you have already acted, ask yourself whether your action could have 
been so willed. 
3)    Virtue Theory: Contemplate your situation and consider how you could 
act or what you did. Does or did a particular course of action exemplify 
a virtue, such as truthfulness, fidelity, generosity, temperance, mercy, 
or kindness? Does or did it exemplify a vice such as greed, lust, cruelty, 
dishonesty, injustice?
Each of these proposed tests divides proposed and completed actions into 
distinct evaluative categories. Utilitarianism (of which there are many 
subspecies) says that actions that increase the amount of happiness or well-
being in the world are morally good and ought to be performed, whilst 
those that increase the amount of pain and frustration in the world are 
morally bad and should be eschewed.21 Kantianism says that actions that 
cannot be universalised are forbidden.22 Actions whose opposites cannot 
be universalised are obligatory. Virtue theory says to practice virtue and 
avoid vice. It is conceivable that applying one of these procedures will lead 
me to all and only moral truths. But how could I possibly come to know 
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that one or the other of these procedures—or some version of one or the 
other—is capable of delivering all and only moral truths if I cannot identify 
the moral truths in the first place? And if I can know which are the moral 
truths independently of using the theories, why should I be interested in 
the theories? If the theory conflicts with my own judgement about what I 
should or may do, directing me, for example, to torture an innocent person 
to produce a great social benefit, does that mean my judgement was wrong? 
Or does it indicate that there is something wrong with the theory?23
In fact, there is remarkable convergence amongst the three major classes 
of moral theory and a good fit with my own spontaneous judgements. 
The agents in cases 1–7 above all seem to manifest vices, and the agents in 
cases 8–14, virtues. Kantianism also seems to condemn the actions in cases 
1–7 as wrong, for I would not judge it permissible for agents to behave 
in this way whenever they felt like it. Conversely, I would welcome the 
universalisation of the behaviour described in cases 8–14. The Utilitarian 
evaluation also matches the results of the others. In 1–7, the happiness or 
well-being of Person 1 is less than the suffering endured by Person 2. In 
8–14, there is a small burden to the agent, Person 1, outweighed by a great 
benefit to Person 2. Insofar as all three theories agree with one another 
and are in conformity with my spontaneous judgements, I am disposed to 
regard my own judgements as secure and the theories as good normative 
theories. 
There is a problem, however, with taking these good fits as conclusive 
evidence for the reliability of my judgements and the excellence of the 
moral theories. In astronomy, a good theory accounts for the observed 
and recorded motions of the celestial bodies and predicts future celestial 
appearances better than its rivals do. The theory in this case is said to be 
‘empirically adequate.’ If a moral theory were like a scientific theory in 
this regard, it would prove its worth not only by agreeing with previous 
‘observations’ such as those just cited, but by predicting new observations—
my assent or dissent from various proposals about the moral qualities of my 
targets of appraisal. But I can see that this proposal will not vindicate the 
choice of a theory that gives the right answers to moral questions. Rather it 
will vindicate the choice of a theory that accurately captures and predicts 
my judgements about right and wrong. It will be empirically adequate as 
a theory of my Normative Kit, but not as a theory of Moral Reality. Isn’t 
it possible after all both that my spontaneous judgements are wrong and 
that the theories that predict them are inadequate? Maybe the behaviour 
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described in 1–7 is really morally good and the behaviour in 8–14 is really 
morally objectionable? 
If a sceptic were to make this objection to me, I would be baffled. I 
would want to know what this sceptic could possibly mean by their claim 
that these moral judgements of mine are possibly upside down. In what 
sort of world could the agents in 8–14 be virtuous and those in 1–7 vicious? 
I should admit, however, that by adding certain embellishments to the 
situations as they were sketched, the moral status of the actions described 
would appear to me differently. I might not judge it wrong for a starving 
employee to filch money from the exploitative boss’s desk. If the moral 
theories back me up on this, this should increase my confidence in them as 
well as in my own judgement. If, however, my judgement is at odds with 
them all, I shall face a dilemma without a formal solution. I must either 
admit that my judgement was wrong or declare the theories inadequate. 
Further, despite their remarkable convergence on many cases, the three 
major moral theories can conflict in their pronouncements. A truthful, hence 
‘virtuous’ declaration might add to the quantity of misery in the world. It 
would accordingly be proscribed by the Utilitarian. A Virtue Theorist would 
protest that many actions which produce more happiness than misery are 
morally wrong, such as cutting up one healthy person to transplant her 
organs into five sick people to save their lives—virtuous doctors do not do 
this. Which theory should I be led by, Utilitarianism or Virtue Theory? Or 
suppose I am wondering: ‘May I lie to my mother to protect my brother?’ If 
the Utilitarian answers ‘Yes!—you may, provided the happiness produced 
by your doing so outweighs the distress,’ but the Kantian answers ‘No!—
you could not will consistently that lies can be told whenever they spare a 
person distress,’ what shall I do? The Virtue Theorist can only tell me that 
there is no unique answer, that I can exemplify the virtue of truthfulness or 
the virtue of kindness in this situation, but not both. 
I conclude that none of the traditional theories can be regarded either 
as descriptive of Moral Reality in the way that Copernican astronomy is 
descriptive of our solar system, nor as offering the correct decision procedure 
for doing the right thing and avoiding doing the wrong thing. Rather, I 
should see each of them as a heuristic device that focuses my attention in 
a slightly different way on the costs to Person 2 of any proposed action by 
Person 1. When faced with a moral question, I need to adopt the Perspective 
of Person 2, the person who stands to suffer most for a proposed action. Is 
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it reasonable for this person to accept what is going to be done to them? 
Would they regard the benefit to Person 1 as justifying their own burden?24 
I think this consideration can even block the extreme Utilitarian proposal 
to cut up one healthy person to save five terminal patients. Although the 
sacrifice is a great benefit to each of the five, it is unlikely that any one of 
them would agree that it would be reasonable for them to give up their life 
if they were healthy. It is reasonable to conclude that no healthy person is 
obliged to give up his life to save five terminally ill people. 
As better prudential decisions reflect better knowledge and more 
appropriate concerns, so better moral decisions seem to reflect better 
epistemic and emotional conditions of decision-making. To engage in 
moral theorising is to evaluate critically the ‘oughts’ and norms that stem 
from other cultural sources of normativity, including prudence or self-
interest, manners, custom, and conventions. As prudence requires me to 
learn more than I perhaps know now about the long-term consequences of 
various courses of action and to care more about certain things than I do 
now, so does morality. Moral progress, the growth of moral knowledge, 
depends on this process of expansion of factual knowledge, including an 
understanding of other people’s lives and experiences, and an extension of 
concern. 
To help to determine whether I care enough about the things I ought 
to care about it strikes me that it is important to attend to the grievances 
of others. My own reaction to moral injury—to being lied to, betrayed, 
abandoned, or exploited—is to complain of mistreatment, brooding over 
my grievance and announcing it to others, seeking acknowledgement of 
the wrong and an apology or compensation from the perceived offender, or 
even attempting to retaliate by harming my persecutor. Moral injury may 
also pertain to a group. ‘We’ may then voice our discontent or outrage, seek 
acknowledgement and compensation and perhaps revenge. We may seek 
to recruit allies to help us to press our moral grievance against the perceived 
offender. Since ancient times, there have been slave rebellions and sailors’ 
mutinies, sex strikes, presentation of petitions, public demonstrations and 
riots in the street, picketing and work stoppage by unions, and other forms 
of collective action by persons who believed themselves to be victims of 
moral harm. Such complaint and protest situations are invitations to 
observers to consider or reconsider their existing values. At the same 
time, I have to recognise that the grievances of the complainers are not 
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always sincere and justified, and conversely that many people suffer moral 
indignities and wrongs silently, either because they are afraid to protest or 
because they do not realise that they are being mistreated.25
The history of civilisation, as I reflected on it at the beginning of this 
enquiry, presented me with numerous examples of interactions between 
Person 1 and Person or Persons 2 that, knowing what we know now 
about people and how the world works, can confidently be judged to be 
wrong. Slavery, routine torture, imprisonment without trial, lynching, 
the abandonment of infants, the exclusion of women from the honourable 
professions, and the exploitation of wage labour are practices that I can 
now declare I know to be wrong. The fact that others have come to know 
these things as well has shaped some of the laws, institutions, and practices 
of the contemporary world. 
In declaring that I know certain moral truths, by making claims about 
slavery, torture, corruption, deception, warfare, exploitation, and so on, I 
express the conviction that I have made the relevant factual investigations 
and critically examined my preferences. At the same time, I am loathe to 
fall into the sort of moral dogmatism that can encourage scepticism. There 
are many issues about which I am inclined to think one way or the other 
but I would not claim to know what is right and ought to be done. Are 
late second-trimester abortions morally permissible? Here I feel unable to 
determine what is the best compromise between the interests of a pregnant 
woman and the interests we ascribe to the foetus—what’s good for it. 
Either one may be seen as Person 1 deriving a benefit at too great a cost 
to Person 2. And what if I expand my definition of morality to encompass 
relations not just between persons, but between persons and animals? 
Should animals, as it were, have to accept that they are reasonable prey 
for humans, or should humans renounce the benefits of meat-eating to 
eliminate animal suffering? Perhaps a more thorough understanding of 
what it is like to be a fearful pregnant woman, or a foetus, or an animal, or 
a naturally carnivorous human will make it clear eventually what we ought 
to do about abortion and meat-eating. 
Some moral realists believe that there is a uniquely correct answer to all 
moral questions whether or not we will ever come to know it. This seems 
to me deeply implausible. There may simply be no fact of the matter, no 
moral truth to be discovered. Sometimes I can see that something ought not 
to be done—some institution or practice ought not to exist—whilst having 
no clear idea what ought to be done instead. I can recognise a badly run 
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prison system or poor end-of-life policies, but positive knowledge eludes 
me: I do not know how to organise a prison system in the way in which I 
know how to ride a bike, or how best to manage intractable end of life pain 
and desperation in the way in which I know how to bake a cake. I do not 
even know the conditions under which it is morally acceptable to tell a lie 
or for one person to kill another. Perhaps someone else does know how to 
design a morally acceptable prison system or manage end of life difficulties 
in a morally good way? That is possible—but it is also possible that no 
one knows these things, and even that no one knows when it is morally 
acceptable to tell a lie or for one person to kill another. I am still uncertain 
whether they can be known. 
In claiming to know (when I do claim this) the wrongness and rightness 
of actions, situations, events, and the moral qualities of persons, I think I am 
committed to the position that no further information—about people, their 
feelings, or how the world works—that I could gain, nor any correction 
in the scope and intensity of my caring about things, will cause me to 
reverse my judgement. But isn’t it always theoretically possible that better 
information and more appropriate levels and kinds of concern would cause 
me to retract my judgement? I admit that this is so, yet we are entitled 
to make some knowledge claims even without being certain what the 
future will bring. I know that iron rusts in the presence of oxygen, and I 
am convinced that future experiences and experiments will never overturn 
this judgement. At the same time, I admit that it is conceivable that I and 
many other people are deceived about this: it is logically possible that some 
undiscovered element that is always bound to oxygen causes iron to rust. 
I am further persuaded that, just as there is more scientific understanding 
in the world now than in 300 BCE, there is more moral knowledge as well. 
This is not to say that each individual in the world has more of each. Nor 
is it to say that the number of scientifically or morally false beliefs held by 
human beings all over the world has declined. The number of false beliefs 
in individual minds may actually have increased with the tremendous 
increase in population and with the spread of communications. Rather, to 
say that ‘we’ now know more than we did is to say that as a result of the 
active pursuit of scientific knowledge and moral understanding, those who 
have made the effort have been successful. As the world has been shaped 
and changed by the increase in scientific knowledge and technological 
expertise, it has also been changed by the increase in moral knowledge, 
some of which has been acquired through improvements in knowledge 
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and values prompted by rebellion and expressions of resentment,26 some of 
which through ‘experiments of living’27 that have either worked out well or 
have failed. This is not to say that less moral wrong overall is perpetrated 
now than in the past, or that the number of wrong or abhorrent moral views 
held by individuals has diminished. New wrongs arise as old wrongs are 
righted. Nevertheless, many grievous wrongs have been righted to some 
extent, many others are in the process of being righted, and many others 
that have not yet appeared may one day be recognised as wrongs and 
righted. 
Earlier I wondered whether there was any role for moral experts. A 
moral expert of the most expert sort would be a person who would know 
the solution to any moral dilemma and whose judgements of character, 
of right and wrong, of what is permissible, forbidden, and obligatory not 
only could be absolutely relied on, but ought to be absolutely relied on. 
Could any human being really fulfil this role? Maybe not. At the same time, 
I accept it that there can be good and bad advice in matters of prudence 
from those whose predictive abilities and knowledge of likely outcomes are 
well developed. So why not suppose that there can be good and bad moral 
advice from people whose understanding of the biases of judgement, the 
conditions of life, and responses to them of persons involved in morally 
significant relationships are richer than mine? Their ability to imagine 
possible ways of restructuring those relationships in better ways would 
render their pronouncements superior to mine. They ought accordingly to 
be preferred by me to my own initial judgements, and I should investigate 
thoroughly the reasonings and opinions of those who appear to have 
thought most deeply about these matters. But it is hard to distinguish such 
persons from others who are quick to give advice and opinions, and in the 
end relying on my own considered judgement is the best way forward I 
can think of. 
Summary
The Enquirer summarises the results of their investigation 
Perturbed by the amount of moral uncertainty and disagreement in the 
world, the variety of practices that people accept or reject as morally 
proper, and puzzled by my own indecision on important moral questions, 
I decided to doubt what common sense had up to now appeared to tell 
me: that there were such things as good actions and evil intentions, virtue 
and vice, moral obligations and permissions, and that actions, situations, 
events, and persons could have moral qualities. I decided to make a clean 
break from the view that morality was anything real.
First, I tried out the hypothesis that nothing is really right or wrong, 
better or worse than anything else, and that I was under the illusion that 
actions, events situations and persons possessed such properties as being 
‘evil,’ or ‘morally heroic,’ or ‘morally forbidden’ or ‘morally permissible.’ 
To enable me to entertain this supposition, I supposed that all evaluative 
properties are illusory. I supposed that menu items are not really ‘delicious’ 
and crocodiles are not really ‘dangerous,’ and that I only experience them 
as such because of my cerebral wiring and the beliefs and preferences 
impressed on me through my culture. I reminded myself that the deepest 
theories of the world that we possess—physics and chemistry—do not 
contain value judgements or terms that connote values. 
However, I came to realise that I do not live amongst and experience the 
particles and forces of physics and chemistry, and that the world I live in 
unavoidably presents itself to me as value-laden. I realised that although 
I could at times adopt an entirely detached perspective in which neither 
tragedies nor happy surprises mattered, I could not do so over the longer 
term or as a way of life. The possibility of purging my language, not only 
of value terms like ‘good,’ ‘right,’ and ‘obligatory,’ but also terms with 
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connotations of value like ‘film-star’ and ‘criminal’ seemed remote. Most of 
my ordinary vocabulary would have had to go.
I then imagined a population of Destroyers of Illusion who had purified 
their discourse by interpreting all value-laden terms as reflecting the 
speaker’s likings and dislikings, rather than as reflecting the properties of 
evaluated things. The Destroyers appeared to have satisfactory paraphrases 
for all the sorts of evaluative statements I am in the habit of making. When 
I said something was right or good, they translated this to mean that I said 
that I liked it, and when I said something was wrong or evil, they translated 
this to mean that I said that I disliked it. 
Next, I determined that, even if the paraphrases of the Destroyers 
might be good translations of what I really mean in making evaluative 
judgements, this did not impact on my claim to know certain evaluative 
facts. I could after all know something about what is good and bad. The 
Destroyers could not convince me that I did not know that my existence was 
better than my nonexistence. Indeed, they could not convince me that I did 
not know certain things about what was in my self-interest and what was 
in the self-interest of other people. I determined, however, that knowledge 
about what it was in my own self-interest to do or to refrain from doing, 
and what it was in other people’s self-interest to do or refrain from doing, 
was often hard to come by. Making good decisions about self-interest often 
depends on acquiring as much relevant factual information as possible 
about the self involved and its particular situation, and about what usually 
happens. It seemed that the best thing for me to do in my own self-interest 
on various occasions was what I would be motivated to do if I knew what 
I ought to know and cared about what I ought to care about, and that the 
same was true in the case of other people. For me to know how to advance 
my self-interest on a given occasion, I have to know as much as I need 
to in order to make a decision and I have to care sufficiently about the 
right things. But of course the claim that I know and care enough on any 
given occasion is itself a value judgement. It is hard to see how I could 
know that claim to be true. Nevertheless, the observation that the truth of a 
knowledge-claim about values implies the truth of these other claims gives 
me an incentive to seek information and to reflect critically. 
I then went on to consider several ways in which people can interact 
with one another. I noted that I have firm expectations about the ‘right way’ 
and ‘the wrong way’ to behave in certain social situations according to the 
conventions of good manners, ordinary friendliness and decent behaviour. 
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To some extent, then, I and others seem to know ‘how to behave.’ I then 
speculated on the possible motives for conforming or refusing to conform 
to the conventions of ‘good manners.’ I decided that a person might often 
be motivated to deviate from conventions they knew about and that 
they might sometimes even have a good reason for deviating from these 
conventions. I decided that there were nevertheless good reasons to observe 
these conventions most of the time; it was usually in my own self-interest 
to do so. Hermits, by contrast—whether happy or unhappy—might have 
neither reasons nor motives to observe what I called the Norms of Civility.
I went on to try to determine how morality was both similar to and 
different from manners. Both manners and morals, I could see, involve 
relationships between two people or between one person or group and 
others. In ‘civil encounters,’ people confront one another in such roles 
as Host and Guest, or Strangers on a plane, or as tourist and native. In 
‘moral encounters,’ people confront one other in such roles as spouses, 
friends, officials and constituents, parents and children, employers and 
employees. I determined that morality is nevertheless somewhat different 
from manners in several ways. First, morality seems at least sometimes to 
call for greater sacrifices than mannerly behaviour and to involve greater 
asymmetry between the moral agent and the person or people whose 
well-being they affect. Second, morality presents me with dilemmas that 
manners ordinarily do not. Third, morality does not seem to be a matter 
of local conventions; if people in a faraway culture want to eat with their 
fingers or slurp their soup noisily, I think it’s ‘up to them’ in a way it’s not 
‘up to them’ if they want to marry off ten-year-old girls.
I then considered some explanation of how we human beings might have 
naturally evolved a disposition to sacrifice for the good of others. It was not 
difficult to explain these dispositions by considering the natural history 
of the species and its ancestors. Apes and monkeys engage in altruistic 
behaviour and seem concerned with fairness and reciprocity as do some 
other animals. I concluded that there is a biological platform for morality 
that is a requisite of the social life of the species and its perpetuation.
It occurred to me at that point that I had never settled the question 
whether the paraphrases of the Destroyers were adequate, so I returned to 
a direct consideration of that question. I realised that even if the Destroyers 
were right to suppose that the qualities of goodness and badness could 
not inhere in any target of moral appraisal, and even if their paraphrases 
in terms of ‘likings’ and ‘dislikings’ captured something of the meaning 
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of moral claims when they were asserted, this still left me with the task of 
determining what actions, events, situations, and persons I ought to like 
and dislike. Should I like vegetarianism? Should I dislike torture under any 
conditions?
Answering these questions for myself to the extent that I could, did not 
involve consulting my inner experience or learning about anyone else’s 
inner experience. I was never in any doubt that many of the things other 
people ‘like’ to do—persecute people of particular racial or ethnic groups, 
beat up homosexuals, marry off very young girls—were disliked by me, 
and that I disliked the fact that others liked them. This discrepancy in our 
feelings seemed to indicate that I or they ought perhaps to have different 
feelings. To determine whether I ought to be indifferent to or dislike other 
people’s likings and dislikings seemed to require an investigation of the 
institutions themselves and the reasons for liking or disliking them. I would 
have to do some actual investigation of the practices and implications of 
vegetarianism and torture.
Returning to the question of the sacrifices that seem to be essentially 
involved in morality, I tried to determine why people might be motivated 
to make them or have reason to make them. It occurred to me that even 
acting in one’s own self-interest, acting prudently, can involve sacrifices, 
namely the sacrifice of present enjoyments and comforts for one’s Future 
Self. I decided that we have some natural incentive to be concerned with 
the welfare of our Future Selves, and also some natural incentive to be 
concerned with our kith and kin—our Extended Selves. I acknowledged 
nevertheless that some people do not care about anything except their 
own well-being at the present moment. It might be possible to motivate 
them by giving them incentives—by pointing out to them that they can 
avoid regret or punishment by sacrificing their short-term advantages in 
favour of another person. Or they might be motivated by being assured of 
reciprocity by others, or their esteem, or even by the prospect of achieving 
moral nobility or ‘honour.’ But I could find no contradiction in supposing 
that a person might be unmoved to care about their Future Self or their 
Extended Self by all arguments and considerations. Only this would be 
an unusual sort of person, and he or she would likely find themselves in 
somewhat poor condition and socially isolated.
A more difficult question was why I might be motivated to make 
sacrifices involving my present well-being on behalf of strangers. I noted 
that many human institutions, such as hospitals, police forces, and benefits 
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bureaus exist in large societies of strangers. As individuals, we do have 
some instinctive concern for Strangers and are not only mannerly towards 
them but sometimes make large sacrifices on their behalf, as I noted at the 
start of my Enquiry. By and large, however, my concern for Strangers is 
weaker than the concern for my Future and Extended Selves. The incentives 
that might move a person to be less concerned with the present, or less 
selfish with regard to family and friends, such as avoidance of regret and 
avoidance of punishment, or the expectation of reciprocity, seemed to be 
minimal or lacking altogether. 
I recognised that I might nevertheless be moved by the consideration 
that it is noble or honourable to be concerned with the well-being of 
Strangers, and by the reason that my enjoyments and my well-being are no 
more important in the grand scheme of things than theirs. 
Then the question arose: how much ought I to sacrifice for the good of 
people I do not personally know? I had realised earlier that there is sometimes 
a good answer, but often no unique ‘right answer,’ to the question, ‘What is 
it now in my self-interest to do?’ I understood that the answers to questions 
about prudential ‘oughts’ are better the more they reflect my knowing what 
I ought to know and caring about what I ought to care about. I have reason 
to expect that the same is true of questions about what I ought to do in 
morally problematic situations regarding other people. My decisions will 
be better if I know what I ought to know and care about what I ought to. 
But—alas!—I can never be certain that I am in either condition. My claims 
to know what it is right to do are conjectural. Indeed there may be no fact of 
the matter as to how much I should sacrifice for my Future Self, or my kith 
and kin, or a Stranger, or how much I ought to require them to sacrifice for 
me. However, I determined that I could increase my chances of avoiding 
moral error by increasing my understanding of the world and people and 
by becoming aware of my own biases and irrationalities.
This led me to consider briefly the role of the traditional moral theories 
Utilitarianism, Kantianism and Virtue Theory. I could see the point of each 
of these theories: Utilitarianism directed my attention to the painful or 
pleasurable, welfare-reducing or -enhancing effects of actions on policies 
on everyone affected by them; Kantianism reminded me not to try to make 
exceptions for myself that I wouldn’t grant to others; and Virtue Theory 
provided an easy-to-remember list of Person 1 traits that helped to assure 
good interactions with Person 2. I decided that employing these theories 
was helpful in reducing the chances of moral error, though no theory could 
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be depended on always to give the right answer to the question of what 
should be done. I concluded finally that there has been moral progress as 
moral errors have been revealed and corrected since the time when the 
study of morality originated. 
Discovering how I am linked to the world as a competent, self-interested 
being, a being who is at the same time a member of a sociable species, 
has given me insight into the origins of my moral feelings and opinions. 
I realise that I am descended from a long line of ancestors who survived 
and reproduced themselves because their beliefs and desires enabled them 
more successfully to find what they needed and to escape dangers. They 
must have evolved motivations, perceptions, and responses to frequently-
encountered situations that preserved their lives and attracted the trust, 
co-operation, and assistance of others. So along with selfish tendencies 
in myself, it is no surprise that I find benevolent ones. My ‘knowledge’ 
that kindness and sincerity are virtues, and my motivation to be kind and 
sincere in certain situations, are, in this regard, rather like my knowledge 
that certain fruits are edible and my motivation to eat those fruits. The 
virtues might be said to lie within us, as our dietary tastes do. But mine 
cannot fully develop unless I grow up in a culture that points out to me the 
edible and the poisonous fruits and that punishes cruelty and lying and 
encourages the virtues of kindness and truthfulness. 
Social learning accordingly plays a role in my identifying new edible 
fruits and in refining my motivations, so that I avoid the dangerous ones 
and develop a taste for the more salutary ones. Fortunately, along with 
tastes and inclinations, I have inherited certain evolved mechanisms for 
learning, for translating the raw data of experience into knowledge of an 
external world and its properties. Perhaps these learning-mechanisms 
fail at times, but they must at least have been good enough to enable my 
ancestors in competition with slightly differently endowed members of 
their species to produce me.
When I began my sceptical enquiry, I regarded my Neurological 
Constitution and Cultural Transmission as obstacles to obtaining moral 
knowledge, but my perspective has shifted. I can now appreciate how 
the norms I think of as general and fundamental—such as the norms 
of truthfulness and nonaggression—may correspond to inherited 
predispositions with a neurological basis, such that normally, I am inclined 
to speak the truth to others, and that normally, I am not as irritable as 
chimpanzees are and do not attack my fellow humans with the same 
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vehemence I have observed in other primates. And where I first tended to 
think of Cultural Transmission as imposing arbitrary and often irrational 
and unnatural norms of behaviour on the members of various cultures, 
it now occurs to me that Cultural Transmission can also preserve and 
disseminate knowledge as it is won by me and by others over time. 
I conclude that my initial pessimism in the face of the multiplicity of 
moral beliefs and cultural practices in the world was unjustified. I am no 
longer inclined to suppose that there is nothing at all to choose between 
various cultural practices and that all moral convictions are merely personal 
beliefs, with no one’s Normative Kit better or worse than anyone else’s. 
Where manners are concerned, I think my motto ought to be ‘When in 
Rome, do as the Romans.’ I ought to master the Guest-Host conventions 
of whatever milieu I inhabit, recognizing the differences as well as the 
similarities between China and Rome and between Rome and New York. 
I ought to behave as a Host or Guest as others in my culture behave and 
in accordance with the norms just enunciated unless there is reason to do 
otherwise. I cannot translate this recommendation into morals, however. It 
seems to imply that if I had lived in ancient Rome, I ought to have acquired 
slaves, flogged them when they disobeyed, and cheered at gladiatorial 
shows—these being the norms of my culture. It seems to imply that the 
attitudes, emotions, and practices of Greek slaveholders and Roman circus-
goers were those I ought to have had in that context. It seems to imply that 
I should learn and accept the morality of my culture. Now that I appreciate 
that moral norms may reflect ignorance of the facts or unreasonable biases, 
I see no need to regard all practices as equally good and defensible, though 
how much I ought to interfere with established practices is itself a moral 
question. 
Finally I considered the possibility that there are moral experts who 
possess more moral knowledge than most people do, thanks to their 
extensive knowledge of human life and their appropriate levels of concern. 
Insofar as expert advice is available on many topics—how to cook well, 
how to travel safely and inexpensively—expert advice on how to treat 
other people in morally significant situations is probably available as well. 
But as it is difficult to identify the experts and as they often disagree with 
one another, I concluded that I was right to conduct my own reasonings, 
taking into account those who had long meditated on particular moral 
problems, and to try to reach expert status on the particular questions that 
I faced by myself. 
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